to distinguish the self-representational theory from the higher-order view. But even so, *Subjective Consciousness* is an important piece in the dialectical puzzle of consciousness. It is full of stimulating argument and analysis, prompting even those who disagree to sharpen their thinking in response. I highly recommend it to all who are interested in the cutting edge of consciousness studies.

*Department of Philosophy*  
*University of Houston*  
*513 Agnes Arnold Hall*  
*Houston*  
*TX 77204*  
*USA*  
jweisberg@uh.edu

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This book is about doctrines that concern the dependence of truth on being, and how those views impact on other metaphysical debates. The doctrines in question are *Truthmaker* — the claim that for each truth there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that truth true — and *Truth Supervenes on Being* (TSB) — the claim that all possible worlds alike with respect to which objects exist and which properties and relations those objects exemplify are alike with respect to what is true. The book argues, among other things, that there is little to prefer in TSB, when it is formulated as a thesis of worldwide local supervenience, over Truthmaker (Ch. 4). It also argues: that truthmakers necessitate, or at least conditionally necessitate, their truths (Ch. 1); that if every truth has a truthmaker then some of those truthmakers are states of affairs; that a truth is *about* its truthmaker; that Truthmaker must exclude certain properties (Ch. 2); that negative existentials constitute a reason to doubt Truthmaker (Ch. 3); that Truthmaker and TSB are not consistent with reductive accounts of modality (Ch. 5); that Presentism is inconsistent with Truthmaker and TSB, but that this is a reason to reject Truthmaker and TSB (Ch. 6); that subjunctive conditionals are not entirely about the existence of anything nor are they entirely about things actually having a property, and so do not need to meet Truthmaker or TSB (Ch. 7); that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is distinct from Truthmaker (Ch. 1), and the Correspondence Theory is false and truth is a monadic and primitive property of truth-bearers (Ch. 8). This book, which is written in a very clear style, is an interesting and provocative piece of philosophy, but I found many of its arguments weak and many of its theses doubtful. I shall here explain
some of the main arguments and theses (and, when I disagree with them, I shall explain why).

One of the main theses of the book is about the motivation of Truthmaker, the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker (p. 1). According to Merricks, its primary motivation is to articulate the intuition that what is true depends in a non-trivial way on what there is, or the world, or things, or being (p. 2). I agree that such an intuition is the primary motivation for Truthmaker. Now, some truthmaker theorists object to the views of other philosophers on the basis that these views violate Truthmaker. This happens when the truthmaker theorist has a definite ontology and his opponent admits as true claims that cannot be made true by the entities in the ontology of the truthmaker theorist. Merricks says that what the truthmaker theorist is then doing is trying to ‘catch the cheaters’. But then Merricks goes on to say that the primary motivation of Truthmaker is really the same as trying to ‘catch the cheaters’ (pp. 3–4).

The cheater will typically have his own ontology and might use it to ground the truths of several claims, but he will be considered to be a cheater because his ontology will include ‘suspicious’ properties or entities. Merricks does not say what are the necessary or sufficient conditions for being a suspicious property, but he considers, for instance, irreducibly past-directed Lucretian properties and irreducibly counterfactual Suarezian properties as suspicious (pp. 135, 149). But since Merricks thinks that catching cheaters is the same as the primary motivation of Truthmaker, he claims that a fully articulated Truthmaker must say which properties are suspicious (p. 37). And, Merricks rightly says, a full account of which properties are suspicious is a full-blown metaphysics (p. 37). Of course, as Merricks recognises, in order to catch some cheaters only a partially articulated version of Truthmaker is necessary — namely, a version of Truthmaker that identifies only some suspicious properties (pp. 37–8). But this means that Truthmaker will not be able to satisfy its motivation (i.e. to catch cheaters), unless it incorporates some substantial metaphysical or ontological commitments — even if only negatively, that is, as saying which properties are not acceptable.

That Truthmaker has such metaphysical commitments constitutes a central doctrine of Truth and Ontology, since much of the book presupposes it. But it seems to me that such a doctrine is wrong. The metaphysics of Truthmaker is really thin: all that Truthmaker commits one to is the existence of some entities (assuming there are some truths, but Truthmaker commits one to at least one truth, namely Truthmaker itself; and assuming that there are some truths I think that Truthmaker commits one to some abstract entities, since it seems to me that truthmaker theorists must take truthbearers to be some kind of abstract objects; but this is not the place to argue this point). But there is no commitment in Truthmaker as to what kinds of properties are unacceptable. For all Truthmaker says, the world could contain irreducibly counterfactual properties, or irreducibly negative properties, or
irreducibly past-directed properties. Of course, individual truthmaker theorists have their own ontologies and consider some properties unacceptable, but this is not because of their commitment to Truthmaker but because of other metaphysical commitments or their general metaphysical views.

