Welcome
From the Chair of the Faculty Board

I hope this finds you and yours as well as may be in these coronavirus-blighted times. Lockdown began a week after the end of Hilary Full Term. By then the term’s teaching had finished, as had the Hilary Term examinations in philosophy. Several of these appointments represented the bringing-back-up-to-number of the fellows in philosophy at the relevant college, following a gap—with St Anne’s and Worcester returning to two fellows after a number of years, and Balliol (of course, a much-storied college for philosophy) returning to three.

Sad news gathered over the winter, however, as we learnt of the deaths of a number of greatly esteemed emeritus colleagues: David Bostock, Myles Burnyeat, Jim Griffin, Rom Harré, John Lucas, and Brian McGuinness. Many of you will have personal memories of these gifted philosophers and teachers, or will have studied their works. In my own case, I think particularly of Rom Harré and John Lucas, who were amongst my very first teachers in philosophy of physics; I, conversely, would have been amongst the very last of the students they taught in Oxford. Both played a very significant role in establishing the joint schools of Maths and Philosophy and Physics and Philosophy in the late 1960s.

The very first edition of this magazine, back in 2009, carried a piece about the then-anticipated move of the Faculty to a large, new Humanities building to be built on the Radcliffe Observatory site. This building project ran aground shortly thereafter, in large part a victim to fallout of the 2008 financial crisis. A combined Humanities building remained an ambition for the Humanities Division, however, and planning for it was revived over the last couple of years. Last June we were delighted to hear of a £150 million donation from Stephen Schwarzman to fund this new building, which will house seven Humanities Faculties—including Philosophy—and a combined Humanities library. In addition, there will be graduate study spaces, flexible research space, lecture theatres and performance spaces. The architects (Hopkins) have now been appointed and are finalising the detailed design, in consultation with Faculties. We still anticipate that the building will open in 2024.

More pleasant to recollect, at the beginning of the academic year we welcomed a number of new colleagues as tutorial fellows—Catharine Abell (aesthetics at Queen’s); Alexander Brown and Marion Durand (ancient philosophy at Balliol and Corpus respectively); Will Davies and Matt Parrot (philosophy of mind at St Anne’s and St Hilda’s respectively); and Natalia Wrights Hickman (philosophy of action at Worcester). Several of these appointments represented the bringing-back-up-to-number of the fellows in philosophy at the relevant college, following a gap—with St Anne’s and Worcester returning to two fellows after a number of years, and Balliol (of course, a much-storied college for philosophy) returning to three.

CONTENTS

2 Welcome From the Chair of the Faculty Board: Chris Timpson
4 News
5 New People
6 Aesthetics in the 21st Century: Catharine Abell, James Grant & Alison Hills
8 Philosophy at Oxford 1979-2020: Anita Avramides
10 The Story of Academia.edu: Richard Price
12 A Mind Still Valid: Katherine Parkinson
13 AI Ethics at Oxford: Peter Millican
15 Minds That Speak: Philip Pettit
16 Recent Books
26 Obituaries

Chris Timpson
Professor of the Philosophy of Physics
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, Brasenose College

More pleasant to recollect, at the beginning of the academic year we welcomed a number of new colleagues as tutorial fellows—Catharine Abell (aesthetics at Queen’s); Alexander Brown and Marion Durand (ancient philosophy at Balliol and Corpus respectively); Will Davies and Matt Parrot (philosophy of mind at St Anne’s and St Hilda’s respectively); and Natalia Wrights Hickman (philosophy of action at Worcester). Several of these appointments represented the bringing-back-up-to-number of the fellows in philosophy at the relevant college, following a gap—with St Anne’s and Worcester returning to two fellows after a number of years, and Balliol (of course, a much-storied college for philosophy) returning to three.

Sad news gathered over the winter, however, as we learnt of the deaths of a number of greatly esteemed emeritus colleagues: David Bostock, Myles Burnyeat, Jim Griffin, Rom Harré, John Lucas, and Brian McGuinness. Many of you will have personal memories of these gifted philosophers and teachers, or will have studied their works. In my own case, I think particularly of Rom Harré and John Lucas, who were amongst my very first teachers in philosophy of physics; I, conversely, would have been amongst the very last of the students they taught in Oxford. Both played a very significant role in establishing the joint schools of Maths and Philosophy and Physics and Philosophy in the late 1960s.

The very first edition of this magazine, back in 2009, carried a piece about the then-anticipated move of the Faculty to a large, new Humanities building to be built on the Radcliffe Observatory site. This building project ran aground shortly thereafter, in large part a victim to fallout of the 2008 financial crisis. A combined Humanities building remained an ambition for the Humanities Division, however, and planning for it was revived over the last couple of years. Last June we were delighted to hear of a £150 million donation from Stephen Schwarzman to fund this new building, which will house seven Humanities Faculties—including Philosophy—and a combined Humanities library. In addition, there will be graduate study spaces, flexible research space, lecture theatres and performance spaces. The architects (Hopkins) have now been appointed and are finalising the detailed design, in consultation with Faculties. We still anticipate that the building will open in 2024. As well as to us, it will be a home to new activities, some of which have already begun, including a new initiative in Ethics and AI, which is planned to lead to the foundation of a new Institute for Ethics in AI within the Faculty. Peter Millican writes about current Ethics and AI activities at Oxford later in the magazine.
Jake Quilty-Dunn wins the 2020 William James Prize

Jake Quilty-Dunn, a postdoctoral research fellow on the European Research Council-funded project, Metacognition of Concepts, has won the 2020 William James Prize. The prize is awarded by the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness for “the most outstanding single published contribution to the empirical or philosophical study of consciousness”. Jake’s winning paper, “Is Iconic Memory Iconic?”, is published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and can be found at doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12625.

Martin Pickup wins the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaphysics

Martin Pickup, Turpin Junior Fellow at Oriel College, has won the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaphysics, a biennial prize awarded by the Marc Sanders Foundation to philosophers who are within 15 years of the completion of their PhD. Martin was awarded the prize for his paper, “The Situationalist Account of Change”. He received a cash prize of $5,000 and his paper will be published in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. More information and a copy of the paper are available at marcsandersfoundation.org/metaphysics.

Amia Srinivasan elected as the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls

Amia Srinivasan, previously Associate Professor of Philosophy and Tutorial Fellow at St John’s College, was recently elected as the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College. She is the first woman to hold this prestigious Chair, which was previously occupied by Isaiah Berlin, Charles Taylor, and Jerry Cohen. After a BA at Yale, Amia completed her BPhil and DPhil in Philosophy at Oxford, initially as a Rhodes Scholar, and then as a Prize Fellow at All Souls College. She works on topics in political philosophy, epistemology, the history and philosophy of feminism, and metaphysics. Amia has recently been writing about anger in politics, political epistemology, no platforming, and Title IX and the ethics of pedagogy. Her collection of feminist essays, The Right to Sex, is forthcoming with Bloomsbury.

Rafał Banka joins the Faculty as recipient of an ERC Starter Grant

The Faculty is delighted to begin hosting Rafał Banka’s three-year research project in comparative philosophy, which is funded by a prestigious European Research Council Starter Grant. Rafał, who has expertise in Chinese philosophy, has joined the Faculty as a research fellow for the duration of the project from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. His project aims to bring contemporary analytic metaphysics into dialogue with Chinese philosophy by deploying techniques drawn from mereology to clarify, or reconstruct, the metaphysical system found in the Daodejing.

NEW PEOPLE

Catharine Abell: The Queen’s College

Catharine joins the Faculty from the University of Manchester, where she was Lecturer, Senior Lecturer and then Reader in Philosophy. From 2006-2010, she was a Macquarie University Research Fellow. She has a PhD from Finkers University and an undergraduate degree from The University of Adelaide. Her research focuses on aesthetics. She has written on the nature and value of art, the expression of emotion, and the nature of genre and its interpretative and evaluative roles. Her research also addresses issues specific to the representational arts, including the nature of depiction, and of cinematic and photographic representation. She has recently completed a book, Fiction, in which she develops an account of fiction as a social practice. Her next research project will address the nature and importance of artistic style.

Alexander Bown: Balliol College

Before joining the faculty, Alex had already spent a couple of years at Oxford, as a Career Development Fellow at The Queen’s College. He was also an undergraduate at Oxford, but received his PhD in 2018 from the University of Geneva. He mainly works on issues related to logic, epistemology and ontology in ancient philosophy, he is especially interested by the views of Hellenistic philosophers and Aristotle on these topics. In recent years, most of his research has focused on the Epicurean school and their attempts to deal with problems such as the status of future contingents, the truth conditions of conditionals, and (something like) the problem of induction.

Will Davies: St Anne’s College

Will joins the Faculty from the University of Birmingham, where he was Lecturer in Philosophy from 2017-19. He studied for the BPhil and DPhil at Balliol College, during which time he was appointed as a Junior Research Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge. He later held postdoctoral positions at the Universities of Antwerp and Oxford. Will’s main research interests are in the philosophy of mind, broadly construed. His main focus is on colour perception, in particular, the nature of colour constancy, and the relationship between colour and form. He is also working on a project concerning social explanation in psychiatry.

Marion Durand: Corpus Christi College

Marion joins the Faculty from the University of Toronto, where she spent seven years, first as a PhD student and then as a lecturer in the Department of Classics and the Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Before that, she had studied Classics as an undergraduate at Cambridge. Marion’s primary research is in Stoic philosophy of language with forays into ancient logic and grammar as well as contemporary philosophy of language. Her recent work explores the semantics of Stoic propositions and attempts to understand the place of language in the Stoic philosophical system, including its relationship to metaphysics and the role it plays in Stoic epistemology.

Matthew Parrott: St Hilda’s College

Matt joins the Faculty from the University of Birmingham, where he was a Birmingham Fellow in the Department of Philosophy from 2017-2019. Prior to that, he was Lecturer in Philosophy at King’s College London from 2014-2017 and held a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Oxford from 2012-2014. Matt received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses primarily on questions in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but it extends to issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. His current projects are focused on self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, the role of imagination in delusional thinking, causal explanation in psychiatry, and the nature of self-consciousness.

Natalia Waights Hickman: Worcester College

Natalia joins the Faculty after two years as a Junior Research Fellow at The Queen’s College, Oxford. Before that, she spent two years at the University of Oslo’s Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMIN), first as an academic visitor completing her Oxford DPhil, and then in a research post. Since 2017 she has also been a research affiliate at Oslo’s ConceptLab project. Before the DPhil, she completed an MA in Philosophy at Reading, and a BA in PPE at Oxford. Natalia’s research intersects epistemology, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language and mind. