Nietzsche and Eudaemonism

Edward Harcourt
Keble College, Oxford OX1 3PG
01865 272741
e-mail: edward.harcourt@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

[T]here is a great deal in [Nietzsche] that must be dismissed as merely megalomaniac. … He condemns Christian love because he thinks it is an outcome of fear … It does not occur to [him] as possible that a man should genuinely feel universal love, obviously because he himself feels almost universal hatred and fear, which he would fain disguise as lordly indifference. His ‘noble’ man - who is himself in day-dreams - is a being wholly devoid of sympathy, ruthless, cunning, cruel, concerned only with his own power. King Lear, on the verge of madness, says:

I will do such things –
What they are yet I know not - but they shall be
The terror of the earth.
This is Nietzsche’s philosophy in a nutshell.i

Thus, notoriously, Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy, and for a long time mainstream analytic philosophy had little more to say for Nietzsche as a moral philosopher than Russell did. More recently, however, Nietzsche’s ethics has begun to be rehabilitated, an effect due in no small measure to the neo-Aristotelian movement. For both Nietzsche and the neo-Aristotelians call not only for a rejection of a Judaeo-Christian (or crypto-Judaeo-Christian) ‘law conception’ of ethics but also for a new approach to ethical issues in which the central question is not ‘what makes an action the morally right one?’ but rather ‘what sort of life would be good for us, given the sorts of creatures that we are?’ – an approach, that is, in which the idea of the good life for man occupies centre-stage.

The identification of this common ground between Nietzsche and the neo-Aristotelians may, however, come at a price. If Nietzsche just says the same thing as the neo-Aristotelians, as certain recent readings have suggested, this is an interesting exegetical observation but with so many neo-Aristotelians already on the philosophical curriculum, why is there any special need to read Nietzsche? Domesticating Nietzsche as
a neo-Aristotelian rescues him from the dustbin to which he was consigned by earlier interpretations portraying him as a megalomaniac or champion of evil, but carries the danger that his distinctive voice in the history of ethics will not be heard. This paper attempts to tread a path between an optimistic neo-Aristotelian reading, which makes Nietzsche sound sensible but in no way distinctive, and ‘immoralistic’ readings (as in Russell’s History and, more recently, in Philippa Foot) which make him genuinely radical but at the same time worthy only of dismissal.

1. My strategy will be to compare Nietzsche’s critique of the value of the ‘morality of pity’ with neo-Aristotelian critiques of the ‘law conception’ of ethics (Anscombe), ‘morality in the narrow sense’ (Wollheim), or the ‘morality system’ (Williams), both with respect to what they oppose and with respect to what they aim to put in its place.

First of all, terminology. I don’t want to suggest that these four terms – the ‘morality of pity’, ‘morality in the narrow sense’ etc. - all pick out precisely the same sets of ideas, but a bit of imprecision here will, I think, do no harm. Anscombe, Wollheim and Williams all have in mind, at the very least, a conception of practical thought in which a privileged position is occupied by concepts of moral requirement, prohibition and (perhaps) permission. Simple act-utilitarianism is an example: not only are questions about rights, for example, or about particular virtues, resolvable into questions about moral rightness and wrongness (as decided by an act-utilitarian test), but because there is always a single utility-maximizing course of action (unless there’s a tie), the only practical question an agent can ever be faced with is the question of what he is morally required to do. So there’s no room here even for permission: every practical question is a
question about one’s moral duty. We need a word for this version of practical thought, so let’s call it ‘morality in the narrow sense’ – Wollheim’s term, though I do not by this choice intend to give any special favour to Wollheim’s characterization of it.

I want to draw attention, for the moment, to just two neo-Aristotelian objections to morality in the narrow sense. The first is that it has the structure of a legal system and without an accepted supreme legislator this structure is empty: what appear to be laws in fact make no genuine claims on us. Michael Tanner nicely illustrates the Nietzschean credentials of this first objection when commenting on the many points of contact between Nietzsche’s call for a ‘critique of moral values’ in the light of the decline of Christian faith - ‘When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality from under one’s feet’ - and Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’:

The concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics [i.e. the law conception] which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. … To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed ... is required by divine law ... Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians . . . It is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten.

As Tanner says, ‘one is amazed again and again by the Nietzschean tone of this unwitting disciple’.

The second, quite different, objection is that a human life governed by morality in the narrow sense will, given the sorts of creatures we are, be less good for the person leading it than it might otherwise be – if we need a slogan here, it would be ‘morality in the narrow sense is bad for you’. Of the three broadly neo-Aristotelian writers I have
cited so far, perhaps it is Wollheim who articulates this objection most clearly. Morality, he says,

faces a challenge of remarkable gravity, [that it is] … in its origins and throughout our lives, simply a price that we pay … for relief from external fear. We are frightened in childhood, we interiorize the fear by substituting an internal [object, i.e. the superego] for an external object, we placate the internal representative of the fear by the sacrifice of instinctual gratification, the gain in tranquillity outweighs even the crippling loss of satisfaction, but the sacrifice has nothing independently to recommend it. Morality is an internalized Danegeld.viii

And though Wollheim thinks this challenge can in part be answered – the superego which governs by fear comes gradually to be replaced by something else – this something else is the Ego-Ideal, the internal representative not of morality in the narrow sense but of what Wollheim calls, in explicit contrast to it, ‘value’. So while our mature practical thought evolves beyond morality in the narrow sense and beyond the punitive superego, the challenge as addressed to morality in the narrow sense itself goes unanswered.

