however, and early in part 2, he concludes that Parmenides holds what we will call *strict* monism—the view that there exists only one thing. But his argument for this conclusion is peculiar. He appears to concede Barnes's claim that there is nothing in the deductions of B8 that demand *any* kind of monist reading (113), but then asserts that the use of '*mounogenes*' at B8:4 should be interpreted precisely so as to *confirm* the *strict* monist reading—even though he acknowledges that there are many other possible interpretations of this term that he has not explored. Why? Because his earlier reconstruction of the argument of B2 and B6 can be shown, by a straightforward but non-obvious chain of reasoning, to entail strict monism (113–14). For Wedin, then, even disputes about the meaning of key terms in *WT* are to be settled by appeal to his own reconstruction of what he takes to be deductively prior arguments in *WT*. This is a risky procedure, to say the least, and we doubt that it is adequately justified.

Though we do have serious reservations about Wedin's approach in this book, we have no reservations whatsoever about recommending it to those who wish to join the fascinating and still unresolved struggle over what Parmenides really said.

S O S S E H   A S S A T U R I A N
M A T T   E V A N S

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Anna Marmodoro. *Aristotle on Perceiving Objects.* Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. x + 291. Cloth, $79.00.

The study of Aristotle's psychology has long been dominated by metaphysical concerns, centering above all on the relation between the soul and the body. For centuries, this was inevitable, given the widespread preoccupation with immortality and considerable puzzlement as to whether Aristotle's views about the intellect committed him to it or not. But in the twentieth century the soul-body relation has continued to be the main focus, even when talking about perception. The debate over perception that raged from the 1980s until the last decade was almost entirely restricted to the question of whether Aristotle was a functionalist.

It is a welcome change, then, to have a book whose primary concern is the content of perception. There are many questions worth pursuing here that have not received sufficient attention in the literature: for example, does perception have content for Aristotle and, if so, of what sort? Is it propositional? Is there only conceptual content or does he allow for a kind of nonconceptual content? And others as well. Although Marmodoro initially sets her scope wide, to describe Aristotle's account of "the structure of experience" (1), she is in fact predominantly concerned with one specific problem: how we can perceive *ordinary objects as such*, despite their possessing perceptible qualities that belong to different sense modalities. She approaches this question effectively in two stages: first, by asking to what extent and in what way perceptible objects determine the content of perception on Aristotle's theory (chapters 1–3), and second how cross-modal binding is possible (chapters 4–8). To answer the first she looks closely at Aristotle's causal theory of perception, above all in *De Anima* 3.2; and for the second at his views on the "common sense" and his repeated discussions of what is required to distinguish perceptible qualities from different modalities. She takes issue with Pavel Gregoric's *Aristotle on the Common Sense* (OUP, 2007), in particular by arguing more "robustly" that the common sense has powers "over and above" those of the special senses that constitute it and which cannot be reduced to them (200–205).

Once the issues are framed in this way, though, it should come as no surprise that Marmodoro's approach is resolutely *metaphysical*: her arguments hinge almost entirely on the individuation of events, the nature of powers, identity conditions, sameness and difference, how unity is achieved in various multiplicities. This emphasis is natural enough, and indeed justified, since Aristotle's discussions of the causal interaction between perceiver and

perceived, and the unification of the special senses, are carried out largely in metaphysical terms. But the question here that is never fully addressed is whether these considerations are *sufficient* to determine answers about content and awareness. I think they can, but only up to a point. For example, Aristotle makes clear why the question of unity is relevant to multimodal discrimination: a single subject must be aware of two different qualities, yet each can only be intrinsically perceived by distinct special senses. A solution to this problem is *necessary* for cross-modal binding to be possible, and in chapters 6–8 Marmodoro examines six different solutions she finds in Aristotle. But is that enough to explain how we unify the perception of certain qualities into the recognition of an object and not others (as opposed to the unity of perceptual consciousness more globally)? It hardly seems so. If Aristotle has an answer to this, he would have to say much more. A similar point can be made about the "subtle perceptual realism" Marmodoro attributes to Aristotle in chapter 3. She is right to take the passages from *Metaphysics* 4.5 and *De Sensu* 6 that she discusses on 135–39 as indicating multiple causal effects from a common cause. But do they say explicitly anything about variation *in content*, much less subjectivity as she claims (especially as she rejects privacy on 141), or about standard conditions and reliabilism?

I cannot do more than mention some of the many innovative interpretations in this book: for example, Marmodoro's extensive reconstruction of the Aristotle's metaphysics of causal powers in chapter 1, especially regarding the transmission of form; perceptible qualities as multi-track and multi-stage dispositions (126–33); the reception of the form in the medium as a "disturbance" that leaves it unaffected (144–53); the special senses as having only a partial grasp of common perceptibles (169–74); the constitution of common perceptibles (175–76); as well as many interesting readings of individual passages. All of these are worth engaging.

The book is thoughtfully organized, written in a clear and lively style, and aimed at an audience that includes both contemporary philosophers and scholars of Aristotle alike. It provides an excellent introduction to many issues that have not gotten the extended and focused discussion they deserve. Very few books are the last word on a topic. But not all do the field a service, as Marmodoro's does, by stimulating further debate.

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A. A. Long. *Greek Models of Mind and Self.* Revealing Antiquity, 22. General editor, G. W. Bowersock. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. xvi + 228. Cloth, $25.95.

After a summary introduction, the book consists of five chapters that cover material from Homer through the Stoics. Intended for non-scholars (x), the book makes no effort to engage competing scholarly views or to indicate where such positions might be found.

For the general public, however, many lacunae limit the book's value. Long sometimes refers to details of texts, or to ancient authors not actually quoted in the book, in ways that would bewilder most general readers. Nor is the discussion a full survey; important figures and issues in the history of the topic are left untouched. Of the many Presocratics who might be discussed in a book like this, one finds scattered mentions of only Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles, and these are noted mostly in passing for their influences on others. Although the first chapter begins with a couple of pages on Plotinus, the Neoplatonists receive no sustained attention. The Epicureans are named in the first pages of the final chapter, which is then mostly devoted to the Stoics, especially Epictetus. Aristotle is characterized briefly as a somewhat unfaithful Platonist. Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and Gorgias are discussed in some detail; archaeological evidence, Greek dramatists, and historians are not.

But not just numbers of ancient authors are passed over; Long never once directly engages with the obviously pertinent (and notoriously thorny) problem of laying out what