Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Others, and ‘the thing called love’
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Under the influence of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically inspired research in child development, philosophers have recently begun to acknowledge the role played by loving nurture in the development of the capacity to think about oneself or, as I shall put it – though the thoughts in question obviously sometimes fall short of knowledge – the capacity for self-knowledge. As Neera Badhwar has said, drawing on the work of D.W. Winnicott and others:

The look of love does more than see the loved individual veridically: it also shows the loved individual what it sees. ... The loving mother reflect[s] the baby’s facial expressions and mental states on her own face, thereby giving the baby a concrete image of its own psychological states. The mother’s look of love is, then, the first avenue to self-awareness and self-understanding.1

In this paper I approach love’s role in the development of self-knowledge via Wittgenstein’s account of knowledge of other minds. I identify a gap in the account of knowledge of others often credited to Wittgenstein, and try to repair it using some relatively neglected Wittgensteinian materials. The conclusion of that part of the discussion is that a given subject’s capacity to self-ascribe psychological states, and that same subject’s capacity to other-ascribe them, depend on knowledge of that subject by another. I then turn to child development, where some recent work points tentatively towards the conclusion that the capacity to think about oneself in mental state terms, as indeed about others, depends on quality of nurture – very roughly, then, that receiving the right kind of loving nurture promotes one’s capacity to be a self-knower. But arguably loving another involves, among many other things, seeing the other as they really are. So philosophy gives us reasons of its own to accept the tentative conclusions of empirical research: if self-knowledge depends on others’ knowledge of us and others’ knowledge of us is implied by their love of us, the conclusion that others’ love of us works in favour of self-knowledge is more or less what we should expect.

The shape of the paper is as follows. First I outline two problems about other minds and Wittgenstein’s general approach to them (§1). I then amplify the solution to the more fundamental of these problems that’s usually credited to Wittgenstein, and identify some difficulties with it (§2). Next, and drawing on further materials from Wittgenstein, I sketch a way of repairing these difficulties which makes use of the connections between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, both our own knowledge of others and others’ knowledge of ourselves (§3). In the final section I argue that a focus on child development makes vivid the priority over self-knowledge of the knowledge others have of us by showing how love is implicated in both (§4).

1.
Philosophers distinguish at least two problems of other minds, the epistemic problem and the conceptual problem. The epistemic problem is the problem of how we can know that others have minds, or what particular mental state they’re in. But in order so much as to pose these questions, we must already have a concept of mentality, or of different particular mental states, such that it’s possible at least to entertain the thought that persons other than ourselves

have minds, and are in those states. We deploy concepts of mentality in others in framing the epistemic problem, and indeed in the well-known sceptical answer to it, which combines the thought that we can’t ever know whether others really have minds with the thought that they do appear to. So the conceptual problem is prior: the very fact that the epistemic problem can be posed shows that the conceptual problem – the problem, that is, of how we can so much as conceive of mentality in others, or possess concepts of mental states that both I and others can in principle satisfy - has a solution, though of course we may not yet be able to state what that is.

So much, I assume, is agreed. But Wittgenstein takes the priority of the conceptual over the epistemic problem one step further. According to Wittgenstein, if we can solve the conceptual problem – if we can show how it’s possible to possess concepts of mental states such that both I and others may intelligibly satisfy them – the epistemic problem evaporates. Let me expand a little. The threat which the epistemic problem engages with is other minds scepticism – mightn’t I be the only one? But the other minds sceptic assumes two things. The first is that I can have direct, supposedly sceptic-proof, knowledge of a mental state only through being the subject of that state. The second is that I can acquire mental state concepts from my own case alone: just being in a mental state is enough to give me a concept of that state that’s applicable both to myself and to others. For convenience let’s call concepts of mental states that are applicable to myself and to others person-neutral concepts. The sceptic must allow that his mental state concepts are person-neutral, otherwise the question whether or not others really instantiate them can’t be genuinely open, as the sceptic needs it to be. But thanks to the sceptic’s first assumption, the question is then readily settled in the sceptic’s favour, since all I can know directly of others – their behaviour – is (so it’s said) compatible in every case with the absence of the state.

To this, Wittgenstein replies as follows:

If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. … For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of [another’s] body. (Which would also be possible.)

To summarize: I can’t (according to Wittgenstein) acquire a person-neutral mental concept just from my own case. At the same time it’s beyond question that I have mental concepts, and that I can apply them to myself. Now either these concepts are person-neutral or they are not. If they are not, then solipsism is true: it’s no longer doubtful whether there can be minds other than my own, but a conceptual truth that there can’t be, because my mental concepts are such that I’m the only one who can conceivably satisfy them. Thus the second horn of the dilemma puts the other minds sceptic, and so the epistemic problem, out of business. If my concepts are person-neutral, on the other hand, the sceptic’s first assumption – that the only mental states I can know directly are my own – must be false, so once again the epistemic problem is out of business, because it relies on that assumption to get going. On Wittgenstein’s view, then, the epistemic problem of other minds occupies an unstable middle ground between the possibility – fallible, of course – of knowledge of other minds, and solipsism. The conceptual problem of other minds is the only game in town.

2 L. Wittgenstein (1953) [henceforth *Pf*], §302; cf. also especially §351: ‘Yet we go on wanting to say: “Pain is pain – whether he has it, or I have it; and however I come to know whether he has a pain or not.” – I might agree. – And when you ask me “Don’t you know, then, what I mean when I say that the stove is in pain?” – I can reply: These words may lead me to have all sorts of images; but their usefulness goes no further.’