Since Merricks identifies the primary motivation of Truthmaker with the idea of catching cheaters, Merricks does not properly distinguish between the primary motivation of Truthmaker and the most common polemical use of Truthmaker. But I think it is necessary to distinguish carefully between these two things. The primary motivation of Truthmaker is to articulate the dependence of truth on being, and the reason to engage in this kind of project is simply to get things right about the relationship between truth and being. Once one is committed to Truthmaker, and one has combined it with one’s own view about what kinds of properties (or, more generally, entities) one deems unacceptable, one can use it polemically to catch (what one considers to be) cheaters.

Why does Merricks think that trying to catch the cheaters is the same as the primary motivation of Truthmaker? Because, he says, the primary motivation of Truthmaker, the idea that truth depends in a substantive way on being, is not consistent with every possible claim. Theories that violate truth’s dependence on being ‘cheat’, and so ‘opposition to cheaters and the idea that truth depends substantively on being are two sides of a single coin’ (p. 4). But, as I have argued above, the metaphysics of Truthmaker is thin. Thus, although the idea that truth depends in a substantive way on being is not consistent with every possible claim (for instance, it is not consistent with the claims that truth does not substantively depend on being and that there are truths but there are no beings), it does not exclude what Merricks characterizes as cheaters, since it does not exclude irreducibly dispositional properties, irreducibly negative properties, and irreducibly past-directed properties.

Necessitarianism is the idea that a truthmaker necessitates that which it makes true: $x$ is a truthmaker for $p$ only if $x$’s mere existence is metaphysically sufficient for $p$’s truth (p. 5). Merricks argues that necessities of propositions, as opposed to ‘beliefs or sentence tokens or what have you’ (p. 6), are the bearers of truth. The argument is simple. Assuming that electrons are essentially electrons, it follows that electron $E$ is a truthmaker for (2):

\[(2) \text{ At least one electron exists} \]

Given Necessitarianism, in every world in which $E$ exists, (2) is true. But there is a world, bereft of language and believers, which contains only $E$ and whatever $E$ necessitates.

So, in $W$, (2) itself is neither a linguistic item nor a belief. It seems that that truth could only be an abstract proposition. In this way, Truthmaker combined with Necessitarianism seems to lead directly to abstract propositions. (p. 7)
Merricks then argues that to avoid commitment to abstract propositions truthmaker theorists should replace Necessitarianism by Conditional Necessitarianism which is the denial of Necessitarianism plus the claim that if \( x \) is a truthmaker for \( p \), then, necessarily, if both \( x \) and \( p \) exist, then \( p \) is true (p. 7).

Merricks himself adopts abstract propositions as truthbearers and he does not make much of the difference between Necessitarianism and Conditional Necessitarianism. His point is the conditional one that, if there are no abstract propositions, Conditional Necessitarianism is the better option since, he argues, Necessitarianism is committed to abstract propositions (p. 11).

But there is no need to adopt the more complicated Conditional Necessitarianism, since Merricks’s argument can be resisted. One might think that the argument is a non sequitur because all that it establishes is that in a world in which there are no language users and believers, \( (2) \) is an abstract proposition. But it does not follow from this that actually \( (2) \) is an abstract proposition. But Merricks had assumed that abstract propositions cannot be identified with sentences or beliefs (p. 6, n. 4), so one cannot escape his argument by saying that although \( (2) \) is an abstract proposition in the world in which only \( E \) and what it necessitates exists, it is a sentence or a belief in the actual world.

Nevertheless the argument is a non sequitur since, for all Merricks has said, \( (2) \) could be a sentence type. Sentence types are not propositions, since sentence types are relative to languages, while propositions are not. Thus Necessitarianism does not commit the truthmaker theorist to abstract propositions.