There are really several claims here that need to be disentangled. First there is the negative claim that morality in the narrow sense is bad for one. Secondly there is the positive claim that some modes of life in which morality in the narrow sense does not feature are better for one, and better for one because morality in the narrow sense does not feature there. And thirdly there is the further, implied positive claim that the central question in evaluating types of practical thought is the question under which type or types does humanity fare best. All have strong echoes in Nietzsche. ix

As regards the first, negative claim, there is Nietzsche’s claim that man, or ‘life’, fares worse under a morality of pity than it did before that morality took hold. x Here he is (from the Preface to On the Genealogy of Morals):
What was especially at stake was the value of the ‘unegoistic’, the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, which … became for [Schopenhauer] ‘value-in-itself’, on the basis of which he said No to life and to himself. But it was against precisely these instincts that there spoke from me an ever more fundamental mistrust, an ever more corrosive skepticism! It was precisely here that I saw the great danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction - but to what? to nothingness? - it was precisely here that I saw the beginning of the end, … the will turning against life …: I understood the ever spreading morality of pity that had seized even on philosophers and made them ill, as the most sinister symptom of a European culture that had itself become sinister, perhaps as its by-pass to a new Buddhism? to a Buddhism for Europeans? to – nihilism?

Or again, there is the following passage from Daybreak:

Has morality not … opened up such an abundance of sources of displeasure that one could say … that with every refinement of morals mankind has hitherto become more discontented with himself, with his neighbour and the lot of his existence? Did the hitherto most moral man not entertain the belief that the only justified condition of mankind in the face of morality was the profoundest misery?xi

As regards the second claim, there is Nietzsche’s portrait of the life led by ruling class men before the ‘slave revolt’ in morality took place:

The knightly-aristocratic value-judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity.

This is evidently intended as a portrait of human beings (or a sub-group of them) flourishing or doing well: according to the ‘aristocratic value-equation’, ‘good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy’. xii Conversely the inventors of slave-morality are, among other things, ill. Nietzsche’s critique of morality should be seen therefore as grounded not solely in the first objection (the emptiness of a law conception in the absence of belief in
a lawgiver) but also in the second: human beings flourish to the extent that their natural capacities are given the greatest possible room for expression, and ‘slave morality’ narrows this room disastrously. This brings me to the third claim, the more abstract of the two positive ones: ‘We … having opened our eyes and conscience to the question where and how the plant “man” has so far grown most vigorously to a height’ is just one phrase which betrays Nietzsche’s subscription to it, but his work is littered with evidence of it. But to hold that human beings flourish to the extent that their natural capacities are given the greatest possible room for expression is to be a eudaemonist. Nietzsche, therefore, is to be seen as a eudaemonist.

It is important to notice that these two lines of objection to morality in the narrow sense are independent of one another. Philosophers have certainly tried to combine support for morality in the narrow sense with what I’m calling eudaemonism, thus placing themselves in opposition to the second objection: Kant and Mill were, I take it, both (in different ways) supporters of morality in the narrow sense, and I read them both also as eudaemonists. (I think this is obvious in Mill’s case, and it should be obvious in Kant’s too, to anyone who reads Kant beyond the *Groundwork*, or indeed who reads section 1 of the *Groundwork* with their eyes open.) And if that combination of views is possible, there is no reason why to rejection of the second objection (thus motivated) one should not add acceptance of the first: acceptance, that is, that though a life governed by morality in the narrow sense would in fact be the life in which man flourishes the most were it unproblematically available, such a life could only be led at the cost of great insincerity and bad faith. What rejection of the second objection marks out as the best life for us acceptance of the first places beyond our reach. This position would make one a
pessimist, but not obviously inconsistent. Conversely one might hold that a life governed by morality in the narrow sense was bad for man (thus accepting the second objection) while finding no fault per se with Kant’s or Mill’s attempts to keep the ‘law’ structure together in the absence of a lawgiver (thus rejecting the first).xviii

Having established, pro tanto, the Nietzschean credentials of both these neo-Aristotelian objections to morality in the narrow sense – and without wishing to suggest that these are the only ones - I want for the rest of this paper to set the first objection aside in order to concentrate on the second. To some readers of Nietzsche, however, the very suggestion that Nietzsche was a eudaemonist may seem preposterous, and we need to say something in reply to this before going further.

One objection to the suggestion rests on Nietzsche’s frequent dismissive remarks about the value of ‘happiness’:

Whether it is hedonism or pessimism, utilitarianism or eudaemonism – all these ways of thinking that measure the value of things in accordance with pleasure and pain, … are ways of thinking … on which everyone conscious of creative powers and an artistic conscience will look down upon not without derision. … Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that makes man ridiculous and contemptible – that makes his destruction desirable.xix

But passages like this, central as they are to an understanding of Nietzsche, are no reason for dismissing the claim that he was a eudaemonist; and the passage itself, indeed, shows us why. To say that the extent of human flourishing is not to be measured in terms of pleasure or freedom from suffering – the ‘universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone’xx – is simply to make a point about what flourishing or eudaemonia is, not to say that the promotion of
flourishing, when correctly understood, is the wrong standard by which to evaluate types of practical thought. It would be a mere quibble to observe that ‘happiness’ often translates ‘eudaemonia’: Nietzsche’s hostility to the ideal of a life free of suffering shows not that he dismisses flourishing (or well-being or eudaemonia) as a value, but that he thinks ‘well-being as you understand it’ is not well-being.

Another objection is put by Simon May who, though agreeing that ‘flourishing is, for Nietzsche, the only unconditioned end in relation to which the worth of all values, ends, practices, and concepts is to be judged’, argues that this is ‘not Aristotelian’ because (1) ‘the class over which ‘potentiality’ ranges [in Aristotle] is the human species … whereas for Nietzsche it is the individual’, and (2) ‘for Nietzsche … the perfect and final actualisation of a clear and fixed potential is neither possible, nor knowable, nor should be sought’. As regards (2), I have no quarrel with this either as an interpretation of Nietzsche or as a genuine point of difference between Nietzsche and Aristotle. But its truth does not interfere with the classification of Nietzsche as a eudaemonist as I have explained the term. The reverse would be true, however, of (1) if (1) were correct. However, to read Nietzsche as denying that the relevant potentiality is species-specific renders problematic the great many passages in his work in which the good of the ‘species “man”’ is under discussion, such as e.g. (in Beyond Good and Evil alone) ‘the plant “man”’; ‘[religion] keeps the type “man” on a lower rung by preserving too much of what ought to perish’; ‘the moral imperative of nature which … is addressed [not] to the individual … but to peoples, races, ages, classes – but above all to the whole human animal, to man’; the ‘enhancement of the type “man”’; and so on. This is not to say that May is wrong to emphasize the importance of individual potentiality in Nietzsche,
but rather that (1) embodies a false opposition between individual and species potentiality: realizing the former, for any individual, is just one of countless different ways of realizing the latter, and unsurprisingly, there is no suggestion in Aristotle that every good life need be led in exactly the same way: even if every good life exemplifies the same virtues, it won’t consist – indeed could not possibly consist – of the same exemplifications of these virtues. xxiii

If Nietzsche is a eudaemonist, however, it is still very much an open question how close his version of eudaemonism was to that of Aristotle or his followers. The right way to measure the distance (if any) between Nietzsche and neo-Aristotelian critics of morality in the narrow sense is to ask which version of practical thought, according to each of them, is the one under which humanity does best.