3 I am indebted here to Hacker’s (1986) discussion: see the comparison of the ‘weak-kneed sceptic’ and the ‘tough-minded solipsist’, pp. 262-4. Note, however, that to claim philosophical priority for the conceptual problem is not to claim priority in the order of acquisition for concepts of others’ mental states over knowledge of such states. On the contrary, I take it that the concepts and the knowledge are developmentally coeval (and that the development of both is very gradual).
To note that this is Wittgenstein’s view of the relation between the epistemic and the conceptual problems is not, of course, to argue for it. What’s more, even if it’s true, the Wittgensteinian view I have sketched is disjunctive - either solipsism or the possibility of shared knowledge – and I haven’t said anything to favour one of these alternatives over the other. The burden of eliminating the first alternative – that one can acquire non-person-neutral mental concepts from one’s own case – is carried, in Wittgenstein’s own work at least, by his considerations about the (im)possibility of a private language. My topic here, however, is the second alternative. If the mental concepts I have are indeed person-neutral, then there must be a story to tell about how I have come to have them (and indeed a story to tell about how I can have knowledge, directly, of the mental states of others and they of mine). Assuming this second alternative is roughly the right way to go, I’m going to sketch some shortcomings of a story often credited to Wittgenstein, and then try to say something about how to put them right.

2.
Wittgenstein is often credited with the view that, far from knowing our own mental states directly, we cannot properly be said to know that we have them at all:

It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour, - for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

In place of what we can call the first-person-only direct access model, he proposes the following account of primitive self-ascriptions of mental states:

How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? – of the word ‘pain’, for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. … [T]he verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

As Hacker puts it, ‘the utterance, like the groan, is an expression or manifestation … of pain. It is a learnt form of pain-behaviour’. Let’s call this the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription.

The expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription has been the target of various objections. First of all the account cannot, it’s said, apply to all mental concepts, because not every mental state is like pain in having a natural, language-independent expression: in Anscombe’s view, intention does not; nor does belief. Secondly, it can’t be a complete account, just as it stands, even of those mental concepts to which it does apply. For though some psychological self-ascriptions are ‘wrung from us’ by the states they express – ‘that hurts’, perhaps, as uttered when prodded by an exploring doctor – by no means all of

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\begin{enumerate}
\item See e.g. \textit{PI} §293.
\item \textit{PI} §246.
\item \textit{PI} §244, my italics. See also e.g. \textit{PI} II, p. 174, ‘[T]hink of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: the words ‘It makes me shiver’ are themselves a shuddering reaction’; Wittgenstein (1992), p. 14, ‘[An] exclamation is [an expression] … in a different sense from [a] report. It is wrung from us. It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain.’
\item Hacker (1986), pp. 293-4.
\item Anscombe (1957), §2.
\item \textit{PI} §546: ‘And words can be wrung from us – like a cry’. Cp. Wittgenstein, (1992), p. 14: ‘[An] exclamation is [an expression] … in a different sense from [a] report. It is wrung from us. It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain.’
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them are, and this is not yet to mention compound uses (and therefore uses which obviously aren’t doing any expressing) such as ‘I’m not in pain’ and ‘If I’m in pain I want the strongest painkillers I’m allowed’. Nonetheless the concept ‘pain’ that features in these uses is surely the very same one that features in the uses most congenial to the expressive account.

To these objections Wittgenstein could, I think, reply that the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription isn’t meant to be a complete account of how we get into the way of ascribing mental states to ourselves: it’s only meant to be an account of the primitive beginnings of this capacity, and the story of how we get from the primitive beginnings to the full-blown capacity will of course need to be elaborated step by step. The person-neutrality issue, however, gives rise to a more serious pair of objections, more serious because they threaten the adequacy of the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription even as an account of mere beginnings, and for this reason I’m going to focus exclusively on this pair of objections and the solution to them, leaving the step by step elaboration of the full story to another day. The first-person-only direct access model of self-knowledge creates difficulties, as Wittgenstein says, for the idea that anyone other than me could even possess the concept I deploy when I say I am in pain – let alone know that I satisfy it. But does this problem get any easier on the expressive account? On the face of it, no. Crying out in pain doesn’t seem to be the deployment of a concept at all, so the more closely psychological self-ascription shadows the natural expressions of the states so ascribed, the less we have an account of concept-acquisition. Moreover, the only mental states I can express are my own, so if the story about my acquisition of the concept I deploy when I say that I’m in pain appeals only to the idea that ‘I’m in pain’ replaces an unlearnt pain-expression, then this concept too looks as if it will be one which only I can possess.

This second worry can be developed a bit further. A standing difficulty with mental concepts if the sceptic’s assumptions are granted is that the concepts fragment, so instead of one concept that’s exercised both in the first and third person we have two: one that’s usable only in the first person (because it gets its meaning from something only the subject of the state can be exposed to, namely the state itself), the other that’s usable only in the second or third person (because it gets its meaning from what we have to make do with when talking about other minds, namely observable behaviour). So even if you and I both mean the same when we each say ‘I am in pain’ – that is, forgetting for the moment about the threat of solipsism – I don’t mean the same when I say ‘I am in pain’ as you do when you say, of me, ‘he is in pain’. But this makes it, absurdly, appear as an accident that ‘I’m in pain’ as said by me is true if and only if ‘he is in pain’ is true as said of me by another. Something like this problem seems to resurface on the Wittgensteinian view, at least unless more is said. On the Wittgensteinian view no less than on its rivals, we ascribe psychological states to others on the basis of behaviour. But, on the expressive just as on the first-person-only direct access model, self-ascriptions of mental states are not evidence-based – that is, they aren’t answerable to evidence of any kind. So on the face of it the old worry about person-neutrality hasn’t gone away: if two different types of evidential basis led, on the old picture, to the fragmentation of (apparently) person-neutral mental concepts into distinct first- and third-person concepts, why is this problem any less urgent when, instead of two different types of basis we have a behavioural basis (in the third person) and no basis (in the first)?

To raise these problems is not to say that the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription, even when clear-sightedly presented as an account only of that, is wrong, but rather that it is incomplete: the approach needs to tell a story about how first- and third-person uses of the same psychological words (‘pain’ and so on) can constitute exercises of the same psychological concepts, and we haven’t told that story if all we do is replace the first-person-only direct access model with the expressive model. More needs to be done to show how the

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10 This problem was emphasized by P.F. Strawson, though it has been overlooked often enough since: see Strawson (1959), pp. 99-100.
first- and third-person uses of these words stitch together. In the next section I want to make some (I hope) new efforts in that direction.

3.