But, it might be thought, although sentence types are not propositions, they are as abstract as propositions are, since types are abstract entities. Perhaps. But even if so, no reason has yet been given why the truthmaker theorist who wants to reject abstract objects must reject Necessitarianism and accept Conditional Necessitarianism. All such truthmaker theorist needs to do is to formulate Necessitarianism in terms of a notion of being true of a possible world. Thus let us make a distinction between true in a possible world and true of a possible world. A truthbearer \( p \) is true in a world \( w \) if it exists in \( w \) and things are as \( p \) says they are. A truthbearer \( p \) is true of a world \( w \) if things are as \( p \) says they are, whether or not \( p \) exists in \( w \). (This distinction corresponds to distinctions previously made in the literature. Thus Robert Adams distinguishes between true in a world and true at a world ('Actualism and Thisness', Synthese, 49 (1981), p. 22) and Kit Fine distinguishes between inner and outer notions of truth ('Plantinga on the reduction of possibilist discourse', in J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Plantinga, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, p. 163.).) Thus a contingently existent concrete truthbearer — a token sentence say — can be true of a world in which it does not exist. For instance the token sentence 'There is at least one electron'
is true of a world in which there is one electron but there are no token sentences. But then Necessitarianism can be preserved, provided it is formulated thus: If e is a truthmaker for a truthbearer p, then every possible world in which e exists is a world of which p is true. (This is not, of course, the standard formulation of Necessitarianism. What I am claiming is that this formulation captures, in terms of the notion of truth of a world, the point of Necessitarianism no less well than the standard formulation in terms of the notion of truth in a world.)

Merricks (p. 21) believes that Truthmaker is committed to states of affairs as truthmakers (I disagree with this claim, but for reasons of space I shall not elaborate here). Merricks thinks that by postulating states of affairs, Truthmaker outstrips its primary motivation, since when it comes to the truth of that Fido is brown, that motivation seems to demand only a brown Fido (p. 69). And Merricks claims that this is one of the advantages of TSB over Truthmaker, since TSB only postulates a brown Fido (pp. 70, 93). But it is false that TSB postulates only a brown Fido. For, as Merricks formulates it, TSB says that any two possible worlds alike with respect to both what entities exist and which properties (and relations) each of those entities exemplify are thereby alike with respect to what is true (p. 68); or, in a different version, that necessarily, each true claim is such that, necessarily, given all the entities that exist and the properties that each of those entities has, that claim is true (p. 72–3). But then TSB does not postulate only a brown Fido, since it also postulates the property of being brown and claims that Fido exemplifies it. (NB: Claiming that Fido exemplifies such a property is not the same as saying that there is a state of affairs of Fido’s being brown.) Thus if the primary motivation of TSB demands only a brown Fido, TSB also outstrips that motivation. (Merricks notes that tropes, instead of states of affairs, could be used as truthmakers, and that even with tropes as truthmakers, Truthmaker would outstrip its primary motivation (p. 21, n. 3). But, even if tropes are truthmakers, my point still stands: if the primary motivation of TSB demands only a brown Fido, TSB also outstrips that motivation.)

Only when formulated in a more ontologically innocent way — like ‘any two possible worlds alike with respect to both what entities exist and how those entities are (both in themselves and in relation to each other), are thereby alike with respect to what is true’ or ‘necessarily, each true claim is such that, necessarily, given all the entities that exist and how those entities are, that claim is true’ — will TSB commit to no more than a brown Fido. Even then this will be an advantage of TSB over Truthmaker only if the primary motivation of Truthmaker, when it comes to the truth of that Fido is brown, demands no more than a brown Fido. That this is the case is something Merricks asserts but gives no argument for.

In chapter five, Merricks discusses reductive accounts of modality. He does this because he thinks that if he says that that Fido is possibly black is partly made true by the irreducibly modal property of being possibly black, some will
call him a cheater. But he says that no defender of Truthmaker should thus object (p. 98). The reason is, basically, that Truthmaker and TSB are committed to *de re* modality (because each truthmaker is *essentially* such that its truth is true, and it is *impossible* that all actual objects exist and have the properties they actually have and *p*, for all true propositions *p*, be false), but they are incompatible with reductive accounts of modality (p. 116). Why does Merricks think that Truthmaker and TSB are incompatible with reductive accounts of modality? I shall here concentrate on what Merricks says about the Lewisian reduction of modality.

According to Lewis, Fido’s being possibly black is reduced to the existence of black counterparts of Fido. Thus *that Fido is possibly black* is made true by any and all of Fido’s black counterparts. But, assuming that Fido is actually brown, none of these black counterparts exist in the actual world. Thus *that Fido is possibly black* is actually true but has no actually existing truthmaker. But Merricks argues that Truthmaker militates against there being any actual truth without an actual truthmaker (pp. 99–100). For, Merricks says, *that a horse exists* is actually true, but *that a unicorn exists* is not actually true. But on Lewis’s view there are truthmakers for both claims, since there are horses and there are unicorns. Merricks thinks that to account for why one of these claims is actually true and the other is not, Lewis should say that *that a horse exists* is actually true because it has an actually existing truthmaker and *that a unicorn exists* is not actually true because it lacks an actually existing truthmaker. So, he concludes, a corollary of Truthmaker is that, in general, actual truths have actual truthmakers. But, he says, Lewis cannot satisfy this corollary of Truthmaker when it comes to claims of *de re* modality since, given Lewis’s account of modality, *that Fido is possibly black* is actually true but lacks an actual truthmaker. Therefore, Merricks says, Lewis’s story about what grounds truths of *de re* modality conflicts with Truthmaker (p. 100).

The problem with this argument is that from the fact that *that a horse exists* has an actual truthmaker and *that a unicorn exists* lacks an actual truthmaker it does not follow that all actual truths have actual truthmakers. All this entitles us to conclude is that some actual truths have actual truthmakers and some propositions that are not actually true lack actual truthmakers. This is consistent with some actual truths lacking actual truthmakers. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that *that a horse exists* is paradigmatic and its case generalizes to all other actual truths. Such truth is non-modal, and so the fact that it has actual truthmakers does not establish that all truths, including modal ones, have actual truthmakers (likewise *that a horse exists* is a positive truth with positive truthmakers, but this does not establish that all truths, including negative ones, have positive truthmakers). Thus nothing in the argument has shown that the Lewisian must accept that all actual truths have actual truthmakers, and therefore it has not been shown that Lewis’s story conflicts with Truthmaker.
Another problem with the argument is its undefended assumption that *that a unicorn exists* is not actually true. I do not see why the Lewisian must accept this. All a Lewisian about modality needs to accept is that actually no unicorn exists. But from this (plus the T-schema and rules about negation) all that seems to follow is that *that actually a unicorn exists* is not true. But this is consistent with *that a unicorn exists*’s being actually true. *That a unicorn exists* is actually true because it is actually the case that there exists a unicorn in some other possible world.

Some might think that although Lewis’s story does not conflict with Truthmaker, given that there is more to the idea of a truthmaker than what Truthmaker says, Lewis cannot give truthmakers for truths like *that Fido is possibly black.* According to Merricks a truthmaker must necessitate its truth, and must be what its truth is *about.* Merricks never elucidates the rather elusive but (given how he uses it) crucial notion of a proposition’s being *about* an entity (this notion is more than the non-relational, thematic notion of aboutness according to which propositions about ghosts and hobbits are about ghosts and hobbits; the notion in question is a relational notion according to which if a proposition is about something then there is something that proposition is about; see pp. 32–3). All Merricks does is to state some of his intuitions about what some propositions are about (for instance, *that Merricks exists* is about Merricks, p. 168) and what some propositions are not about (for instance, Fermat’s Last Theorem is not about my thumb, p. 27). Merricks is aware that he is giving no analysis of the notion of aboutness, and he even has some sympathy for the sceptic who thinks that we cannot really make sense of the *aboutness* relation (pp. 33–4), and yet he thinks his examples give us an adequate grasp of the relevant *aboutness* relation (p. 33), and, as I said, he uses it in a crucial way. In any case, let us grant for the sake of argument some kind of intuitive grasp of the relevant notion of aboutness. Is it then true that nothing non-actual can be what an actual truth is about? Suppose there are non-actual things, and that some actual things resemble non-actual things. Then there are actual truths like *that a resembles b*, where *a* is actual but *b* is not. But this truth seems to be as much about *b* (although it is not only about *b*, since it is also about *a*) as *that Merricks exists* is about Merricks. So it seems that the Lewisian can give non-actual truthmakers for actual truths consistently with the requirement that truthmakers be what true propositions are about.

Merricks concedes that Lewis might deny that actual truths require actual truthmakers. But Merricks thinks such a denial is a cost. Although he does not explain why this is a cost, by calling the idea that actual truths have actual truthmakers an intuitively plausible corollary of Truthmaker (p. 101), he suggests that such denial is a cost in so far as it constitutes the denial of something intuitively plausible. But the Lewisian truthmaker theorist will reply that such a cost is offset by the many benefits of the reductive account of modality.
Merricks adds that even if Truthmaker did not suggest that actual truths have actual truthmakers, since most truthmaker theorists reject the ontological commitments of Modal Realism, the Lewisian reduction would still be unacceptable to most truthmaker theorists. Fair enough, but this point is irrelevant to his claim that Truthmaker is inconsistent with the Lewisian reduction of modality.

