3

Self-Love and Practical Rationality

Edward Harcourt

3.1

What does our moral psychology—our character—look like when it develops as it should? How, more specifically, should our various faculties of mind—reason, appetite, and so on—be related to one another in maturity? The dominant answer in the philosophical tradition has tended to be a rationalist one at least in the following sense, that—as Aristotle has it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*—a central part of what it is for character to be properly formed consists in our being practically rational. These very same questions are, in my view, also addressed by psychoanalysis. But psychoanalytic writers have often given the notion of love a very much more prominent place in their conception of what it is for character to develop as it should than those in the philosophical mainstream. Thus the psychoanalyst Hans Loewald speaks of ‘[the] erotic dimension of [man’s] . . . becoming what may properly be called a self’: ‘a human being’s becoming a person’—which I take to be the same thing as character’s developing as it should—is ‘[a matter of the] development of our love-life’ (Loewald (1978): 32). I believe that this conception and the rationalist conception of the philosophical tradition complement one another. I am encouraged in this belief by the prominence given, in some versions of psychoanalysis, to ideals of psychological organization such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘individuation’ and, in attachment theory, to secure attachment. For I take it that the lesson of these theories is that these dispositions are formed in us by the right kind of loving nurture. And not only that: though this is controversial, I take it also that these dispositions overlap in their manifestations of, even if they do not exactly coincide with, the practical rationality of the philosophers. If these beliefs are right, then, a correct account of our moral psychology should show love and practical rationality to be closely connected. However, I record these beliefs not because I propose to defend them here, but rather in order to motivate the investigation I shall be pursuing. The connection between love and practical rationality I have already mentioned—that love of the right kind is formative of practical rationality—is a causal claim, about the development of character. But it would be that much more interesting if
the fact that practical rationality typically has such a history shows up in what practical rationality is, that is, if a second, constitutive claim were true. It's a constitutive claim of this kind that I think Jonathan Lear has in mind when he says that 'without love' we cannot understand the psychic structure which constitutes the individual'.

But what does it really mean to say that love is part of the structure of the (properly formed) character? I approach the question this way. Supposing—as my first claim has it—that a properly formed character comes about via receiving the right kind of other-love, what feature might we expect such a psychology to have? A plausible answer is that we might expect it to exemplify self-love: the properly formed self might be expected to have the same attitude to itself such that receiving it from others has helped to form it. So if properly formed characters—as the rationalist philosophical tradition has it—exemplify practical rationality, we should expect practically rational individuals to be self-lovers.

I propose to argue for a constitutive, that is, more than merely causal, connection between love and practical rationality by trying to show that this expectation is well-founded.

3.2

Before I go further, I want to note some ambitious claims which have been made for the connections which Aristotle undoubtedly makes in some shape or form between love, self-love, and practical reason. Pauline Chazan, for example, has written that [A] certain kind of self-love is foundational for moral agency. [Moreover] that virtue requires self-love...is a central Aristotelian claim...Aristotle holds that the relation the self has to itself has priority over its relations to others: virtuous conduct depends on the relation to self which Aristotle terms 'love of self'...[A] virtuous person is one with the right kind of self-love.

(Chazan (1998): 63)

Now if Aristotle really thinks that self-love is the foundation of virtue, then given that (for Aristotle) virtue (excellence) is what the proper development of our distinctively human natures consists in, Aristotle must also hold that self-love is the foundation of the proper development of our natures. So, because practical rationality is essential to virtue (excellence) on Aristotle’s account, he must hold that self-love is, if not the foundation of, then at least intimately connected to, practical rationality. But if he thinks all this, any argument I might present to the same effect is just so much re-inventing of the wheel. So before I argue for a connection between practical rationality and self-love, I want to spend a little time arguing that this is not a connection that Aristotle makes. I want to argue that, on the contrary, Aristotle’s conception of love and friendship presupposes his conception of virtue. And since virtue is what the proper development of our distinctively human natures consists in (in Aristotle’s view), his conception of love and friendship presupposes his conception of that too, and so cannot tell us what constitutes it.