The thought I want to explore here, by way of filling in some gaps in the Wittgensteinian story, is that self-knowledge depends, at least in part, on the knowledge others have of us. But though I do want to assert the priority ‘ontogenetically’ over self-knowledge of the knowledge others have of us – that is, to assert that my self-knowledge (as indeed my knowledge of others) typically depends for its expansion on the presence in my environment of others who know me – one place I would like to end up is a point at which the capacity for self-knowledge and the capacity for knowledge of others become, in the case of a single individual, two aspects of the same complex capacity. That, at any rate, is the ambition. Secondly, I don’t want to abandon the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription: what’s wrong with the Wittgensteinian account I’ve set out so far is not that it places self-expression in some sense at the beginning of the story of our acquisition of person-neutral psychological concepts – I think it’s quite right to do this – but that it doesn’t say enough about what else belongs with it. Thirdly, I suggest that the ambition of an appropriately filled-out Wittgensteinian account should be not to offer a transcendental deduction of what we know to be the case – that we possess person-neutral psychological concepts – but rather to tell a story about how we acquire them that actually takes place. So there will be more by way of empirical material than there is in Wittgenstein – though I think this is wholly consistent with his own approach. Finally, though perhaps it doesn’t matter how it happens as long as we can point to some way in which it happens, I’m going to discuss just one family of ways in which it happens – but of course there may be others.

Commentaries on Philosophical Investigations 244 tend to make a great deal of just one idea in it, the idea that the child’s own sensation-language is a verbal substitute for expressive behaviour - what I’ve called the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription. This account has the apparent merit of solving one problem: if ground-level sensation-language is nothing but a verbal substitute for expressive behaviour – that is, if it is expressive behaviour – then we don’t have to worry about how the child finds out that he’s in the state he says he’s in when, e.g., he says he’s in pain. As Wittgenstein himself says,

It is not as if he had only indirect, while I have internal direct evidence for my mental state. Rather, he has evidence for it, (but) I do not. 11

There isn’t, at this level, an epistemology of sensations (in the sense of a way we know which ones we’re having) any more than there’s an epistemology of crying or shivering. This helps along the thought that the knowledge others have of our mental states when we thus express them is direct, because there is no more direct knowledge of them which the child himself has and with which others’ knowledge can be unfavourably contrasted.

But in embracing the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription, commentators tend also to miss something. The child – obviously enough - doesn’t get from natural expression to verbal substitute unaided: as Wittgenstein says in a sentence I didn’t emphasize the first time I quoted Investigations 244, ‘adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences’. 12 But a great deal is presupposed by this ‘teaching of exclamations’ (etc.) which needs to be brought to the fore. In particular, teaching exclamations (etc.) presupposes that the adults in question know or can recognize what psychological state the child is in.

12 Cp. ‘We teach the child to use the words “I have toothache” to replace its moans, and this was how I too was taught the expression’, Wittgenstein (1968), p. 295.
It’s at this point that the question how we can know others’ – in particular pre-verbal children’s – psychological states is of special importance. A crucial part of Wittgenstein’s answer to this is summed up in a – compared to the many sources for the expressive account of self-ascription – rare but invaluable passage:

It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is – and so to pay attention to other people’s pain-behaviour, as one does not pay attention to one’s own pain-behaviour.13

The first thing to say about this is that it seems to be true: we experience a range of sympathetic reactions to others which are as involuntary as are, sometimes, the expressions of our own psychological states and which, even if it might be misleading to describe them as unlearned – they might have an interesting developmental history which would give the lie to that phrase – it is natural and typical for human beings to display. A child cuts its finger and sheds blood – you wince; a trusted person panics in a situation that seemed to be under control, and you panic; a loved one – or perhaps not a loved one, given the right context – bursts into tears, and you burst into tears too. The moral Wittgenstein wants to draw from this is that other-ascriptions of psychological states are rooted in prelinguistic behaviour – our reactions to others - no less than the corresponding self-ascriptions are. Of course if the disposition to react to others in these ways were found, unpredictably, in some people only, or in all people but only some of the time, these dispositions couldn’t ground anything which has the regularity characteristic of language-use. But this is not the way things are. The very high degree of regularity in the types of states we ascribe on the basis of others’ expressive behaviour is explained by the fact that we converge in our dispositions to react to others’ reactions (and to other related aspects of their behaviour and of its context). The fact that we converge in our unlearned dispositions to react to others’ expressive behaviour means that these reactive dispositions can provide a foundation for our other-ascriptions of psychological states which predates identification, i.e. the subsumption of some observed phenomenon under a concept. Here’s how the Zettel passage goes on:

But what is the word ‘primitive’ meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour [sc., reacting to others’ reactions] is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought.

And again a few remarks further on,

Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game – and here I take it he doesn’t mean, or doesn’t only mean, our language game of psychological self-ascription –

is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.)14

In other words it’s no less true of other-ascriptions of psychological states than it is of self-ascriptions that they are, at the ground level, linguistic replacements of prelinguistic behaviour. Let’s call this the expressive account of primitive psychological other-ascription.15

13 Wittgenstein (1967), §§540-1, first italics mine. Compare Wittgenstein (1980), §27, ‘When I see someone else in a terrible situation, even when I myself have nothing to fear, I can shudder, shudder out of sympathy. … We are afraid along with the other person, even when we have nothing to fear’; PI §287, ‘Pity, one might say, is a form of conviction that someone else is in pain’.

14 Wittgenstein (1967), §§541, 545.
There’s an objection to the overall Wittgensteinian picture of knowledge of mind that the expressive account of other-ascription helps with. I’ve presented the expressive account of self-ascription so far as a way of countering the thought that others’ access to our mental states is indirect. But it buys this advantage at the cost – or so it would seem - of maintaining that talk of knowledge of our own mental states (at least where pains etc. are concerned) is out of place altogether (‘it can’t be said of me at all … that I know I am in pain’). But why say that, because there’s no way in which we find out that we have pains (no evidential basis for the self-ascriptions), we don’t know that we have them? And anyway, don’t we know we have them? We are aware of our pains (that is to say, we have them), and it might be said that the gap between ‘awareness’ and ‘knowledge’ seems too small to be significant. These are tricky issues which I cannot hope to resolve here, but the expressive account of other-ascription allows us to sidestep them. We can have direct knowledge of others not because they don’t have knowledge of themselves, but because our natural dispositions to react are geared as much to others’ expressive behaviour as they are to, for example, injuries to our own bodies. Maybe what the verbal substitutes for one’s own pain-reactions express is knowledge of oneself, but never mind – it’s something others can have of me too, and for not dissimilar reasons.