Thus Merricks has not shown that Truthmaker is incompatible with the Lewisian reduction of modality. But some of his claims about Truthmaker and TSB presuppose his claim that Truthmaker and TSB are incompatible with the Lewisian reduction. For instance, Merricks claims that it is not surprising that dispositional conditionals are counterexamples to Truthmaker and TSB since such conditionals are about the way something would be in a non-actual situation, and so there is nothing whose existence and features are what a dispositional conditional is about (p. 165). But, assuming the Lewisian story about modality, there is something whose existence and features are what a dispositional conditional is about. (Admittedly the reductive story would have to be complicated to account for the truthmakers of counterpossible subjunctive conditionals (assuming some of them are true). But the conditionals Merricks concentrates on have possible antecedents.)

In chapter six, Merricks argues that no reconciliation of Presentism with Truthmaker and TSB is possible, and he takes this to be a reason to reject Truthmaker and TSB. Merricks criticizes two attempts to reconcile Presentism with Truthmaker and TSB; one is the proposal that what makes that the Trojans were conquered true is the state of affairs of a presently existing maximal proposition that entails that the Trojans were conquered having been true (such maximal propositions Merricks calls abstract times), and the other is Lucretianism, the view that what makes that the Trojans were conquered true is that the universe, or an abstractum like the property of being blue, presently has the past-directed property of being such that the Trojans were conquered. He objects to the first proposal that that the Trojans were conquered is not about abstract times (p. 133), and to the second that such a claim is not about the universe or an abstractum like the property of being blue having the property of being such that the Trojans were conquered (p. 137).

Now, Merricks thinks that no possible view can reconcile Presentism with Truthmaker or TSB. This is because, for instance, that the Trojans were conquered is not about presently existing objects or the presently exemplified properties of such objects. Thus Presentism implies that such a claim is not about any existing objects or any properties of such objects. Therefore, since Truthmaker and TSB imply that every truth is about some existing things, or the property of some existing things, Presentism cannot be reconciled with Truthmaker and TSB (p. 138).
But it seems to me that, for all Merricks has said, there is a view that would reconcile Presentism with Truthmaker or TSB. For Merricks’s objection to Lucretianism is that it is clear that a claim like *that the Trojans were conquered* is not about the universe, or an *abstractum* like the property of *being blue*, having the property of being *such that the Trojans were conquered*. The first thing to note here is that Merricks does not make the general point that such a claim cannot be about any abstract or non-concrete object. He only makes the plausible claim that it is not about such *abstracta* like the property of *being blue*. But consider the view, similar to the view that has been defended by Williamson in the modal case, that always everything exists always, although some things are concrete at some times but non-concrete at others. (See, for instance, his ‘Necessary Existents’, in A. O’Hear, ed., *Logic, Thought and Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 233–51. Indeed, Williamson thinks it is arguable that the temporal view that always everything exists always is a corollary of his modal view that necessarily everything exists necessarily.) On this view, the Trojans exist now, although now they are non-concrete. It is not clear that *that the Trojans were conquered* is not about the presently existing Trojans having the property of *having been conquered*. This view must be rejected to be able to maintain that no reconciliation between Presentism and Truthmaker or TSB is possible. Merricks does not say anything about it, but given that he thinks that it is arguable that *that Merricks was a child* is about him having the property of *having been a child* (p. 135, n. 16; p. 144), he will have to make a good case that although truths about the past can be about presently concrete objects having past-directed properties, they cannot be about merely presently non-concrete objects having such properties.

Merricks notes that the Correspondence Theory of Truth entails that every truth is true in virtue of being somehow related to some existing thing. But since Merricks rejects Truthmaker because he thinks there are truths that are not true in virtue of being related to any existing thing, he thereby rejects the Correspondence Theory (pp. 173–4). He rejects not only the Correspondence Theory, but also any theory according to which truth is a relation or relational property (p. 182). For him truth is a primitive monadic property. It is monadic because it is not relational. But that it is monadic does not mean that it is intrinsic, since whether a proposition is true is often a matter of how things are around it (p. 182). Then Merricks gives an argument that since truth is a monadic property, it must be primitive. The argument is simply that since *being true* is monadic, if it has an analysis it must be in terms of monadic properties had by each and every true truthbearer. But, Merricks says, ‘I do not think any monadic properties of truths deliver an analysis of *being true*’ (p. 183). So, he concludes, *being true* has no analysis and is therefore primitive. This argument is inconclusive since Merricks gives no reason why he thinks that no monadic properties of truths deliver an analysis of
being true; and indeed Merricks acknowledges that this is a weak argument (p. 183). But although he is aware of the weakness of the argument for the primitiveness of truth, he is prepared to believe and defend this idea.

One thing he says in defence of the primitiveness of being true is that a primitive property of being true is preferable to the primitive properties implied by Truthmaker, for instance the property of being such that there is nothing more in the universe (p. 187). But this is all Merricks says about this. But since he does not say why he thinks that one is preferable to the other, and he does not even say in what respect one is preferable to the other, it is difficult to know how to assess his claims about preferability in this matter.

Merricks also defends the primitiveness of truth from the objection, advanced by Horwich, that if truth were primitive it would be mysterious. Merricks’s reply consists partly in saying that there are primitive but non-mysterious properties, which shows that being primitive does not entail being mysterious. And surely Merricks is right about this. But when he elaborates on the specific case of truth, all he says in defence of the non-mysteriousness of truth is that the primitive nature of truth is consistent with our knowing a lot about truth, for example, that the so-called T-biconditionals are true, that truth depends on being in the sense that that hobbits do not exist is true because hobbits do not exist, etc. (p. 186–7). But saying that a property is mysterious is not saying that one does not know anything about that property or that one cannot recognise instances of the property. Saying that a property is mysterious is saying that one cannot understand or fully understand the nature of the property.

That one cannot explain some facts or features about a certain property might suggest that one does not fully understand the nature of the property in question and therefore that it is mysterious. This, it seems to me, is what happens when one takes the property of being true to be primitive. For then it is not clear, for instance, why that hobbits do not exist is true because hobbits do not exist. Why should truth depend on how things are in that way? It is not clear that the primitivist about truth can say anything helpful in this regard and, to that extent, truth is a mysterious property. The Correspondence theorist, on the contrary, seems to be better placed to explain such dependence. For he will take the ‘because’ in ‘that hobbits do not exist is true because hobbits do not exist’ as a relational predicate so that what it really means is that that hobbits do not exist is true because of the fact that hobbits do not exist. And so the Correspondence theorist will say that if that hobbits do not exist is true, then its truth consists in and obtains in virtue of its being in the relation of correspondence with what makes it true, namely the fact that hobbits do not exist. Thus if that hobbits do not exist is true, it is true because hobbits do not exist. Perhaps the primitivist can match explanations like this — but if so Merricks has not shown it. (Thanks to Ghislain Guigon,

Stephen Mulhall’s work is always engaging, original, and fertile, and his latest book is no exception. Take it as read, then, that whatever of his book (and there is plenty) that I do not discuss in the short space of this review is very largely right, important, and/or new. I will focus in what follows only on a couple of key points where nevertheless I do not think that Mulhall has fully grasped the boldness of the challenge offered his readers by J. M. Coetzee.

Without a doubt, Mulhall has performed a very valuable service by writing this book on perhaps the greatest living novelist writing in English: J. M. Coetzee. For if this description is true of Coetzee, then it is a happy truth for readers of the back half of *Mind*: for Coetzee is, possibly above all else, a philosophical novelist.

Like Mulhall himself, Coetzee is a formidably clever man: acquaintance for instance with his remarkable 1981 paper ‘Tense, Time and Aspect in Kafka’s “The Burrow”’ would prove this to any philosopher, linguist, or lettrist. And Coetzee is — in the common-or-garden sense of the word ‘philosopher’ — no mean philosopher, as his forays into the journals make clear (see for example his 2003 reply to me, ‘Fictional Beings’, in *Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry*), partly but not only in virtue of their palpable character sometimes as lovely small pieces of literature-as-philosophy. But it is in his novels that his philosophy — for instance, his profound interest in the history of ideas, in what and how we can know, in the nature and limits and importance and unimportance of reason, in the political philosophy of our time and its limits — truly flowers. With trepidation then, and aware of the danger of the heresy of violating (by paraphrasing) the ineluctably literary character of Coetzee’s full-scale, experientially convincing presentations, we might risk offering the following thumbnail characterizations of some of those novels:

- *In the Heart of the Country* is a virtuoso early work that offers quite as great an analysis of the thin line between taking-philosophy-seriously and insanity as does (say) the writing/sayings of Foucault or Louis Sass or the Tibetan and Zen Buddhist lamas and roshis, and demonstrates gorgeous erudition in the process — but Coetzee’s