2. How much space is there, then, between Nietzsche’s answers to the question which version of practical thought is the best one for us and the neo-Aristotelian one? The first thing to say, of course, is that there is no such thing as the neo-Aristotelian answer to that question: even if every neo-Aristotelian is, by definition, a eudaemonist in the sense I have explained, it is evident that neo-Aristotelian eudaemonism comes in a variety of different versions with different answers to that question to match.

Granted the independence of the two neo-Aristotelian objections to morality in the narrow sense which I sketched in the last section – that it is based on an empty ‘law conception’ of ethics, and that it is bad for human beings – it is at least possible for reflection on the version of practical thought under which man does best to lead us straight back to a life in which the only practical question is ‘which action is morally the
right one?’ or, slightly more complicatedly, in which the only virtue is the capacity to master impulse in the service of moral duty. That is, one can be a eudaemonist and subscribe to the ‘law conception’. There’s evidently no need to invoke Nietzsche’s supposed immoralism to demonstrate his distance from that sub-variety of neo-Aristotelian eudaemonism.

However, one-virtue virtue theories are probably the minority in contemporary virtue ethics. And once we move beyond those, the difference between Nietzsche and the neo-Aristotelians may be harder to discern without appealing to Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’. It has been suggested, for example, that in order to see that Nietzsche was not delivering ‘a sermon in praise of ruthlessness’ we need only see him as substituting for the narrow question ‘what ought I morally to do?’ the more broadly based question ‘how should I live?’ But this is the question of modern ‘virtue ethics’ par excellence. If Nietzsche’s alternative to morality in the narrow sense coincides with this neo-Aristotelian one, the charge of immoralism is avoided at the cost of a disappointing familiarity.

It’s an open question, I think, how far acknowledgement of a plurality of virtues really takes one from the primacy of questions of moral duty or therefore from the ‘law conception’: the various virtues might just be regarded as dispositions needed to enable us to discern and carry out our moral duty in different types of situation. But even supposing that it takes us quite far, the fact that Nietzsche and the pluralistic neo-Aristotelians both ask the same question does not imply that they both give it the same answer. The latter maintain, with Aristotle, that the supreme good for man is a certain kind of life in which the capacities with which we are distinctively endowed by nature are
most fully developed. This I take to be part of the lesson of the ‘harpist’ (or ‘flautist’) analogy in Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But of course Aristotle’s most famous—and independent—claim there is that ‘the good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue’.*xxviii* To claim that the best life for us is the life in which our natures are perfected is one thing (what I’ve called eudaemonism); to claim that the life in which our natures are perfected is also the life of virtue is another. (For the pluralist neo-Aristotelian this won’t typically mean resistance to contrary inclination, but something which could be said to express all the more completely the supremacy of moral over other considerations, viz. the idea that the mark of the virtuous disposition is the silencing of countervailing considerations.*xxix*) This stance is compatible with upholding the second objection to morality in the narrow sense: the reason morality in the narrow sense is bad for us is just that it is narrow, but once moral righteousness is supplanted by a sufficiently rich catalogue of virtues, the point is reversed – our ultimate satisfaction consists in leading the life of virtue. The ‘immoralistic’ passages alone would seem to make it clear that the (many-virtued) life of the pluralistic neo-Aristotelian can’t straightforwardly be Nietzsche’s answer to their common question. There is more than one way of expanding the catalogue of (supposed) human excellences which go with different conceptions of how one should live. However, merely identifying a logical gap between Nietzsche and pluralistic neo-Aristotelians doesn’t advance our overall project of helping Nietzsche to tread a path between (familiar) neo-Aristotelianism and (crazy) immoralism: it could still be that, even if Nietzsche doesn’t say the same as the neo-Aristotelians, the only reason he doesn’t is that he recommends badness instead of goodness.
In pursuit of that project I now want to make the two-cornered discussion between Nietzsche and the neo-Aristotelians explicitly three-cornered by introducing Aristotle himself as an independent voice. For there is the suspicion that the dominance of moral considerations in the good life as envisaged by both monistic and pluralistic neo-Aristotelians is due not to whatever they may share with Aristotle but to their post-Christian inheritance. Correspondingly, it may be that in Aristotle himself we will find the familiar equation of the good life for man with the life of virtue, but in combination with a sufficiently different catalogue of virtues to capture Nietzsche’s own version of eudaemonism.

3. An unpublished fragment of Nietzsche’s repeats, in an explicitly Aristotelian connection, the dismissive attitude we have already noted to ‘happiness’ as an end of life:

Happiness as the final goal of the individual life. Aristotle and everyone! Thus it is the dominance of the concept of purpose which has been the ruination of all previous moralities.xxx

But direct references in Nietzsche to Aristotle’s moral philosophy are few and far between, and it would be a mistake to infer from a passage such as this – even if it is not a one-off – that Nietzsche and Aristotle are poles apart.xxxi On the contrary, the reply to that inference is along the same lines as the reply to the other passages dismissing happiness: Nietzsche makes the mistake in interpreting Aristotle’s eudaemonism of assuming ‘eudaemonia’ means something like being contented or leading an enjoyable life. xxxii This would, in the context of Nietzsche’s conception of the good life for man, justify the dismissal; but an alternative reading of Aristotle in which eudaemonia is a
formal, superordinate goal - the name of what you’ve got when the substantive goals of life are attained - is also available.