Now the ability to other-ascribe psychological states comes into the explanation of the child’s ability both to self-ascribe them (‘teaching exclamations (etc.)’) and to other-ascribe them, insofar as adults must possess that ability in order to teach children which words to substitute for their pre-verbal reactions. But at the adult level, other-ascription isn’t wholly to be explained by the expressive account of it any more than adult self-ascription is to be wholly explained by the expressive account of that. But there is another, if anything more important moral of the Zettel passage which concerns the child’s own ability to other-ascribe psychological states. That knowledge of one and the same fact is expressed by my primitive verbal substitutes for my pain-reactions and by a child’s primitive verbal substitutes for its reactions to my pain-reactions point to the co-ordinated pattern of ‘primitive behaviour’ – my expressive behaviour and a child’s expressive behaviour that’s attuned to it – on which our language-game of psychological ascription is based. And for someone plagued by the worry that our psychological vocabulary expresses unrelated concepts in its first- and second- or third-person uses, this co-ordination of primitive behaviour holds the promise of deliverance. Let’s begin with the fact that any child’s reactions to my pain-reaction – to stick with that example, though my joy-reaction would do as well - not only have the same degree of regularity as nature displays in giving shape to my expressive behaviour itself: they are also sometimes the same reaction. If I can teach a child to say, of itself, ‘my finger hurts’ thanks to its expressively wincing and sucking its finger, I can also teach it to say, of me, ‘your finger hurts’ on the basis of that same child’s wincing when I hurt my finger. Thus it looks as if there is a neutrality between the first and second or third persons already at the pre-verbal level: just the sort of thing one needs if one is seeking, in Wittgensteinian fashion, to account for the possibility of a concept by finding its ‘prototype’, that is, by displaying its use as the elaboration of some more primitive phenomenon.

But how often is the reaction really the same?16 In some cases, indeed, not only is the reaction the same for both persons but so is the psychological state expressed, as clearly in the panic case above. Sometimes, however, the reactions are the same but the psychological states are distinct or merely overlapping, as in the case of my cutting myself, where perhaps shock or distress are shared, but pain in the finger is not, though at a certain level of description the stimulus is the same: someone’s cutting their finger. However, I am not sure that we should

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15 For something very like the expressive account of other-ascription (though I do not mean to burden her with the elaboration of it I give here), see Bar-On (2004), p. 288. This book came to my attention too late for me to be able to do it justice in this paper.

16 This question is pressed in Hobson (2009).
look upon the cases where there is sameness of reactions (and *a fortiori* sameness of states) as basic, and seek to work outwards from these, attractively simple as it might seem to claim that it is sameness of reactions that, in the basic case, underwrites the sameness of the psychological concept expressed in first- and second- or third-person uses of the same substituting psychological words. After all, it is not as if the word ‘pain’ is offered, on the expressive account of self-ascription, as a first-person substitute for just one particular reaction (it can just as well replace crying as wincing or rubbing the injured spot). So even if what underwrites the person-neutrality of the concept expressed by the word ‘pain’ is that your and my twinned reactions to my injury are both characteristic pain-reactions, it seems unnecessary that they both be the same one. But I do not think the concept’s person-neutrality is underwritten by the fact that our twinned (co-ordinated) reactions to my injury are both characteristic pain-reactions, if indeed they are: what it’s underwritten by is the fact that they are co-ordinated, in a sense I’ll explain. What appears crucial is that the other-ascription I offer you (‘you’re in pain’, to be said by you to me) be offered as a substitute for a reaction of yours which is a reaction to my reaction, and which – obviously, if I am in a position to do the offering - I understand as such.

However, this too isn’t quite enough. The phrase ‘a reaction to my reaction’ covers at least two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, it fits the case where I panic and you ‘catch’ my panic and panic as well. In this case, you are reacting to my reaction (indeed, you are reacting to the state my reaction expresses), but the relation my state bears to yours is *merely* that of cause to effect. By this I do not mean that it is just as if you, about to be inoculated, had panicked at the sight of a needle, since even our primitive ‘catching’ reactivity to one another (as opposed to our reactivity to stimuli of other sorts) is doubtless an important part of the scaffolding on which the distinct form of reactivity I wish to focus on is built. Nonetheless, in the ‘catching’ case, the fact that the cause was a state of *mine* has, as it’s tempting to put it, no echo in the nature of the state your reaction expresses. The reactions to others’ reactions I have in mind, by contrast, show a more intelligent reactivity. These differ from ‘catching’ cases for a start because they are behaviourally different, in that the reactions in question form a much looser family: I can only catch panic from panic, but though I *can* intelligently wince at your wincing, I can also react with a look of distress, or a sharp intake of breath, or by reaching out my hand towards you. Moreover in the intelligent cases, it may be that there is no way to characterize your reaction otherwise than to say that it’s a reaction to *my reaction*, and indeed to the state my reaction expresses. Contrast panic: it *is* a reaction to my reaction, but an intrinsic characterization is also available, viz. that it simply expresses your panic, and that panic is what it is no matter what caused it. In the panic case all the adult will think of the child is that his own panic has ‘set the child off’; in the intelligent case, by contrast, the adult will think, of the child, ‘he is upset that I am upset’, or ‘she is shocked that I am in pain’. Now because, in the intelligent case, I understand your reaction (whatever typical form it takes) to be an acknowledgment of the very state expressed by my own reaction, there’s a point to my teaching you to substitute for it the same word, in the second person, which I use, in the first person, to express the state I see you are reacting to. (Just as when I teach you to self-ascribe pain, I teach you the first-person form of the word which, in the second person, I learnt to substitute, years back, for my own intelligent reaction to the state you express with it.) It’s the co-ordination of your intelligent reactivity with my expressive behaviour, and of my intelligent reactivity with your expressive behaviour, that gives point to the introduction of one and the same word to express both your pain and (with the relevant shift of person) your

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17 ‘Recent studies of children in the second year of life indicate that they have the … [capacity] to display integrated patterns of concern for others in distress. During this period of development, children increasingly experience emotional concern “on behalf of the victim”’, Zahn-Waxler et al. (1992). In another study, in which parents simulated hitting themselves with a toy hammer and crying out in pain, 100% of normal children looked at their parent’s face and 68% showed ‘facial concern’, Sigman et al. (1992).
reaction to mine, and thus that underwrites the person-neutrality of the psychological concept it expresses. In this way by supplementing the expressive account of primitive psychological self-ascription with the expressive account of primitive psychological other-ascription we are able to remedy a troublesome defect in the account of our knowledge of others frequently credited to Wittgenstein.\footnote{Anita Avramides does well to emphasize the importance both of untutored reactions to others and of the person-neutrality issue: see Avramides (2001). However, Avramides seems to have especially in mind the fact that, just as each person is alike in their reaction to their own pain, each is also alike in their reaction to another’s pain. (I take it that this is what she means when she says (p. 196) that ‘[Wittgenstein] does not intend simply to draw our attention to our reaction to, say, pain; he also intends to call attention to the way we react to each other when we are in pain. We share these reactions just as we do all others.’) But notwithstanding her claims to the contrary (‘the description we have given of the asymmetry [between first- and second- or third-person uses] is such as to make it clear how it is that the word “pain” has a univocal meaning’, p. 201), it’s not clear how the person-neutrality problem is solved, if the two sets of common reactive propensities Avramides describes, together with the asymmetrical linguistic practice they are said to ground, is all there is to our practice with sensation-words. Let’s agree that the two sets of common reactive propensities explain how the first-person use of ‘pain’ and its second- and third-person uses do not simply constitute the deployment of two distinct concepts, one to go with each set. To explain why they do not requires not only that each person be alike in their reaction to their own pain and alike in their reaction to another’s pain, but, as I have emphasized here, that each person’s reaction to another’s pain be such that its nature cannot be specified without reference to the state it’s a reaction to.}

But is the story we have told really one about the acquisition of a concept? The worry is that the closer we get to describing what’s distinctive about intelligent reactivity as the possession of an attitude with an object (such as the child’s distress at the adult’s pain), the closer we get to conceding that the pre-linguistic child already has the person-neutral concept whose possession we’re trying to explain, and so the closer also to conceding that our story is simply about fitting words to concepts the child already has. The objection tries to get us to choose between two alternatives: either the child’s learning to say ‘you are in pain’ or ‘that hurts’ (pointing to another) marks a leap from no concepts to concept-possession, or it adds nothing to the child’s conceptual capacities. If we choose the second, we must give up on explaining the person-neutrality of the concept expressed by the word ‘pain’ (or whatever it might be) by appeal to something more primitive; and we cannot choose the first if we are not to deny ourselves the means to distinguish the intelligent from the merely ‘catching’ reaction, since such an important addition to the child’s behavioural repertoire surely marks an expansion of its conceptual capacities too. Perhaps we could dig in our heels here and say that the expansion in repertoire is merely behavioural, but nonetheless it is a critical expansion because it puts in place the scaffolding for the introduction of a new psychological concept – that of someone else’s pain – that wasn’t there before. But suppose we do not dig in our heels. Why accept that the two stated alternatives are the only ones? Let’s suppose first of all that language-learning and concept-acquisition are not coeval, a view suggested by the child who can react intelligently to others’ reactions but who is as yet incapable, even if not of articulate speech altogether, at least of other-ascription. This supposition is consistent with rejecting the first alternative, as the objector wants us to do. But it’s also consistent with claiming that, whatever conceptual capacities the child already has in virtue of his intelligent reactivity, the transition to articulate speech adds something to them, so it’s consistent with rejecting the second alternative as well. For our story to be a story of concept-acquisition, it is not required that the child make a sudden leap from a lack of any concepts at all to possession of the person-neutral concept: all that’s required is that its conceptual repertoire be gradually expanded. A similar reply can be made if we suppose, alternatively, that language-learning
and concept-acquisition are coeval, a view we may find attractive once we remember that language-acquisition is itself very gradual. (For example, children learn the rhythm and cadence of sentences, and to look at the person who is speaking to them, before they learn any words, but even at this stage they already have a foothold in the kind of structured interactivity characteristic of language-use.) Given this, we can credit the child who hasn’t yet learned the words ‘you are in pain’ with some conception of the other’s pain, thanks to his intelligent reactivity. But does this mean we have to credit him with the very concept he would possess were he able to say (as he surely won’t be for a while yet) ‘I am sorry that you are in pain’? No: on this picture, concepts come as gradually as language does. Thus whether we suppose that language-learning and concept-acquisition are coeval or not, we can explain the possession of a person-neutral concept by appeal to something more primitive, without claiming that that more primitive something implies the total absence of concepts of any kind.19

Let’s summarize where we have got to so far. Children express their psychological states in unlearned but nonetheless highly uniform reactions. In order for them to advance to the linguistic substitutes for these, they must be offered the substitutes by adults, so adults must be able to match (reliably) words to children’s reactions. Thus, at this basic level, the child’s capacity to self-ascribe psychological states rests on others’ capacity to ascribe these same psychological states to it. But something similar is also true of the child’s capacity to ascribe psychological states to others: this rests on the child’s disposition to react intelligently to others’ reactions, but in order to advance from that disposition to its linguistic elaboration, the environment must contain others who recognize these reactions for what they are. Moreover, because the reactions for which other-ascriptions of psychological states are the second- or third-person verbal substitutes are (and are understood to be) reactions to states expressible, by the subject of ascription, in the first-person form of the very same words, putting the expressive account of psychological other-ascription together with the more familiar expressive account of psychological self-ascription yields the beginnings of an account of psychological concept-possession that’s person-neutral.

4.