From Aristotle’s initial remarks in *Nicomachean Ethics* book VIII, my reading seems obviously right: true friendship is possible only between virtuous people, and so only
between people whose natures are properly formed. So we need to be able to identify
the virtuous people before we can identify which friendships are the true ones. So the
concept of virtue—and so Aristotle’s conception of what it is for character to be
properly formed—is prior to that of friendship or love. Aristotle appears to say
something much closer to the constitutive claim I’m pursuing myself, however, when
he says that love of others ‘proceeds from the good man’s relation to himself’,
namely self-love. The relations which a good man has to his friends (such as desiring
their good and their existence for their sakes, grieving and rejoicing with them, etc.)
turn out to be the same as the relations he has to himself. And though the initial list of
relations does not include friendship itself, Aristotle adds a little later that ‘friendship too
is thought to be one of’ the relations the good man has both to his friends and to
himself (Aristotle (1954): 228). So is Aristotle not saying that as it were the true name of
the set of relations to oneself which constitute being a good (read: properly formed)
man is ‘self-love’, and thus that being a good (properly formed) man is constituted by
self-love?

I think not. The evidence is the two separate shots Aristotle has at spelling out the
relation between virtue and self-love, which are slightly different from one another. At
one point he says that bad people don’t love themselves because, insofar as they are bad,
there is nothing lovable about them (ibid.: 229). This gives the conceptual priority to
virtue, and self-love is to be seen as the intermediate term that explains why other-love
presupposes virtue, as Aristotle initially maintained: other-love proceeds from self-love
and self-love presupposes virtue. One should ‘strain every nerve to endeavour to be
good’, ‘for so and only so can one be either friendly to oneself or a friend to another’ (ibid.: 230).

The second attempt, which begins with Aristotle’s question whether one should be
praised or reproached for loving oneself, takes a slightly different route. The man, he
argues, who ‘gratifies the most authoritative element in himself’, i.e. his rational or
thinking part, is (rightly) ‘most of all a lover of self’ because he assigns to himself the
things that are best (ibid.: 235). To condense what is not in fact a single line of
argument, things then go roughly as follows. The good man loves the good, and
good things are things done with one’s rational part in control, so the good man loves
his rational part. But the self should be identified with the rational part (‘Just as a
city… is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is
a man’). So the good man (rightly) loves himself. The characterization of virtue and
of the relation among our mental faculties in which it consists—the authority of the
rational part—again proceeds without mention of self-love, while the self-love of
the good man is explained by his goodness. So again the priority, for Aristotle, of the
concept of virtue over the concept of self-love is confirmed.

Before I leave Aristotle, I want simply to note that Aristotle foreshadows not, indeed,
the constitutive claim about the relation between practical rationality and self-love, but
the intuitive claim that those whose natures are formed by love will be self-lovers. For,
Aristotle says, several of the ‘marks of friendship’ which ‘proceed from a man’s relation to
himself” (i.e. self-love)—e.g. ‘wish[ing] and do[ing] what is good . . . for the sake of his friend’—are also things ‘mothers do to their children’, and one of these marks—‘grieving and rejoicing with [one’s] friend’—is ‘found in mothers most of all’ (Aristotle (1954): 227). If the right kind of love from others makes us both practically rational (as I claim psychoanalysis teaches) and self-lovers (as Aristotle says), might self-love not be a part of practical rationality, rather than an independent effect of the same cause?

3.3

Established usage has it that ‘self-love’ is a synonym of ‘self-interest’. It’s also well established that practical rationality includes self-interest—indeed it’s sometimes thought to include only that. If we leave matters there, that there’s a constitutive connection between self-love and practical rationality is scarcely an exciting conclusion. However, the established usage of ‘self-love’ does not give us a theory of self-love, and in particular, established usage is compatible both with affirming and with denying that to have the attitude of self-love is to stand in the same relation to oneself as one stands in to another when one loves them. If one denies this, then connecting self-love and practical rationality adds nothing to what’s already accomplished by the connection between practical rationality and self-interest. If one affirms this, on the other hand, connecting self-love and practical rationality becomes a more demanding business, and one which needs argument. I want to begin arguing for the connection by taking issue with some remarks on this subject by the late Oswald Hanfling.

According to Hanfling, self-love is precisely not a matter of standing in the same relation to oneself as one stands to another when one loves them, since—much as ‘promise’ does in ‘promising oneself’—‘love’ occurs in the compound ‘self-love’ only by a linguistic accident: ‘self-love’ means ‘self-interest’ but, Hanfling goes on, acting in somebody’s interest (including one’s own) is not the same thing as acting out of love.