As regards the substance of Aristotle’s conception of the good life for man, his unChristian conception of at least some virtues has often been noted. There’s no Aristotelian virtue corresponding to the Christian virtue of modesty (that is, modesty with respect to one’s own achievements etc., as opposed to sexual modesty): the vice of boastfulness is contrasted in Aristotle with the virtue of truthfulness and the opposing vice of understatement. Again in Christian or post-Christian accounts of friendship, selflessness tends to be to the fore, whereas Aristotle’s true friend may ‘sacrifice his own interest’ but in doing so he ‘assigns to himself what is most honourable and most truly good’, i.e. the honour in so doing. Aristotle regards ‘lack of proper ambition’ (aphilotimia) as a vice. And his virtues of magnificence (megaloprepeia) - as manifested for example in ‘objects of public-spirited ambition, e.g. … [making] a fine show by the provision of a chorus, or the maintenance of a warship, or even by entertaining the whole city at a banquet’ - and magnanimity (megalopsuchia), which is ‘concerned with honour on a grand scale’, may be thought to have a distinctly Nietzschean ring to them.

Might one not argue, then, that there is so much that is ‘knightly-aristocratic’ about Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues that there is after all no space between Aristotle and Nietzsche here? If this were right, it would open up a significant gap between Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians, and so between the latter and Nietzsche too. For

public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, pity
- qualities which, according to Nietzsche, the ‘herd man’ glorifies as ‘the real human virtues’ and through which he is ‘tame, peaceable and useful to the herd’ - certainly figure in various versions of the neo-Aristotelian catalogue, even if not in Aristotle’s own. But it would hardly help establish the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s voice in the history of ethics. Nor would it necessarily rescue Nietzsche from the contrasting accusation of simply recommending badness, since I take it that public spirit, benevolence etc. really are virtues: it would simply give him, in the shape of the historical Aristotle, an unexpected partner in crime.

However, matters are, I think, more complicated than this. First of all there is Nietzsche’s own verdict on the idea that ‘the virtuous man is the happiest man’, though the occasion of the verdict is (as it happens) Socrates rather than Aristotle. When Socrates went so far as to say this, the Greeks, according to Nietzsche did not believe their ears and fancied they heard something insane. For when he pictures the happiest man, every man of noble origin included in the picture the perfect ruthlessness and devilry of the tyrant who sacrifices everyone and everything to his arrogance and pleasure.

Though Nietzsche might be said to be campaigning against ‘morality in the narrow sense’ in the name of values he derives from the Greeks, these values are not – in his own estimation at least – to be credited to Aristotle, since Aristotle is such an untypical Greek: ‘[The Greeks’] myths and tragedies are a great deal wiser than the ethics of Plato and Aristotle’. Now it’s possible, of course, that Nietzsche’s claim that Aristotle’s ethics are an anomaly relative to Greek culture as a whole is based on the same misunderstanding of Aristotle as we identified in relation to Nietzsche’s (ill-grounded) dismissal of eudaemonia as an end. It’s in any case not the place to adjudicate that claim, as it is
irrelevant to the matter in hand. The most we can say is that even if Aristotle wasn’t untypically Greek, Nietzsche thought he was, and the reasons for his finding him so are reasons which, if genuine, would place Aristotle and his contemporary followers closer to each other than either is to Nietzsche.xlii

One or two other considerations give some substance to this idea. First there is the question of Aristotle’s own attitude towards magnanimity. What perhaps makes this virtue sound especially Nietzschean is the suggestion that it is open only to the rich and well-born: ‘people of high birth or great power are felt to deserve honour, because they are in a position of superiority’xliii and (deservingly) claiming honour in large quantities is a requirement of magnanimity. However Aristotle says that ‘in real truth only the good man ought to be honoured, but the possessor of both qualities [sc. goodness and high birth, wealth etc.] is felt to deserve additional honour’.xlv Some commentators have taken this to show that Aristotle has his tongue in his cheek when reporting the conventional portrait of the ‘great-souled’ man.xlv Secondly, even if the strong presence of ‘self’ in Aristotle’s virtues may bring him close to Nietzsche on the negative side – if Nietzsche were a follower of Aristotle it would explain why ‘these feelings of “for others”, “not for myself” … the whole morality of self-denial must be questioned and taken to court’xlvii – it does not get us very far with, for example, the issue of justice, unarguably an Aristotelian virtue and which includes among other things law-abidingness (enjoining e.g. temperate and patient conduct, or ‘anything which tends to produce or conserve the happiness … of a political association’)xlviii and distributive justice, involving the notion of equal shares.xlviii This seems in sharp contrast to Nietzsche’s ‘we hold it by no means desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth’.xliv
These considerations are, however, somewhat indecisive. But there is a far more decisive ground for setting Nietzsche apart from both Aristotle himself and from the neo-Aristotelians, namely their respective attitudes to internal conflict. Moreover it is Nietzsche’s attitude to internal conflict which gives us the best hope of ‘placing’ his most stubbornly ‘immoralistic’ passages in such a way as to free him from the dismissive readings such as Russell’s with which I began. It is to the subject of internal conflict that I turn in the next and final section.

4. The unity of the virtues is a theme in some, if not all, neo-Aristotelian writing. This is unarguably so in the ‘one virtue’ versions of this outlook, in which the materials for conflict are absent from the start;¹ but it is also the case in some pluralistic versions – as tentatively, for example, Foot in Virtues and Vices.²i Beyond (and independently of) the idea that the virtues cannot conflict, there is also the idea that if moral and non-moral considerations come into conflict then, in a fully virtuous person, it is the virtues that win out – and indeed win out without residue. I take this to be implicit in the ‘silencing’ idea - that perfect virtue manifests itself in the silencing of contrary impulses. Now of course Aristotle himself might be argued to include some things in his catalogue of the virtues that, relative to a Christian or post-Christian perspective, would count as non-moral (friendship perhaps, or proper ambition). So his emphasis on the unity of the virtues yields a different content to the good life than is yielded by either monistic or pluralistic neo-Aristotelianism, and thanks to the inclusion of non-moral goods within his catalogue of excellences, he could be said to leave more room for non-moral goods in the good life for man than his contemporary followers. Nonetheless, allowing for these differences in
content, the idea that the good life for man – eudaemonia – consists in the harmonious integration of a person’s ends is present in Aristotle and neo-Aristotelians alike.