It’s time now that the third element of my title made an appearance, so in this final section I want to leave the person-neutrality issue on one side and focus in more detail on the priority of others’ knowledge of us over our knowledge of ourselves. Iris Murdoch is well known for a view of love which is captured in the following remarks of hers:

[R]eal things [need to be] looked at and loved without being seized or used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. … [T]he ability … to direct attention [away from the self] is love.20

Again,

It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists.21

We don’t have to agree that this is what love is to agree that one of the characteristic marks of love at its best is the capacity to disentangle one’s own needs, interests, thoughts, desires from those of the loved one and to see them disinterestedly, as a person in the round – that is, to see them (insofar as this is possible) truly; conversely one of the things that commonly happens when love goes wrong is that the loved one is seen merely as an extension or echo of oneself. So, we might think, those who are best placed to know us best are those who love us best. In

19 Nonetheless there is no way of identifying the concepts learners possess at their various stages of development otherwise than as the developmental forerunners of the relevant adult ones.
fact, however, we can distinguish a strong and a weak thesis here. The strong thesis is that knowledge of another is found only where we find love of that other: that is, knowledge implies love. (I suspect this is what Murdoch thought.) Now if self-knowledge depends on other’s knowledge of us and other’s knowledge of us implies their love for us, it would seem to follow that self-knowledge requires other’s love for us. That would be a very strong connection between self-knowledge and love. The weaker thesis is that, of those who love us at all, those who love us best are those who know us – which leaves it open that we may be known by others who don’t love us. So on the weaker thesis, knowledge of us is implied by others’ love of us. But here too there’s a connection. For if self-knowledge depends on other’s knowledge of us and other’s knowledge of us is implied by their love for us, it would seem to follow that self-knowledge is fostered by other’s love for us: other’s love for us might be a standard route to self-knowledge, even if self-knowledge doesn’t require it. This is the connection between self-knowledge and ‘the thing called love’ that I shall be exploring here. Now the capacity for self-knowledge is unevenly distributed so, if the connection between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is as I say, we should expect to find the capacity for self-knowledge at its most fully developed where there is a context of other-knowledge – that is, knowledge by others of us – to favour it. Moreover for this very reason, if those who are best placed to know us best are those who love us best, we should expect the uneven distribution of the capacity for self-knowledge to track the obviously uneven distribution of the availability to potential self-knowers of love. Though they don’t quite put it like this, I think this conclusion is supported by some recent work in child development, which I now proceed both to summarize and to interpret.

Before I go on, however, I’d like to try to forestall an objection. If there’s truth in the thought that love fosters self-knowledge – so the objection runs – the thought can hold good at most for self-knowledge in the sense in which the Delphic inscription adjured us to accumulate it, that is, for a form of wisdom. For it’s only self-knowledge in this sense that is unevenly distributed. The Wittgensteinian considerations rehearsed up to now, on the other hand, hold good not for this self-knowledge but for its mere homonym, self-knowledge in the minimal sense of the capacity for (true, more or less reliable) self-ascription of things like pains, and since everyone has that, it can’t depend on quality of interactions with others. A modest reply to this objection would be that though mundane self-knowledge is so mundane that no one can lack it, this doesn’t show that it’s wholly independent of the presence in the environment of knowing others – it’s just that what’s required for it from others is so basic that they cannot fail to provide it. But perhaps one can overdo the distinction between the mundane and the ‘Delphic’. Though no one counts as wise just because they know they are currently in pain, it is a mistake to insist that there are two different senses of ‘self-knowledge’ in play here rather than a spectrum of different (and differently significant) kinds of things about oneself which one can know. If the Wittgensteinian story I have told so far has any truth in it, even self-knowledge of the mundane kind depends on social interaction, and if the interaction were impaired, we would expect the capacity even for mundane self-knowledge to be impaired too – which is not to deny that, the further we ascend towards the Delphic, the more is demanded of quality of social interaction for the capacity for self-knowledge to be in place, and the more chancy it is whether or not those demands are met.

Now to a point about terminology. In the child development literature, the capacity to think of oneself and others as minded is often referred to as the capacity to ‘mentalize’. The term covers the capacity to deploy psychological words in relation to oneself and to others, though

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22 I have chosen this phrase of D.W. Winnicott’s (Winnicott (1964), p. 17) for the same reasons I assume he chose it himself: there is a range of phenomena including attunement to another, concern, emotionally toned responsiveness and so on for which ‘love’ is a perfectly good word, but if you object to the word, drop it and think of another one – at this point at least, it is the phenomena and not the word that matter.

23 For a statement of the mere homonym view, see for example Jäger (1999), p. 1.
it needn’t be tied – because the capacity to think of oneself and others as minded needn’t be –
to the use of a clearly demarcated vocabulary. The capacity to mentalize, which I shall focus
on in this section, therefore clearly covers what I have been calling the capacity for self-
knowledge (though of course it also covers more – the capacity for knowledge of others
too). By contrast developmentalists don’t tend to talk about love or have any single word
that covers the same ground. This is presumably because the definition of love is itself
controversial, and even if it were not, because love is manifestable in a great variety of ways
and it’s easier to track the causes and effects of these singly or in small clusters than to track
those of love itself. I hope to show, however, that this doesn’t matter, so I won’t mention love
in introducing the empirical material but try instead to bring it back in at the end.

There is now a body of evidence that seems to show that the development of mentalizing
ability is favoured by social, interactional factors as well as by physiological endowment. If
physiological endowment were all that mattered, one would expect physiologically
indistinguishable children to be developmentally the same. But deaf children of deaf parents
are apparently swifter to develop mentalizing abilities than deaf children of hearing parents,
though they are physiologically alike. Indeed pre-school age deaf children of hearing parents
show roughly the same delays and deficiencies in development of mentalizing ability as
autistic children (and deafness is a common misdiagnosis of autism). Why? The thought is
that deaf parents are much more likely to communicate with one another in ways accessible to
a deaf child – e.g. in sign language – than hearing parents are. So the deaf child of deaf
parents grows up in a family context in which it can ‘overhear’, and share in, conversations,
including conversations (if they’re going on) in which mental state concepts are deployed.
The deaf child in a hearing family, by contrast, will be relatively socially isolated.

