Scrutability thesis: There is a compact class of truths C such that all truths are scrutable from truths in that class.

S is a priori scrutable from C iff it is knowable a priori that if the truths in C obtain, then S obtains.

Russellian propositions: composed of objects and properties.
Fregean propositions: composed of Fregean senses.
Possible-worlds propositions: sets of possible worlds.

Argument from Assertion 1

Mary says ‘Hesperus is a planet’, knowing that the morning star is a planet and believing that the evening star is not.

1. Mary’s assertion is not knowledgeable (sincere, justified, …).
2. If the Russellian view is correct, Mary knows (believes, is justified in believing, …) the asserted proposition.
3. An assertion is knowledgeable (…) if the speaker knows (…) the asserted proposition.

4. The Russellian view is incorrect.

Argument from Assertion 2:

1. Mary’s assertion is not knowledgeable.
2. If the Russellian view is correct, Mary knows the asserted proposition.

3. If the Russellian view is correct, it is not the case that an assertion is knowledgeable if the speaker knows the asserted proposition.

We can say: An assertion S is knowledgeable iff the speaker knows S.

The speaker knows (believes, is in a position to know) an assertion/token S iff the thought expressed by S constitutes knowledge (belief, potential knowledge, …).

The speaker knows (…) a sentence type S iff the speaker has knowledge expressible by an assertion of S.

S is a priori if S expresses a thought that is justifiable independently of experience, yielding a priori knowledge. [for sentence types: potentially expresses]
Argument from suspension of belief:

1. One can know if $PQI'$, then $M$ even upon antecedently suspending all empirical beliefs.
2. If one can know if $PQI'$, then $M$ upon antecedently suspending all empirical beliefs, one can know a priori that if $PQI'$, then $M$.

3. One can know if $PQI'$, then $M$ a priori.

Argument from reconditionalization:

1. For all ordinary truths $M$, one is in a position to know if $PQI'$, then $M$.
2. If one is in a position to know if $PQI'$ then $M$, justified by empirical evidence $E$, then one can know if $PQI'$ and $E$, then $M$ with weaker empirical evidence independent of $E$.

3. For all ordinary truths $M$, there is basic empirical evidence $F$ such that one can know if $PQI'$ and $F$, then $M$ independently of empirical evidence.

4. All basic empirical evidence is itself a priori scrutable from PQI.

5. All ordinary truths $M$ are a priori scrutable from PQI.

Reconditionalization: If a rational agent knows $M$ with empirical justification from $E$, they can have conditional knowledge of $M$ given $E$ with weaker empirical justification independent of $E$.

Conditionalization: If $\text{cr}^*(M|E) = \phi$ at $t_1$, and one acquires total relevant evidence $E$ between $t_1$ and $t_2$, then $\text{cr}^*(M) = \phi$ at $t_2$.

Strong reconditionalization: If $\text{cr}^*(M) = \phi$ at $t_2$, and one acquires total relevant evidence $E$ between $t_1$ and $t_2$, then $\text{cr}^*(M|E) = \phi$ at $t_1$.

Weak reconditionalization: If $\text{cr}^*(M) = \phi$ at $t_2$, and one acquires total relevant evidence $E$ between $t_1$ and $t_2$, and $\text{cr}^*(M|E)$ is defined at $t_1$, then $\text{cr}^*(M|E) = \phi$ at $t_1$.

Synchronic reconditionalization: If $\text{cr}^*(M) = \phi$ at $t_2$, and one acquires total relevant evidence $E$ between $t_1$ and $t_2$, and $\text{cr}^*(M|E)$ is defined at $t_2$, then $\text{cr}^*(M|E) = \phi$ at $t_2$, with justification independent of $E$.

Core Knowability Thesis: All knowable [non-Fitchian] truths are knowable by reasoning from core evidence.

An empirical factor $E$ plays a enabling role in scrutability from $M$ from PQI when $E$ (or belief in $E$) is causally relevant to the subject’s acquiring concepts in $M$. $E$ plays a mediating role when the subject infers from PQI to $E$ and then to $M$. $E$ plays a justifying role when the inference (or conditional belief) is justified by $E$. 