The idea that the good life for man consists in the harmonization of ends – either moral ends at the expense of all others, or of moral and non-moral ones – is notably absent, however, from Nietzsche’s thought: conflict both among moral ends and between moral and non-moral ones is not only envisaged but indeed celebrated. The following passage is worth quoting at some length:

In an age of disintegration … human beings have in their bodies the heritage of multiple origins, that is, opposite, and often not merely opposite, drives and value standards that fight each other and rarely permit each other any rest. Such human beings … will on the average be weaker human beings: their most profound desire is that the war they are should come to an end. Happiness appears to them … pre-eminently as the happiness of resting, of not being disturbed, of satiety, of finally attained unity … . But when the opposition and war in such a nature have the effect of one more charm and incentive of life – and if, moreover, in addition to his powerful and irreconcilable drives, a real mastery and subtlety in waging war against oneself, in other words, self-control, self-outwitting, has been inherited or cultivated, too – then those magical, incomprehensible, and unfathomable ones arise, those enigmatic men predestined for victory and seduction, whose most beautiful expression is found in Alcibiades and Caesar ….

Here the theme of Nietzsche’s familiar opposition to ‘happiness’ as an ideal is recapitulated but also developed: at the core of Nietzsche’s disdain for it is not, or not only, the fact that happiness involves the abolition of suffering, but the fact that it involves the abolition of internal conflict. Unlike suffering, which is (for Nietzsche) a necessary condition of the ‘enhancement of the species “man”’, internal conflict – as the ‘Alcibiades’ passage reveals – is constitutive of it, a component rather than a mere enabler. However many ‘selfish’ or non-moral excellences of character one adds to the
Aristotelian catalogue of virtues the contrast between Nietzsche’s and Aristotle’s conception of the good life, and therefore between their versions of eudaemonism, is not going to go away, since the harmonization of ends is an integral feature of Aristotelian eudaemonia.

Before bringing this picture of Nietzsche’s conception of the good life into connection with his alleged ‘immoralism’, I want briefly to defend this statement of the contrast between Nietzsche and both Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians against some remarks of Nehamas’s about Nietzsche, which may be thought to place the contrast in jeopardy. Developing Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘becoming who one is’, Nehamas claims that ‘the process of dominating (or creating) the individual … is a matter of incorporating more and more character-traits’, a ‘continual process of greater integration of one’s character-traits, habits and patterns of interaction with the world’ which ‘maximizes diversity and minimizes discord’. Now clearly the maximization of diversity fits the high status accorded by Nietzsche, in the ‘Alcibiades’ passage, to ‘those magical, incomprehensible, and unfathomable ones’ who ‘wage war against’ themselves. But the ‘minimization of discord’ does not fit at all, and the fact that Nietzschean ‘becoming who one is’ is, correctly, said by Nehamas to be a process and ‘not a final state of being’ doesn’t make the problem disappear: if someone is admirable partly insofar as they are at war with themselves, a process by which discord is minimized can only make them less admirable, not more so.

One way of pinpointing what has gone wrong is that Nehamas has, I think, run together two different senses of ‘integration’: the integration of a person’s ends (commitments, desires, passions, ideals, ambitions) to their character, and the integration
of a person’s ends (commitments etc.) *with one another*. Orestes’ dilemma in the *Eumenides* will serve to illustrate the distinction. He is simultaneously obligated to kill his mother (because one is obligated to avenge one’s father’s murder and his mother murdered his father) and not to kill his mother (because one is obligated not to kill one’s mother). Evidently in the second sense of ‘integration’, these commitments are not integrated with one another: on the contrary, one can be honoured only by betraying the other. But in the first sense they *are* integrated: he is as closely identified with one as with the other, and that is just what makes his situation so difficult. (It is not like a reasoned desire to abstain from something and a persistent desire to do it, which one as it were disowns.) This first sense of ‘integration’ is well captured by Nehamas’s claim that self-creation (or becoming what one is) is ‘the development of the ability or the willingness to *accept responsibility* for everything that one has done and to admit … that everything that one has done actually constitutes what one is’.

But it almost instantly disappears from view again when he adds ‘and in the ideal case its harmonization into a coherent whole’, since there are two ways, not clearly distinguished, for such a whole to be ‘coherent’: for all its constituents to be such that the individual has accepted responsibility for them (integration in the first sense), and for all its constituents to be such that they do not conflict with one another (integration in the second sense). Of course it may be much easier to accept responsibility for all one has done (etc.) if the commitments thereby embodied don’t conflict; but just what’s admirable about the characters Nietzsche describes in the ‘Alcibiades’ passage is that they have achieved integration in the first of my two senses even when their commitments do conflict. Failure to distinguish the two senses makes it impossible to express what’s admirable
about these Nietzschean paragons. Once we have got hold of it, on the other hand, we can agree with Nehamas that integration in the first sense is a crucial component of Nietzsche’s conception of human flourishing while at the same time acknowledging the gulf between Nietzsche’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of it which is created by the contrast between living with unresolved conflict and happiness as ‘finally attained unity’. Of course one might try to use this conclusion to rule that Nietzsche cannot possibly be a eudaemonist, on the grounds that inner harmony is part of the definition of ‘eudaemonia’. But it’s hard to see what the point of this stipulation would be: far better to say that ‘eudaemonia’ means human flourishing and that, as a believer in the ‘enhancement of the species “man”’, Nietzsche is a eudaemonist but of a variety distinct either from the neo-Aristotelians we have considered or from Aristotle himself lvii.

We are now in a position finally to comment on the passages in Nietzsche which have led him to be dismissed as an ‘immoralist’. The following may serve as an example:

Everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of the species ‘man’ as much as its opposite does lviii.

Notice that even here, Nietzsche is not claiming that everything evil (etc.) serves the enhancement of the species more than their opposites. The point is rather that

hatred, envy, covetousness and the lust to rule are conditions of life, … factors which (fundamentally and essentially) must be present in the general economy of life lx.

