I. Kant’s Moral Psychology (from Lecture Three)

Incentive: motivationally loaded representation of an object
Principle: description of an agent’s response to an incentive (the agent’s “contribution”), the treatment of the incentive as a ground for doing a certain action
Principles for human beings: rational principles telling us whether to treat the incentive as a reason for doing a certain action
Principles for animals: instincts telling the animal to treat the incentive as occasion for taking a certain action

Two senses of Autonomy:
   Acting in accordance with the laws of your own causality
   Spontaneity: choosing the laws of your own causality

II. Instinct, Intelligence, and Reason

1. The world viewed “through” an animal’s instincts is organized teleologically around the animal’s interests.

   Instinct = established connection between incentive and response, an action sensed as called for or appropriate by the incentive (normatively loaded representation)
   - How my use is narrower than usual: insofar as one can make the distinction, I am not talking about wholly automatic response, but response experienced as called for
   - How my use is broader than usual: I am not contrasting instinctive response to learned response

   Intelligence = capacity to increase one’s stock of established connections through learning; adds to range of objects perceived as to be avoided, to be sought, etc.

   Instrumental intelligence = capacity to learn about the practical significance of the properties of objects

   Intelligence and instinct: intelligence ramifies instinct and increases its range

   The world viewed “through” intelligence is still teleological – a world of means and ends

   Self-consciousness: ability to turn your attention on your own inner states

   Why self-consciousness leads to reason
      Ability to turn your attention on to your incentives is an ability to question them
      Questioning them is asking whether they provide reasons
      Answering that question is adopting rational principles

III. Results of the development of self-consciousness/reason

1. liberation from the control of instinct (freedom)
2. proliferation in the possible ends we can choose, and with it, capacity to choose actions
   (Kant: “Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History”)
3. division of the soul into parts

IV. How the soul is divided into parts by self-consciousness:

1. Reason (principle determining your response to an incentive) is separated from the incentive
2. Consciousness of the incentive turns it into an inclination
   “I have an inclination” = “I am aware of the workings of an incentive on me”
   Note: incentives are at bottom, inarticulable: the awareness of a basic suitableness-to-me
   “it is pleasant” = “some form of this basic suitableness-to-me is in place”
   i.e. pleasure is a dummy word
   The pleasure is not the object of the inclination, but what makes you like the object

2A. A current debate: do inclinations provide us with reasons?
   Realist position: inclination is a response to the good-making properties of an object; it is those
   properties, not the inclination itself, that provide reasons
   Kantian position: inclination is a response to an incentive, a form of suitableness-to-me. It is that
   suitableness, together with an affirmation of my own value, that makes the object valuable and
   reason-providing. My awareness of that (=the fact that I have an inclination for something)
   can give me a reason (provided it makes some action worth taking). It does not follow that
   when you tell someone your reason, you say “I want it.”

3. When the soul is divided into parts, practical deliberation becomes necessary. Therefore the work of deliberation is
   re-unification (More on that in Lecture Five…).

V. The Origin of Practical Identity

Adopting principles of reason = adopting the laws of your own causality = adopting your own form

Aristotle’s three kinds of life
   Vegetative: capacity for nutrition and reproduction (basic self-constitution)
   Animal: capacity for representation and action
       Transforms the way the animal carries on vegetative activities
       Adds new activities: e.g. love, play
       Adds a new form of identity: being a someone, a subject
       In virtue of that, appropriate object of some reactive attitudes/indirect passions
   Rational: capacity for choice of one’s principles
       Transforms the way a person carries on animal activities
       Adds new activities: e.g., science, philosophy
       Adds a new, more individual, form of identity: practical identity
       In virtue of that, a responsible (answerable) agent

VI. Normativity of the Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives

Why the categorical and hypothetical imperatives are normative for self-conscious agents: because for such agents,
construction of the will is a task.

Deliberating = choosing the laws of your own causality
   Hypothetical imperative governs you insofar as they are the laws of your causality
   Categorical imperative governs you insofar as they laws of your causality