My reply to this is that self-love is indeed, in part at least, constituted by self-interest, but that this is compatible with self-love’s being a matter of standing in the same relation to oneself as one does to another when one loves them; for short, compatible with self-love’s satisfying the same-relation constraint. But the connection between self-interest and practical rationality comes, I take it, for free. Given the latter connection, then, to show that self-love can both be (partly) self-interest and satisfy the same-relation constraint should go quite some way to establishing a connection between self-love and practical rationality.

Hanfling gives three arguments against the claim that self-love, as the term is usually meant, satisfies the same-relation constraint. First, he maintains that a person who acts in his own interest, say by investing some money, is not acting from love . . . I do not promote my own interests or happiness because of self-love [sc., because I bear the same relation to myself as I bear to others when I love them], or from any other motive.
The argument for this seems to be that acting in one’s own interest does not require a motive because it, like self-preservation, is ‘inevitable’. But this, the argument continues, just goes to show that self-interest is not a matter of loving oneself since love of oneself, like love of others, is not inevitable at all—we can hate ourselves sometimes. Secondly, Hanfling claims that there are relations to loved others such as being charmed or entertained that it is impossible to have to oneself. Finally, one can make sacrifices for love, but it makes no sense to speak of making sacrifices for oneself.

Only the first argument seems to speak to the identification of self-love with self-interest; the other two relate directly to the same-relation constraint. All three arguments, however, are questionable. As regards the second—‘entertaining oneself’ and so on—people do, and sometimes without self-satisfaction, take pleasure in their own sense of humour, or their ability to entertain, their accomplishments, appearance, and so on. Of course if one takes pleasure in these features of oneself, it seems more likely that others will too. But, more importantly for present purposes, one can come to take pleasure in a feature of oneself—one’s sense of humour, for example, or one’s looks—by finding that it is enjoyed (in the right way) by others.

As regards the third, one can make sacrifices for oneself, insofar as one can choose—and this may be difficult—to sacrifice one thing one holds dear (say, a promise to a friend) for the sake of some goal of one’s own. I don’t see why a politician should not sacrifice a friendship for the sake of political power, and suffer for it, in just the same way in which he might sacrifice power for the sake of a friendship. It’s important to the example that the politician in question shouldn’t see his life solely in terms of service to ideals, for if he does, sacrificing the friendship for the ideal won’t be a case of sacrificing something for himself. He also mustn’t be too venal, or else there will be no sacrifice because no real sense of loss. But the following kind of example seems perfectly imaginable: a politician wants to reform the National Health Service for the sake of the National Health Service, or for the sake of the ill, but also wants to do it himself: if another politician were able to take his place and do it all just as well, and his friendship be saved, this wouldn’t be good enough. That is why our politician wants power—in order to be the agent of the changes he wants. Though it is indecent to say (thinking of his shattered friendship) ‘I sacrificed a lot for National Health Service reform’ if he gets something very coveted thereby, such as becoming Prime Minister, it could still be true—he could look back on his life and say truly ‘political life cost me a lot’, having his friendship in mind.

What of Hanfling’s first argument? It is a matter of common observation that self-interest is far from inevitable: witness the diabetic man who dies of gangrene because he ‘cannot be bothered’ to seek medical attention before it is too late, the mother who leads an unhappy and frustrated life because she can never put herself before her husband and children, and other similar cases. Inattention to one’s own long- or even medium-term interests can be a standing feature of a person’s approach to life, as well as a matter of (say) local weakness of will. A good explanation for at least some forms of self-neglect, or inattention to one’s own interests, would appear to be
self-hatred, or at least insufficient self-love. Hanfling’s argument may seem to be persuasive because we are inclined to confuse self-interest, which is as far from being inevitable as other-love, with a different capacity or range of capacities which have a much better claim to inevitability. These are the distinct, and lesser, capacities which Aristotle calls ‘cleverness’ (e.g. as manifested by the weak-willed alcoholic getting himself to the nearest place he can buy a drink (Wallace (2001)): this isn’t self-interest, because self-interest would require him to stick to what he has resolved is best for him, namely to give up drink. Rather it is a much more localized instrumentality which survives the destruction of the mechanisms which translate one’s deliberated strategic goals into action. It’s the capacity which Hume, perhaps rightly, claims to operate independently of reason, but in thinking he has shown this is non-rational, wrongly concludes that the whole idea of practical rationality has been debunked. And it’s the capacity which Kant, rather as Hanfling does, (wrongly) inflates into the capacity to look after our own ‘happiness’, but of which he (rightly) says that if its goals were the only goals we had, our endowment with practical reason would be superfluous or indeed harmful. By contrast self-interest proper, which corresponds much better to the capacity to look after our own ‘happiness’, and includes the capacity to envisage goals that are distinctively one’s own, to organize them properly, and to act on them, is something many people seem to lack to a greater or lesser degree.