Nonetheless since Nietzsche is a firm believer in the enhancement of life, or of man, lx simply to dismiss passages like these seems out of the question. Whatever else he is
doing, sometimes he is just recommending evil. I want in conclusion to offer some suggestions as to why he might be doing so.

One explanation of Nietzsche’s hostility, in some contexts at least, to the virtues of slave morality – in part, of our morality – is that he was a kind of non-standard consequentialist. On this reading, the goal in the light of which the rightness or wrongness of all acts is to be assessed – corresponding to, though differing from, the Benthamite criteria Nietzsche condemns – is their tendency to promote, or alternatively to promote the reverse of, the flourishing of the species, interpreted along Nietzschean lines. This interpretation is suggested not only by the passage just quoted but also by the following:

One has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing ‘the good man’ to be of greater value than ‘the evil man’, of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future of man included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the ‘good’, likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future?

It’s not, I think, a ridiculous interpretation despite the huge differences between Nietzsche and standard consequentialisms. Consequentialism is after all a familiar way of ‘valuing values’, i.e. of assigning value to whole modes of valuing particular acts, traits of character and so on; it also seems to have been a natural place for philosophers to come to rest in the nineteenth century and turns up in unexpected places. (Think, for example, of Michael Rosen’s non-standard consequentialist interpretation of Marx.) And it makes good sense of the recommendations of evil: Nietzsche would not be the first consequentialist to face the point that the doctrine is objectionable precisely because it is liable to redraw the boundaries of the permissible in impermissible places.
The real difficulty with relying on a consequentialist interpretation to ‘place’ Nietzsche’s immoralism is that consequentialism relies on a picture of value (be it moral or non-moral) according to which values can always in principle be balanced against one another in order to yield a final overall valuation. It is not a wild oversimplification to say that, on this view, a year in which nothing much happens might come out as equivalent in value to a year in which a lifetime’s research is crowned with the Nobel Prize and one’s wife of forty years is killed in an accident: in either case, a year that is comme ci, comme ça. This picture of value, however, is very much at odds with Nietzsche’s remarks on the role of conflict in the life of some admirable individuals: if balancing is an available option, it’s not clear what the source of the conflict would be. But these same remarks are the clue to a better interpretation of the immoralistic passages, which has the added advantage of placing further distance than the somewhat indecisive considerations of the last section between Nietzsche and both Aristotle and (many) neo-Aristotelians.

Alongside the claim that the life of happiness coincides with the life of virtue, perhaps the most salient feature of Aristotle’s view of the good life for man is the idea that genuine goods fit together into a harmonious whole: this is just the point of the constitutive conception of the relation between eudaemonia and other ends in themselves to which I have already referred. One way to read Nietzsche’s immoralism is to see him as arguing for the (often non-moral) costs of moral goodness, and for the (often moral) costs of non-moral goodness. This reading places him in contrast to Aristotle on the issue of the harmony of all goods, but also gives a point to his sympathy with the ‘terrible in man’ which enables us to see it otherwise than as an angry, reactive heterodoxy. Nietzsche believed, for example – rightly or wrongly: but the truth of the
claim is not what is at issue here - that both music and tragedy appeal above all to ‘warlike souls’:

Men whose disposition is fundamentally warlike, as for example the Greeks in the age of Aeschylus, are hard to move, and when pity does for once overbear their severity it seizes them like a frenzy … . But of what use is tragedy to those who are as open to the ‘sympathetic emotions’ as sails to the winds?lxxviii

The Athenians in the age of Plato were already softer than in Aeschylus’s time, ‘but how far they were still from the emotionality of our urban dwellers!’ The softer we become, that is, the less use we will have for tragedy (or for music). Now there is no reason to see Nietzsche here as making a taste for tragedy into the sole touchstone of the goodness or badness of a civilization. He could be read as saying that the substitution of a propensity to feel the ‘sympathetic emotions’ for a ‘warlike disposition’ is a gain but, since tragedy too is a good, a gain that carries with it a corresponding loss: in contrast to Aristotle, the eligibility of both as ends does not guarantee their compatibility. Other examples illustrating the same point are not hard to find. A great many things that we value now – some of the enduring effects of the Roman or of the British empires, for example – might not have been achieved without measures which now, on moral grounds, we would shrink from. To pretend that we don’t really value them because they have simply fallen into our laps through the actions of previous generations is a kind of moral whitewashing of ourselves – a denial of the complexity of our own sensibility - which Nietzsche is precisely campaigning against. Debates about the propriety of competitive games for schoolchildren illustrate, at a microscopic level, the same complexity. For competition not only rewards undeserved characteristics such as height and strength but goes with pride in faring better than others as a result of them (and simply pride in themlxxix) – all
modes of thought which are anathema to ‘morality in the narrow sense’. No race was ever won by saying ‘you go first’, but this is precisely what the virtue of forbearance enjoins. The point, one might say, of Nietzsche’s attack on slave morality is not, as on the reading which relies on the immoralistic passages simply to dismiss him, to get us to throw over pity, forbearance and the rest in favour of a ‘knightly-aristocratic’ outlook (if this were even possible for us). It is rather to get us to acknowledge, and to integrate into our conception of ourselves, abiding and irreconcilable aspects of our own sensibility – some of which may be heirs to the ‘knightly-aristocratic’, but the historical claim is not essential – which, once acknowledged, would show that slave morality has after all been only partially victorious.

References


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ii See Philippa Foot, ‘Nietzsche’s Immoralism’, in her *Moral Dilemmas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). Foot is patient with Nietzsche where Russell is dismissive, but her aim is nonetheless to steer us away from his ‘sadly seductive’ philosophy, her central objection to it being that it is ‘inimical to justice’ (p. 158).


v The term also appears in J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 106, but in a different sense, and not as a special object of criticism.

vi *On the Genealogy of Morals* [henceforth GM], tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), Preface §6, p. 20: ‘[W]hoever sticks with [the problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity] and learns how to ask questions here will experience what I experienced … [H]is belief in morality, in all morality, falters - finally a new demand becomes audible. Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question.’


viii Wollheim, *The Thread of Life*, pp. 204-5. Wollheim also raises, roughly, the first objection to morality in the narrow sense, *op. cit.*, p. 197 (‘one of the means morality uses to expand its frontiers is to claim total
sovereignty over words in which it has only a part share. ‘Duty’, ‘ought’, ‘virtue’, ‘good’, spring to mind as examples’).

x Of which Wollheim is of course aware: *ibid.*, p. 205.

x Cp. Brian Leiter, ‘Nietzsche and the Morality Critics’, in John Richardson and Brian Leiter (eds.), *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 235 (‘His critique of morality is … driven by the realization that the moral life is essentially inhospitable to the truly creative life’) and p. 237 (‘a culture in which [morality in the narrow sense] prevails … will be a culture that eliminates the conditions for the realization of human excellence’) (p. 237); B. Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 128–9; and R. Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’ (in his *Morbility, Culture, and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 18): ‘The answer to [Nietzsche’s question ‘what is the value of (our) morality?'] … is that at the moment (our) morality has overwhelmingly negative value as a major hindrance to the enhancement of life’.


xii *GM*, I.7, p. 34.


xiv See on this point Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Morality’, p. 9: ‘traditional morality [according to Nietzsche] is contrary to nature’, though Geuss goes on to argue that exemplification of will-to-power is a still more important criterion of evaluation of moralities for Nietzsche.

xv I might perhaps, following Rawls and Hurka, have used the word ‘perfectionist’ here (see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 325 ff and Thomas Hurka, *Perfectionism* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), passim). I choose not to, however, partly in order to emphasize a link with Aristotle and partly in order to avoid several implications which I fear the term ‘perfectionism’ – albeit perhaps unnecessarily – has come to carry. First, perfectionism is billed as an ‘elitist’ or egalitarian teleological alternative to consequentialism. But this seems mistaken: as long as the welfare realized in a life in which one’s natural capacities are fully developed outweighs the welfare realized in other sorts of life *by enough*, there is plenty of room for justifying egalitarian outcomes even within a straight (welfarist) consequentialist framework. More seriously, even if the latter contrast between perfectionism and consequentialism were well-founded, perfectionism appears to share with consequentialism a maximizing conception of the good. In order to bring Nietzsche into the eudaemonist fold, it is important that the idea that goods can invariably be maximized be an optional, rather than a defining, feature of eudaemonism. For more on this, see below, section 4. From a different direction, James Conant questions whether the commitment to the perfection of human nature is egalitarian, on the grounds that everybody’s nature is at least capable of the same sort of development (‘Nietzsche’s Perfectionism’, in R. Schacht (ed.), *Nietzsche’s Postmoralism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 203). I am open-minded about this though I think Nietzsche’s frequent references to ‘higher types’ probably make Conant’s Emersonian reading of Nietzsche something of a long shot.


xvii ‘See Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, tr. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), e.g. p. 191 (‘Man has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature … more and more toward humanity …; morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him’); and p. 273 (‘Who should have more reason for being of a cheerful spirit … than one who is aware of no intentional transgression in himself and is secured [by the cultivation of virtue] against falling into any?’).

xviii A third Nietzschean objection, that the ‘morality of pity’ has hidden motives which are themselves bad, has no echo in neo-Aristotelianism.

xix *BGE* §225, p. 153.

xx *BGE* §44, p. 54.


**xix** Quotations are from *BGE* §44 p. 54, §62 p. 74, §188 p. 102, and §262, p. 210.

**xxii** A similar sort of reply is available to the objection Alexander Nehamas (“‘How One Becomes What One Is’”, in B. Leiter and J. Richardson (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 261) makes to classifying Nietzsche as a (to this extent) Aristotelian eudaemonist. Noting (as does May) the importance of the dictum ‘werde, der du bist’ as a summary of Nietzsche’s conception of human flourishing, Nehamas comments that the self (according to Nietzsche) is something (at its best) which is created. This ‘blocks another obvious interpretation of [the] aphorism. This interpretation would hold that to become what one is would be to actualise all the capacities for which one is inherently suited’, and would be mistaken because it implies, falsely, that ‘becoming who one is’ is – as the Aristotelian realization of species-specific potentiality undoubtedly is - a matter of ‘uncovering what is already there’. But once again, the opposition between the open-endedness of Nietzschean ‘becoming what one is’ and the Aristotelian actualisation of one’s natural potentialities is false, simply on account of the very general character in the potentialities in the actualization of which flourishing, according to Aristotle, consists. A central example of such a potentiality is rationality, and the potential for this just *does* seem to be ‘already there’ as part of our natures. But a potentiality like this leaves the nature of any particular life which actualizes it radically underdetermined, so there is room for a great deal of open-endedness in the way a life in which one ‘becomes what one is’ might actually go comaptibly with such a life – whatever form it takes – also actualising our distinctive natural endowments.

**xix** Kant’s view: ‘virtue signifies a moral strength of the will’, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 206.

**xxiv** Both quotations are from Frithjof Bergmann, ‘Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality’ in R. Solomon and K. Higgins (eds.), *Reading Nietzsche* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 44; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 34, where Nietzsche is said to recommend that practical thought be governed by ‘a great diversity of other action-guiding or person-judging codes that are not moralities [in the narrow sense]’. Compare also Leiter’s contrast (‘Nietzsche and the Morality Critics’, p. 230) between the ‘good life’ and the ‘moral life’: if we expand our conception of the moral life along more or less neo-Aristotelian lines, perhaps the tension between it and the good life will disappear.


**xxvii** See e.g. J.S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, pp. 291-2; also Philip Stratton-Lake, *Kant, Duty and Moral Worth* (London: Routledge, 2000), esp. ch. 4, which makes play with the distinction between primary motives (particular considerations responsiveness to which is characteristic of this or that virtue) and secondary ones (moral duty) in order to harmonize the Kantian claim that right action is action ‘solely from duty’ (p. 63) with an apparently pluralistic picture of the virtues.