But which interactional factors? Some seem to be especially important. According to
Carpendale and Lewis,

> mental state understanding [as measured e.g. by false belief tests at 4 or 5 years] is 
> significantly correlated with factors in the child’s social environment, like 
> attachments, parenting styles and parent-child communication,

that is, with the quality of early child-caregiver interactions. Or as Peter Hobson puts it,
‘appropriate forms of interpersonal engagement' favour children's development of concepts,
and indeed of concepts of mind. Since intuitively one thing that makes early child-caregiver
relations good is love – or at least love from the caregiver and the counterpart proto-attitude
on the part of the infant or child - these interactions would seem to be the place to look for
the kind of evidence we want. That said, the connections between early child-caregiver
interaction and mentalization are very much work in progress, so I’m not only going to be
highly selective but also necessarily take a good deal on trust.

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24 Carpendale and Lewis do well to make this point: ‘In studying talk about the psychological world it is
important to remember that researchers should not just be concerned with mental state terms but more broadly
with talk about human activity’, Carpendale & Lewis (2004), p. 88. Some of the studies (e.g. by Meins) cited
below might have got on more easily if they had adopted a more liberal view of what they were actually after.

25 Since in the previous section I have been arguing for the interdependence, in the case of a single individual, of
knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others, if there is a connection between self-knowledge and love it
would be a surprise to discover there wasn’t also a connection between love and knowledge of others – indeed
the connection might be expected to confirm the interdependence. But exploration of those further connections
must await another occasion.

27 Carpendale and Lewis (2004), p. 79.
28 Hobson (2004), p. 109. There are also other interactional factors beyond parent-child interactions e.g. the
'sibling effect' (see Ruffman et al. (1998), but this doesn’t seem to depend simply on number of siblings or even
of older siblings (Carpendale & Lewis (2004), p. 79), so perhaps the family environment for which the parents
are responsible is what really does the work even here.
One line of thought connecting the child’s mentalizing ability and the caregiving environment runs the connection through maternal ‘mindmindedness’ – mothers’ or other caregivers’ propensity to ‘treat their infants as individuals with minds, rather than merely as entities with needs that must be met’. Thus it is argued that maternal use of mindminded language at five months predicts better performance on false belief tests at 5 years.

There’s also another more complex connection. Security of attachment in infants as measured by the Strange Situation Test (SSn) predicts good mentalizing capacities later. Why? One hypothesis notes a strong correlation between the mother’s attachment classification during pregnancy (on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI)) and that same infant’s attachment classification to the mother (on the SSn) at around 12 months. A possible explanation of the correlation exploits the fact that scoring on the AAI, in which adults are asked about their childhood, is based on narrative style – fluency, richness of vocabulary, gaps, hesitations, coherence, dismissiveness etc. - not on content, so those who are rated secure on that test will tend to be good at talking about themselves and making sense of their experience without either being overwhelmed by it or dismissing it – that is, they will be mindminded, at least about themselves. Since maternal mindmindedness seems to be what’s measured by tests of maternal attachment security, it’s not surprising (it’s said) that infant attachment security predicts the child’s mentalizing ability, since maternal mindmindedness predicts it too – whatever in fact explains the link between the mother’s attachment security and that of her infant.

On the other hand infant attachment security may independently favour the development of mentalizing ability, for more than one possible reason. Mentalization depends ‘on optimal prefrontal cortex functioning’ which in turn depends on optimal arousal (roughly, over-arousal drowns out the capacity for ‘flexible reflective’ responses to others), and secure infant attachment facilitates optimal levels of arousal. Security of attachment also favours other interactive patterns (such as mother-child conversations) which themselves favour the development of the capacity to mentalize.

Another connection between quality of infant-caregiver interaction and mentalization exploits the idea of maternal attunement to the infant: poor attunement impacts negatively on mentalizing ability later on. Thus depressed mothers are less well-attuned to their infants,

31 See e.g. Ainsworth et al. (1978).
32 See Fonagy and Target (1997), p. 687: children’s SSn ratings at 12 months (with mother) and 18 months (with father) were compared with their performance on three ‘theory of mind’ tests at 5 years. Of those rated secure at 12 months 82% passed one of the tests (‘the belief-desire reasoning task’) as compared with 54% rated as insecure (77% secure at 18 months passed as compared with 55% insecure). See also Meins, Ferneyhough et al. (1998), pp. 1-24: 83% of securely attached children passed a false belief task at 4 years compared with 33% insecure, and the ratio was 85:50 on a test at 5 years. Also cited by Carpendale & Lewis (2004), p. 92, who note that security of attachment is also correlated with proto-declarative pointing which is an early indicator of social understanding (Bretherton et al. (1979)).
33 Fonagy, Steele and Steele (1991), pp. 891-905.
36 Field (1985).
37 Fonagy and Target (1997), p. 688, citing e.g. Dunn (1996). The relationship between attachment security and mentalizing capacity would seem to be complex, however, since it looks possible – for example for children in care – to develop their mentalizing capacity thanks to the fact that they have multiple caregivers with whom they interact positively, but to none of whom they are attached (securely or otherwise). (Thanks to Peter Hobson for this point.) If that’s so, security of attachment is a context that favours mentalization, but isn’t necessary for it. The putatively loose link between attachment security and interactivity of the right kind does not on its own, however, challenge the link between mentalization and love of the right kind, since that is itself a looser notion than secure attachment: I’d be happy to say, with David Velleman (Velleman (2005)), that teacher-pupil relations for example can exemplify Aristotelian philia.
more likely to be ‘hostile and intrusive, withdrawn, or showing negative feelings’; similarly mothers with borderline personality disorder (BPD), ‘were … less sensitive and more intrusive towards their infants’ in videotaped two-minute interactions. With regard to the later effects of maternal depression, evidence is somewhat unclear: at 18 months children in the study did comparatively badly on ‘searching for hidden objects’ and (boys only) on more general intelligence tests at 5 years. On BPD, Hobson and his colleagues did not do a follow-up study at an age at which false-belief tests would have been appropriate, but noted that in a follow-up at twelve months, children of BPD and non-BPD mothers performed similarly on ‘non-social’ tasks but children of BPD mothers tended to do less well on social tasks, i.e. tasks which involved ‘engaging with another person’s engagement with the world’. The capacity so to engage may in its turn be a predictor of the development of mentalization later on.