It is precisely self-interest in this sense that Butler, to whom Hanfling refers, means by ‘self-love’ (‘If we act conformably to the economy of man’s nature, reasonable self-love must govern’ (Sermons 2, §217)), and this usage has been continued by various writers in his wake. R.M. Adams, for example, argues that self-love is not the same as selfishness (roughly, Hanfling’s but not my ‘self-interest’), but corresponds to the ‘desire for one’s own long-term happiness or good on the whole’ (1998: 501). Also it is a rational achievement—it doesn’t come for nothing. And J.D. Mabbott explains Butlerian self-love as the rational organization of desires (Mabbott (1953): 118). The more we think of self-interest as a rational achievement and the less we think of it as like Aristotle’s or Hume’s or Kant’s sub-rational cleverness, the less substance there is to the claim that because ‘self-love’ means (approximately) ‘self-interest’, ‘love’ occurs in ‘self-love’ only thanks to a linguistic accident, and the more acceptable it is to maintain that self-love, when it’s used to mean this, satisfies the same-relation constraint. Indeed, self-love satisfies the same-relation constraint in part because it overlaps in meaning with ‘self-interest’, when self-interest is properly understood. But I take it that it does not require much argument to show that what I am calling self-interest proper overlaps, even if it does not coincide with, practical rationality. So self-love—that is, standing in the same relation to oneself that one stands in to another when one loves them—overlaps, even if it does not coincide, with practical rationality.

This conclusion chimes with the causal claim I made (though did not argue for) in section 3.1, that practical rationality is fostered by the right kind of loving nurture. As Adams puts it
None of us invented for ourselves the concept of our own happiness or good. Teaching children to conceive of, and care for, their own good is one of the main ways in which one cares for their good. Conversely children who are undervalued by those who bring them up are apt to find it harder to adopt their own good with clarity and firmness as a project of their own. (Adams (1998): 509)

We become able to identify and organize our goals for ourselves by first of all being shown what they are and how to order them by others. Because they are our goals (and not just our carers’ or educators’ which they have failed to disentangle from ours), at least if we make the further (but I think undemanding) assumption that love of the right kind involves just this kind of disentangling of self from other, this teaching manifests another’s love for us of the right kind. It’s no surprise, then, that—as I have argued on independent grounds—the relation we stand in to ourselves when we come to be able to identify and organize our goals relatively unaided (etc.), that is, when we are practically rational, is that same relation—love—but with different relata (no longer other and self, but self and self).

3.4

I now want to look at a different problem that arises for the thought that to be a self-lover is (in part at least) to be practically rational, which lurks in the background of the above account. This problem is visible in Marcia Homiak’s account of Aristotle on self-love: the *eudaimon* life is, for us, the rational life, so insofar as we act out of the motivations, rationally chosen, that constitute *eudaimonia*, we act out of self-love—the person who is *eudaimon* is the truest self-lover. However well or badly this fares as an interpretation of Aristotle, there is a separate worry here too. Homiak says that ‘we can explain what virtuous [or again as I would prefer to say, excellent or properly formed] character is by explaining what practical wisdom is’ (Homiak (1981): 634). Now add—as she does and as I have suggested above that we do also—the claim that a practically rational (sc., wise) person is a self-lover. The problem is that this additional claim *doesn’t seem to amount to much* if all it is to be a self-lover is to pursue the ends that practical wisdom commends. Self-love sounds like an attitude to an object, but it looks as if we can give a complete inventory of the attitudes the practically rational person has without mentioning self-love, because no distinctive attitude is contributed by being a self-lover. We don’t *further our understanding* of the link between practical wisdom and properly formed character by introducing the idea of self-love, since the notion adds almost nothing to the following pair of claims: one’s character is properly formed only if one is practically wise, and a practically wise person is a person who pursues the ends commended by practical wisdom. The danger for the account I have recommended above is that we can affirm the letter of a connection between practical rationality and self-love at the cost of denying it any real substance. Let us call this problem the transparency problem.
Of course the apparent transparency of self-love isn’t a problem if there is a good reason for it, and according to Harry Frankfurt—who embraces the transparency of self-love with open arms—there is. On Frankfurt’s account, the self is transparent to the self-lover in the following sense, that self-love does not consist in having the attitude of love towards the self:

Someone who loves himself displays and demonstrates that love just by loving what he loves, where ‘what he loves’ is to be understood as a set of objects other than the self. Indeed this isn’t just an accidental fact about self-lovers: for one to be a self-lover at all, there must be something else—not himself—for the self-lover to love. So ‘self-love is derivative from or constructed out of, the love that people have for things that are not identical with themselves’ (Frankfurt (2004): 85).

But can self-love, so understood, satisfy the same-relation constraint? It is (says Frankfurt) a feature of love quite generally that the lover is selflessly devoted to the true interests of the object of love, for their sakes (‘the lover cares about the good of his beloved for its own sake’ (ibid.)). So what would manifest my self-love—i.e. my love when the loved object is myself—if not my being selflessly devoted to pursuing my own true interests, for the sake of those interests themselves? Conversely, if one is not devoted to anything beyond oneself, there are no ‘true interests’ to count as one’s own, and so nothing for a lover of oneself—whether or not that lover of oneself is oneself—to promote, and so (if the lover of oneself is indeed oneself) no room for self-love. Similarly, a familiar manifestation of lack of self-love is not negative reflexive attitudes, but rather the absence of any things beyond the self to which one is devoted, or cares about. Frankfurt’s account provides a ready solution to the transparency problem because one and the same set of features that make self-love look like practical rationality—that is, that make the self-lover’s attitudes consist of all and only those of the practically rational person, and so render it transparent—also serve, on Frankfurt’s account, to explain why it meets the same-relation constraint. So self-love can be transparent without being insubstantial.

The unargued causal thesis of section 3.1, to return to it once more, also fits Frankfurt’s account of self-love. Let’s assume, as before, that ‘secure attachment’ labels a disposition which is typically formed by the right kind of loving nurture and whose manifestations overlap with practical rationality. According to the psychiatrist and attachment-oriented psychotherapist Jeremy Holmes,

there is a reciprocal relation between secure attachment and creative or playful exploration; only when attachment needs are [satisfied] can the individual turn away from her attachment figure towards the world. (Holmes (1996): 4, my italics).

Another’s love (of the right kind) promotes not only practical rationality but also an interest in things beyond the self. But that is the mark, on Frankfurt’s account, of self-love. So another’s love of the right kind promotes both practical rationality and self-love. If self-love
and practical rationality have as much to do with one another as I have argued they have, this should come as no surprise.

3.5

If Frankfurt’s account of love (and therefore of self-love) were the whole story about it, it looks as if the connection between self-love and practical rationality would stand up well. Unfortunately, however, I don’t think it is the whole story. In this section I am going to raise two separate sets of reservations about Frankfurt’s account and show how they can be met without upsetting the conclusions already reached.

The first set of reservations stems from the fact that we are all familiar with people who both seem to be secure in their self-love, and take a minimal interest in themselves, that is, whose focus is almost entirely outwardly directed. (Quine’s autobiography—or perhaps ‘autobiography’—is said to be an example of this.) But not everyone is like that, and attitudes towards oneself are surely among the possible manifestations of self-love, even if not everyone’s self-love manifests itself this way (and even if everyone’s does manifest itself at least in part in the ‘transparent’ way). Consider the ability to accept others’ positive attitudes to oneself—be it their love, or their compliments on one’s good looks, beautifully designed garden, or whatever it might be. To the worry that this might just be vanity, remember that the self-lover is not being pictured as spontaneously reflecting on his or her good looks, beautiful garden and so on: it’s enough to entertain these thoughts when they are suggested by another. But if someone does entertain such thoughts, even if only suggested by another, the thoughts surely manifest attitudes which are self-focused in a way not budgeted for on the transparency account (‘my garden is beautiful’, ‘I look nice in this’, etc.).