**xxix** Emphasized by, for example, John McDowell and Jonathan Dancy.


**xxxi** There is another negative reference at *BGE* §198, p. 109: ‘that tuning down of the affects to a harmless mean according to which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals’, which latter is a subspecies of ‘moralities that address themselves to the individual, for the sake of his “happiness”’ and provide ‘recipes against his passions’. The swipe is therefore another aspect of Nietzsche’s misreading of Aristotle’s eudaemonism as simply recommending contentment. On the other hand Nietzsche also pays Aristotle the compliment not only of being a brighter and broader intellect than Plato, but also of a self-comparison: Aristotle stands to Plato as Nietzsche to Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche, *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vol V-1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), p. 417; cited by Wingler, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

**xxii** Cp. Kant’s mistake in which eudaemonism is interpreted, along quasi-Benthamic lines, as the doctrine that pleasure is what is ultimately aimed at in human action: see *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 183.
I take this to be the lesson of Aristotle, *Ethics*, tr. Thomson, pp. 73-4: happiness is the end such that all other supreme ends are chosen for the sake of it but such that it is not chosen for the sake of anything else. To avoid contradiction in the first conjunct here, ‘for the sake of’ must be read (as Ackrill reads it, ‘Aristotle on Eudaemonia’, in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics* (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1980) in a constitutive rather than an instrumental sense.


Ibid., Book IX, p. 301; my italics.

Ibid., Book IV, pp. 150-1.

Ibid., Book IV, p. 159.

Hugh Lloyd-Jones, for example, takes it as obvious that there are important affinities here: ‘[Nietzsche’s] superman is no more overbearing than Aristotle’s megalopsych’, ‘Aristotle on Eudaemonia’, in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics* (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1980) in a constitutive rather than an instrumental sense.


Ibid., Book IX, p. 301; my italics.

Ibid., Book IV, pp. 150-1.

Ibid., Book IV, p. 159.


In claiming that Aristotle was not a typical Greek, Nietzsche is at least raising a question which seems otherwise to be absent – wrongly – from the reflections of (many) contemporary neo-Aristotelians. Fighting under the banner ‘back to the Greeks’ is unlikely to yield anything spectacularly new if, unwittingly perhaps, the Greek to whom it is envisaged that we return is the one who has untypically much in common with ourselves.

E.g. Aristotle, *Ethics*, tr. Thompson, p. 153 n. 1. Cf. the related speculation by Nietzsche himself at *BGE* §212, p. 138, referring to the ‘conservatives of ancient Athens who let themselves go – “toward happiness,” as they said; toward pleasure, as they acted – and who all the while mouthed the ancient pompous words to which their lives no longer gave them any right’: if we can assume that Nietzsche counted Aristotle among these ‘conservatives’, his remark is at least consistent with the view that Aristotle’s account of *megalopsychia* represents a piece of ossifying conventional wisdom to which he no longer wholly subscribed.


That is, conflict among ends endorsed by the agent: of course conflict between ends he endorses (acting morally rightly) and those he disowns (any countervailing passion) are an integral part of the picture.


*BGE* §200, pp. 111-2. For related passages, cp. the following: ‘master morality and slave morality … at times occur directly alongside each other – even in the same human being, within a single soul’ (*BGE* §260, p. 204); being a battleground for these two systems of morality is ‘today … perhaps [the most] decisive mark of a “higher nature”’ (*GM* I:16, p. 52). ‘Where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully … but are controlled’ (*Werke*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vol.
or in Nietzsche’s idealization of Goethe who ‘bore all the conflicting tendencies of his century within him’ (Werke, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vol. VI-3, p.145).

The quotations are from Nehamas, “‘How One Becomes What One Is’”, pp. 269, 270, 272.

Ibid., p. 270.

Ibid., p. 272, my italics.

Ibid.; cp. also ‘[to become what one is] is to identify oneself with all one’s actions’, and ‘to fit all this into a coherent whole’ (p. 275), which makes just the same slide again.

‘Neo-Aristotelian’ here is, of course, only a convenient label: I do not want to claim that there is no sense in which a philosopher who held Nietzsche’s view of eudaemonia could be described as neo-Aristotelian.

BGE §44, pp. 54-5.

BGE §23, p. 31.

Cf. GM, I;12, p. 44, ‘Here precisely is what has become a fatality for Europe - together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight of man now makes us weary - what is nihilism today if it is not that? - We are weary of man.’

BGE §201, p. 113, makes it clear that Nietzsche does not hold that acts of pity are always bad.

On some apparent affinities, but also differences, between Nietzsche and Railton’s ‘objective’ act-consequentialism, see Leiter, ‘Nietzsche and the Morality Critics’.

Of course there’s a question as to what exactly it means for a species to flourish. Suppose that a species can be said to flourish if members with certain characteristics exist, however few they are in number and whatever their existence costs the other members (either in terms of exploitation of actual members or in terms of the non-existence of possible future ones). It seems there are at least two ways this idea could be captured within the range of consequentialist options. On one formulation, the goodness of species flourishing wouldn’t be arrived at by balancing the welfare of its ‘best’ members against the welfare of the rest (actual or possible), so this would rank as a form of ‘ideal’, i.e. non-welfarist, consequentialism. But the position could also be spelled out in welfarist terms: the good for each human being of living the life of a ‘strong’ (or whatever) member of the species would be argued to be so great that the welfare of these few (if few they are) would be recommendable simply on the grounds of balancing goods and harms, interpreted in a welfarist way.


This is an important strand of Anscombe’s attack on consequentialism in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.

See above. n. 33.

Cf. Tanner on the contrast between greatness and goodness, op. cit., e.g. p. 37.

D §172, pp. 104-5.

Cf. Williams’s discussion in Shame and Necessity (Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press, 1993) of the primitiveness, from the perspective of morality in the narrow sense, of a sensibility which admits shame at things for which we are not responsible.

Just in case the moral credentials of competitive sport might nowadays be thought to be beyond question, I submit the following anecdote (with thanks to Jane Fior). At a cross-country skiing ‘race’ in north Norway earlier this year (2006), the first prize was awarded to the participant whose time for completing the course came closest to the average time, on the grounds that to reward someone who had tried to distinguish themselves from the rest would be to reward a moral failing.

See again BGE §199, p. 111.