Finally, mentalization is said to be fostered by a certain kind of caregiver’s ‘mirroring’ response. This is consistent with the last point since depressed caregivers are likely either not to react to their babies’ reactions at all, or to react in inappropriate and inconsistent ways – so not even the beginnings of ‘mirroring’ here. But there is more than one way of being a ‘mirror’. It might be said to be enough to count as reflecting or mirroring a child’s mental state that the caregiver’s response matches the infant’s expression of mental state and is appropriately prompt. But some researchers in this area are also interested in another property of caregivers’ responses which they call ‘markedness’. This is explained as

the caregiver’s capacity to incorporate into her expression a clear indication that she is not expressing her own feelings, but those of the baby.

Unmarked responses simply duplicate the baby’s state, for example catching the baby’s panic and panicking oneself. Marked responses, on the other hand, don’t simply express a duplicate of the infant’s mental state: while they have something in common with what a response would be which did simply duplicate the infant’s state, they also somehow ‘indicate[s] that [the caregiver’s] display is not for real’. The caregiver ‘combines a “mirror” with a display incompatible with the child’s affect’, e.g. ‘smiling, questioning, mocking display’. It has been argued that marked responsiveness favours the child’s capacity to mentalize. This would seem to be so indirectly because 8-month old infants have been shown to calm down more rapidly after an injection when their mothers’ responses are ‘marked’, linking marked responsiveness to affect-regulation, which in turn fosters the capacity to mentalize (see above). But it may also affect mentalization directly.

There is thus some evidence that maternal mindmindedness, good maternal attunement, infant security of attachment, and ‘marked’ responsiveness all favour the development of the capacity to mentalize. I leave security of attachment out of the story for now because its relation to mentalization raises complex explanatory issues of its own. What’s of interest is why the difference between mindmindedness and treating infants ‘merely as entities with needs that must be met’, between attunement and failure of attunement, and between marked

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38 Murray et al., (1996), cited by Hobson (2002), p. 136n. Incidentally BPD mothers typically score insecure-disorganized on the AAI (Hobson (2002), p. 133), and mothers of securely attached infants are more sensitive to their infants’ needs (Fonagy and Target (1997), p. 689, citing various authors), so this is consistent with the claims about security and mentalization.
44 Fonagy and Target (1997), p. 684. This exaggerated not-for-real response to the infant’s distress could be seen as an elaboration of ‘motherese’ – see Fonagy, Gergely et al. (2004), p. 177 n. 7.
46 See Fonagy, Gergely et al. (2004), esp. chs. 4, 7; also Gergely and Watson (1999).
and merely ‘catching’ responsiveness are all philosophically significant differences. Here again is Hobson on the BPD mother’s difficulty in attuning to her infant:

[The mother] maintained a monologue rather than a dialogue with her [two-month-old] baby. She repeated her own thoughts about her infant’s state in a rather insistent way, often cutting across what appeared to be the latter’s attempts to vocalize and play some more active part in the interchange. What the mother actually said also seemed to reflect some of her own preoccupations, rather than elaborate her baby’s current feelings and actions.\(^{47}\)

The vocabulary here is strikingly close to Iris Murdoch on the way ‘fantasy’ clouds the ability to ‘see’. Again, Bateman and Fonagy explain the significance of marked responsiveness because the capacity to mentalize

develops through a process of having experienced oneself in the mind of another during childhood within an attachment context,\(^{48}\)

which marked responsiveness favours because only the marked response makes the infant’s state of mind available to it truly, and in a form it can digest. (Otherwise the infant does not see its own state in the caregiver’s expression: what it sees is simply that the caregiver herself is also in that state.) Compare Badhwar, whom I quoted right at the start: ‘The look of love does more than see the loved individual veridically: it also shows the loved individual what it sees’.\(^{49}\) The differences between attunement and its absence (and so on) don’t amount to differences in quality of care just because the first apparently makes more easily available than the second something that’s of independent value, namely self-knowledge. Though they do not say as much, what Fonagy, Hobson and others seem to be talking about is love. If it’s a piece of wisdom that love at its best involves the ability to disentangle one’s own needs/desires/fantasies and to see the other truly – to allow one’s thoughts about, and behaviour towards, the other to take their shape from how they are – then the relatively low-level phenomena of mind-mindedness, attunement and marked responsiveness all embody, at a micro-level, the difference between a virtue or quasi-virtue of loving relations and one of its corresponding (quasi-)vices.

Let me put this conclusion together with the more abstract considerations about self-knowledge I advanced earlier. One conclusion of those considerations was that self-knowledge depends on other-knowledge, specifically on the knowledge others have of us. Moreover if love at its best is centrally manifested in the capacity to see another disinterestedly and therefore truly, then those best placed to know us will be those who love us best. If self-knowledge depends on others’ knowledge of us and others’ knowledge of us is implied by their love for us then, empirical considerations aside, it should follow that we will find self-knowledge where we find others’ love of us. The child development material I have been reviewing points towards the conclusion that the capacity for self-knowledge varies with the quality of early interactions – perhaps especially early child-caregiver interactions. This independent connection should strengthen our conviction that the philosophical considerations I’ve advanced are correct, while these in their turn should encourage us – for all the gaps that need to be filled in – to interpret the empirical material boldly, to the effect that self-knowledge owes a debt to ‘the thing called love’.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{48}\) Bateman and Fonagy (2003), p. 191.

\(^{49}\) Of course there is another dimension of interactivity here too, namely the learner’s capacity to understand the other’s knowledge of them as such, and which might be absent while the other’s knowledge is present – but I cannot do justice to this extra loop here.

\(^{50}\) Thanks for valuable comments on this paper and on surrounding issues to Anita Avramides, Dorit Bar-On, Charlie Lewis, Peter Hobson, Angelika Krebs and Roger Teichmann, and to audiences at the Oxford Department of Continuing Education, the University of Hertfordshire, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, the University of Southampton, and at the Self-Evaluation: Individual and Collective workshop, University of Basel.
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