A VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

1. An archer’s shot is thus a performance that can have the AAA structure: accuracy, adroitness, aptness. So can performances generally, at least those that have an aim, even if the aim is not intentional. A shot succeeds if it has the intentional aim to hit a target and does so. A heartbeat succeeds if it helps pump blood, even absent any intentional aim.

2. Beliefs fall under the AAA structure, as do performances generally. We can distinguish between a belief’s accuracy, i.e., its truth; its adroitness, i.e., its manifesting cognitive or epistemic virtue or competence; and its aptness, i.e., its being true because competent.

3. Animal knowledge is essentially apt belief, to be distinguished from the more demanding reflective knowledge. This is not to say that the word ‘knows’ is ambiguous. Maybe it is, but distinguishing a kind of knowledge as “animal” knowledge requires no commitment to that linguistic thesis. Indeed it requires no definition of the word ‘knows’ at all. One might take this to be primitive and still proceed in three stages as follows: (a) affirm that knowledge entails belief; (b) understand “animal” knowledge as requiring apt belief without requiring defensibly apt belief, i.e., apt belief that the subject aptly believes to be apt, and whose aptness the subject can therefore defend against relevant skeptical doubts; and (c) understand “reflective” knowledge as requiring not only apt belief but also defensibly apt belief.

4. Accordingly, a belief can be safe without being sensitive. Radical skeptical scenarios provide examples. Take one’s belief that one is not a brain in a vat fooled by misleading sensory evidence into so believing. That belief is safe without being sensitive. We can thus defend Moorean common sense by highlighting the skeptic’s confusion of safety with sensitivity. Although our belief that we are not radically fooled is not sensitive, it is still safe, since not easily would that belief be false. Radical scenarios are ones that not easily would materialize.

That defense against radical skepticism is soon halted by cases in which a belief seems unsafe while still amounting to knowledge. I am hit hard and suffer excruciating pain, believing on that basis that I am in pain. But I might very easily have suffered only a slight glancing blow instead, in which case I would have experienced not pain but only discomfort, though in fact I would still have believed that I was in pain. This might have been due to priming, perhaps, or to my over-reactive hypochondria. Nevertheless, I do know I suffer pain when the pain is excruciating, surely, even if my belief is unsafe since I might easily have so believed in the presence of discomfort that was not really pain.

5. A belief that $p$ is basis-relative safe, then, if and only if it has a basis that it would (likely) have only if true. A belief that $p$ is basis-relative sensitive if and only if it is based on a basis such that if it were false that $p$, then not easily would the believer believe that $p$ on that same basis.

6. What then is the alternative defense? It proceeds as follows: a. Reject the skeptic’s requirement of outright sensitivity, and even his requirement of basis-relative sensitivity. b. Point out the intuitive advantage, over such sensitivity requirements, enjoyed by corresponding safety requirements. c. Suggest that the plausibility of the sensitivity requirements derives in large measure from the corresponding safety requirements that are so easily confused with them through failure to appreciate that strong conditionals do not contrapose. d. Conclude that the skeptic does not refute common sense, nor does he even locate a paradox within common sense, since we are commonsensically committed at most to basis-relative safety, and not to basis-relative sensitivity. For our belief that we are not radically deceived — as in a BIV or evil demon scenario — is basis-relative safe, though not basis-relative sensitive.

7. I would like to confront dream skepticism directly, without presupposing the imagination model. Indeed, let us initially grant to the skeptic the orthodox conception that he needs for his best dream-based attack. How might virtue epistemology defend common sense against that attack?
8. In conclusion, neither aptness nor safety entails the other. The connection that perhaps remains is only this. Aptness requires the manifestation of a competence, and a competence is a disposition, one with a basis resident in the competent agent, one that would in normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it. Such restricted safety seems quite compatible with our twofold fragility: with the fragility both of the competence, and of the relevant normalcy of the conditions in which it is exercised.

9. Ordinary perceptual beliefs can thus perhaps retain their aptness and their status as animal knowledge, despite the possibility that one is asleep and dreaming. Ordinary perceptual beliefs can still attain success through the exercise of perceptual competence, despite the fragility of that competence and of its required normal conditions. However unsafe a performer’s competence may be, and however unsafe may be the conditions normal for its exercise, if a performance does succeed through the exercise of a competence in its proper conditions, then it is an apt performance, one creditable to the performer. Knowledge is just a special case of such creditable, apt performance. Perceptual knowledge is unaffected by the fragility of the knower’s competence or of the conditions normal for its exercise. The knower’s belief can thus remain apt even if unsafe through the proximity of the dream possibility.