Now this shortcoming in the transparency account of self-love must stem from a parallel shortcoming in Frankfurt’s account of love in general on pain of violating the same-relation constraint, for the transparency account of self-love satisfied the constraint just because it portrayed self-love as a special case of love, no matter what its object. But a parallel shortcoming in Frankfurt’s account of love in general is ready to hand. It is that Frankfurt’s general account of love concentrates too one-sidedly on ‘protecting and pursuing’ the loved one’s interests—or perhaps, better, too one-sidedly on the loved one’s interests, the sorts of things that can be protected and pursued. This language fits well the case where one is (for example) a campaigner for the preservation of a piece of wilderness: Frankfurt’s account of love implies that those who love one will disinterestedly pursue the preservation of the wilderness too, or at least care about its preservation, and this (let’s allow for now) seems right. But what about, for example, a person’s appearance? A fashion model might perhaps have her appearance as an interest, occupying her thoughts in the same way as the wilderness occupies the thoughts of the wilderness campaigner. If that were so, her lover’s concern with her appearance could properly take the form of protecting or promoting something. However, though people often focus on the appearance of those they love, it is rare
for them to focus on it in this way. This objection carries over to the case of self-love. I’ve said that a mark of self-love can be a positive attitude to one’s own appearance. But it is rare for this to take the form of ‘promoting and protecting’, because few people see their appearance as an ‘interest’.

However, though we have certainly come across something Frankfurt’s account of love (of self or other) overlooks, filling the gap does not bring us into conflict with the transparency account of self-love. The self-directed attitudes I have mentioned that normally go with self-love are hedonic attitudes—pleasure in one’s own appearance, or garden. (Again, there needn’t be anything reflective, still less gloating, about this: one can see that someone enjoys their good looks simply from the way they move, for example.) This complements rather than conflicts with the transparency account because that account rules out only that the self be the object of a first-order attitude of love: it doesn’t rule out that the self be the object of first-order attitudes of other sorts, including taking pleasure.

Coming to see the role of pleasure in self-love also helps to show how this expanded account of self-love fits the same-relation constraint. As Neera Badhwar has rightly said:

If [the look of delight and tenderness on the mother’s face] is the primordial experience of being loved and the first lesson in learning to love, then one would expect delight or tenderness to be present as a strand in different sorts of loving relationships . . . Some form of pleasure in (the thought of) the loved object’s existence . . . is central to the most general and basic expression of the emotion of love. In love of persons or animals, this basic emotion of love also includes pleasure in the well-being . . . of the loved object. (Badhwar (2003): 43)

Love, in short, involves taking pleasure in the object of love. The same-relation constraint implies that where the object of love is oneself, one will take pleasure in oneself—that is, it predicts that the self-lover will have precisely the self-directed hedonic attitudes I have mentioned.

My second set of reservations about Frankfurt’s account of love has to do with his deployment of the idea of caring about something ‘for its own sake’. One worry is that, in emphasizing the lover’s care about the loved one’s interests for the sake of those interests, there is as it were an argument-place—that is, a ‘for the sake of . . . ’, where the dots are to be filled in by a designation of the loved one—that Frankfurt has overlooked. Suppose I am landed with a cat to look after. For all that cats can—as we may assume—be objects of love, my caring for this cat might be an act of love towards its deceased owner, who was a dear friend, not towards the cat itself. And yet I might be said to care for the cat’s true interests disinterestedly (i.e. look after it properly, without any thought of further gain, and so on). So caring for somebody’s (or something’s) true interests disinterestedly is not sufficient for loving them (or it).

