

Our Knowledge of the Internal World

VI. Knowing what we are thinking

Two characterizations of epistemic transparency

A thought is transparent in the sense that, if you grasp it, you thereby know everything about it as it is in itself.

Michael Dummett


It is an undeniable feature of the notion of meaning – obscure as that notion is – that meaning is *transparent* in the sense that, if someone attaches a meaning to each of two words, he must know whether these meanings are the same.

Michael Dummett

Boghossian's slow switching story

Peter is suddenly and unwittingly transported to Twin Earth where he suffers no discernible disruption in the continuity of his mental life, but happily lives out the rest of his days, never discovering the relocation that he has been forced to undergo.

A model of the slow switching story



The anti-individualist's simple strategy

Showing that there is no conflict [between externalism and knowledge of content] is basically simple. It depends on realizing that whatever is responsible for the contents of our thought, whether known or not, is also responsible for the content of the thought that we are having the thought.

Donald Davidson

Boghossian's platitude about memory

If S knows that p at t1, and if at (some later time) t2, S remembers everything S knew at t1, then S knows that p at t2.