10. Despite how plausible that may seem intuitively, we soon encounter a problem. You see a surface that looks red in ostensibly normal conditions. But it is a kaleidoscope surface under the control of a joker who also controls the ambient light, and might as easily have presented you with a red-light+white-surface combination as with the actual white-light+red-surface combination. Do you then know the surface you see to be red when he then presents you with that good combination, despite the fact that, even more easily, he might have presented you with the bad combination?
   Arguably, your belief that the surface is red is an apt belief, in which case we would have to say that it amounts to knowledge. For you are then exercising your faculty of color vision in normal conditions of lighting, distance, size of surface, etc., in conditions generally appropriate for the exercise of color vision. Yet is is not easy to insist that one therefore knows that surface to be red.
   If forced to retreat along that line, our solution to the problem of dreams will be undone. For we will not be able to insist that, despite the proximity of the dream possibility, perceptual beliefs are nonetheless apt and therefore knowledge. Apt they may still be, but no longer clearly knowledge. Of course, we could still fall back to the imagination model, but our solution directly through a virtue epistemology would have vanished.
   Recall, however, our distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the animal and the reflective. Any full account would need to register how these are matters of degree. For present purposes, however, the key component of the distinction is the difference between apt belief simpliciter, and apt belief aptly noted. If K represents animal knowledge and K+ reflective knowledge, then the basic idea may be represented thus: K+p <—> KKp.

11. Here now is a premise from which I propose to reason: (C) For any correct belief that p, the correctness of that belief derives from the exercise of a competence only if the exercise of that competence, in appropriate conditions for its exercise, would not too easily then have issued a false belief that p.

12. The problem of dreams arises for any ordinary case of perceptual knowledge through the fact that the subject might too easily have believed just as he does in that instance, although his belief and its sensory basis would have been housed in a dream. Too easily, then, might any ordinary perceptual belief have had its same basis while false.
   We responded by granting that ordinary perceptual beliefs are thus rendered unsafe, while insisting that they can remain apt even so, and hence knowledge of a sort, of the animal sort. This is because what is endangered by the proximate possibility that one dreams is only our perceptual competence or the presence of appropriate conditions for its exercise. And we hold aptness to be what animal knowledge requires, not
safety.

However, the kaleidoscope case puts that response in doubt. What seems there endangered is one’s perceptual competence or the conditions for its exercise, and yet we are strongly drawn to claim that one’s belief is there apt without being knowledge.

In reaction, we have invoked the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, or at least the core of that distinction, namely that between apt belief simpliciter, and apt belief aptly noted. But that is of course to grant that the kaleidoscope perceiver does fall short in one important epistemic respect. He has knowledge of a sort, animal knowledge, but lacks knowledge of another sort, reflective knowledge. So, if we apply our reasoning about that case to the problem of dreams, the consequence will be that our perceptual knowledge generally falls short of the reflective level. The skeptic wins.

13. That is where we are led if we take our cue, for ordinary perception in general, from the kaleidoscope example. In that example, we retain animal knowledge because we retain our normal competence to tell whether we are in normal lighting conditions, and we seem clearly enough to exercise our color vision in its normal conditions (of distance, lighting, size of surface, etc.). We there fall short of reflective knowledge because the jokester precludes the aptness of our implicit confidence that our perceptual belief is apt. Given his control, it is then too easy for us to be so confident (in that default way) in normal conditions for exercising our relevant competence, while still mistaken. So when, as it happens, we are right, not mistaken, this cannot be attributed to the exercise of the competence as a success derived from it.

It might be countered that the presence of the jokester removes the normalcy of the conditions for our taking it for granted by default that the light is god. But this still would result in our failure aptly to take that for granted. We might fail thus in either of two ways. Perhaps we fail because although we take that for granted in appropriate conditions for doing so, nevertheless, our correctness still cannot be credited to our default competence, For, the jokester’s presence makes it too easily possible that we so exercised our competence and get it wrong. Alternatively, we fail because the conditions for the exercise of our default competence are spoiled by the very presence of the jokester. Either way, then, given the jokester, we fail aptly to take it for granted that the light is good.