But is caring for someone’s or something’s true interests disinterestedly even necessary for loving them? For one thing, my various loved ones’ true interests might themselves be very various—the preservation of a piece of wilderness, playing the violin, and the restoration of the French monarchy, for instance. Do I really have to care
about them all in order to count as loving the people in question? So far this worry has merely to do with my own finite capacity to care about things. But what if one loved one yearns for the restoration of the French monarchy and another is an ardent republican? If what I am meant to do as a lover is care about both disinterestedly, I will be saddled with conflicting attitudes. However, consider the reality of loving mothers whose children have opposing political commitments. The mothers need not be subject to conflicting political attitudes of their own, and may be even-handedly delighted by the triumph of either child’s party. The explanation would seem to be that what love for their children requires of them is not (as Frankfurt would have it) care for their children’s true interests—here, the triumph of this or that party—for the sake of those interests, but rather care for those interests for the sake of the children. As Bradley puts it, ‘the self rises and falls with its world’ (Bradley (1962): 285). But the bit of the world this mother’s self rises and falls with is not the rise and fall of her children’s political idols, but rather her children’s selves’ rising and falling with their respective idols’ rise and fall.

How do these objections to Frankfurt’s account play out where lover and loved are one and the same? As to the first objection, it might be said that, where the lover is the loved, it is incoherent to suppose that one’s own true interests might be pursued for anyone’s sake but one’s own. Whether this is in fact so is going to depend in part on what account one gives of a person’s true interests, and I cannot explore that properly here. But suppose that I have a great talent for the violin. On some conception of my true interests, it might be my true interest to develop my talent, but nonetheless the case that I develop it not for my own but for my parents’ sake. If that possibility is coherent, the same-relation constraint—which thanks to the first objection now requires that the lover cares about the loved one’s true interests for the loved one’s sake—implies that the violinist is not a self-lover. But when one imagines someone going through all that violin-playing not for his own sake, that seems like the right thing to say. If on the other hand the possibility is incoherent, then the same-relation constraint will be satisfied come what may.

According to the second objection, if the same-relation constraint is to be met, it is no longer a necessary condition of self-love that one care about one’s own true interests for their own sake. The possibility of the self-lover’s not doing so may seem puzzling, but here again reflection on the notion of pleasure can help us to see why it need not be. We would do well here to remember two thoughts of Peter Winch’s, apropos of a remark by Simone Weil. In Ibsen’s The Master Builder, Mrs Solness welcomes Hilda Wangel to her house, as Winch puts it, ‘in splendid Kantian tones’ with the words ‘I’ll do my best for you. That is no more than my duty’. ‘How very differently we would have regarded her’, Winch goes on, ‘if she had said: “Do come and see your room. I hope you will be comfortable and enjoy your stay”.’ Here Winch wants to draw attention to how one obvious candidate for the label ‘action for the sake of duty’ is not a manifestation of a will that is good without qualification. But for our purposes this is just scene-setting. Of greater interest is what Winch has to say about the contrast case
Switching the example of warm spontaneity to Weil’s case ‘of a father playing with his child—not out of a sense of duty but out of pure joy and pleasure’, Winch says

I also want to resist a suggestion that many philosophers would make here: namely that the father is doing what he is doing [i.e. playing] ‘for its own sake’. The trouble with this locution is that it makes his behaviour too like that in which a man does what he does for the sake of something else—as if the father thought that a situation in which a father plays with his child has positive value in itself and played with the child for that reason, rather than because he thought that doing so would be conducive to further consequences which he positively valued. (Winch (1972): 181, 183)

‘For its own sake’ misdescribes the father’s reasons for playing with the child just as much as ‘for the sake of further consequences’. But the father’s playing with his child is a manifestation of love: certainly of his love for the child (as Badhwar has helped us to see), but also surely of his self-love, because his relation with the child is among his true interests. Generalizing, we both satisfy the same-relations constraint and have a credible psychological picture of the self-lover if the self-lover’s pursuit of his own true interests fails to be for their own sake just in the case where he pursues them ‘out of pure joy and pleasure’.

I said at the outset that there is reason to expect a correct moral psychology to show love and practical rationality to be closely connected, and undertook to demonstrate this by arguing for a constitutive connection between practical rationality and self-love. The connection was seen to depend on maintaining that self-love is an instance of the same relation one stands in to another when one loves them, that is, to respecting the same-relation constraint. Notwithstanding the objections I have raised to Frankfurt’s account of love, I have argued that this constraint can be respected if we take due account of how thoroughly pleasure is involved in love.

References