Is the case of ordinary perception alike in those crucial respects? That is not so clear. Among the things we must take for granted in attaining ordinary perceptual knowledge is that we are awake. Is this something we believe simply based on our being conscious? Plausibly it is, at least on the orthodox conception of dreams. In our dreams we are awake, and on the orthodox conception we thereby believe accordingly, while we dream. Plausibly, then, our basis when we take ourselves to be awake is simply being conscious. And what are the conditions required for exercising this competence? Here it is less clear what to say.

Do we retain when dreaming our normal competence to tell when we are awake? Plausibly we do not. Sleep deprives us of normal competence to respond to features of our experience that would show to someone awake that it was just a dream (were it possible to inspect the contents of a dream while awake). Again, Austin spoke of a “dreamlike” quality, and Descartes of a certain lack of coherence. Suppose the orthodox conception is right, so that in dreaming we have real experiences, and respond to them with real beliefs, including the belief that one is awake. Perhaps we believe we are awake whenever we are conscious. Should we then say that our basis for so believing is just being conscious? If we must say this, then the pertinent competence might too easily lead us astray in any ordinary situation, since any ordinary situation will be one wherein the dream possibility is too proximate, and in that case we would still believe ourselves awake on the same basis, namely on the basis of being conscious.

If we reason thus, however, then we shall have to take back our claim that we can know ourselves to be in pain when we suffer excruciating pain, even if, through priming or hypochondria, we would still have believed ourselves to suffer pain under the light, glancing blow which we very easily might have received in place of the painful one. We shall have to take back that claim to know based on the excruciating pain, for we shall have to take back the claim that the excruciating pain is the relevant basis for our belief. After all, we would have believed ourselves to be in pain whether the pain was excruciating or not. So the real basis for the belief is some more determinable experience of which excruciating pain is
only one determinate.

Suppose we resist such reasoning. Despite the fact that we would have believed ourselves in pain even if the pain had not been excruciating, we might argue, still there is some sense in which the excruciating pain is in all its intensity a cause, and a basis of our belief that we are in pain. If so, then we open the way for a similar response for the problem of dreams. Now we could say that even if we would have believed ourselves awake had we simply been conscious, this does not take away the richer basis that we enjoy in waking life for the belief that one is awake. Now we could appeal, with Austin, to the vividness and richness of wakeful experience, and with Descartes to its coherence, as among the features that form a basis for our belief that we are awake.

Of course, it may be that dreams pose a problem for the safety of ordinary perceptual knowledge in two ways. First, the phenomenological content of dreams may simply be different from that of waking life, in the ways suggested by Austin and Descartes. So, the dreams you commonly undergo may very rarely if ever really be intrinsically all that much like wakeful experience in content. Second, being asleep may impair your competence to discern features relevant to whether it is a dream or waking life. So, the way in which you form beliefs in a dream, including the belief as to whether you are awake, is not the competent way in which you form perceptual beliefs in waking life. This may be because you do not have the same experiential basis, since the dream basis would fall far short in respect of vividness, of richness, and of coherence. Alternatively, and compatibly, it may be because even if your experience in a dream could match ordinary waking experience in those respects, nevertheless your competence to take such respects into account would be so impaired when asleep that it would not matter. You would believe that you were awake so long as you were conscious, regardless of how vivid, rich, or coherent your experience might or might not be.

We now have two quite different solutions for the problem of dreams. The first lecture proposed an imagination model of dreams, as a way of blocking the skeptic’s reasoning for the conclusion that dreams render unsafe our ordinary perceptual beliefs. However, a further argument was needed, and proposed, for the conclusion that we can sustain our claim to perceptual knowledge that is reflective, not only animal. And this led to some surprising implications for how our knowledge that we are awake compares with our knowledge of the cogito.

This second lecture proposes a virtue epistemology with a crucial distinction between the aptness and the safety of performances generally, and of beliefs in particular. This distinction enables a solution to the problem of dreams that does not require the imagination model. On this second solution, dreams pose a problem for the safety of our perceptual beliefs, even perhaps for their basis-restricted safety, but not for their aptness, while it is their aptness and not their safety that is required for them to constitute animal knowledge. It may be thought that dreams still pose a problem for our claims to reflective perceptual knowledge. But we have seen the resources available to our virtue epistemology for meeting also this deeper form of skepticism.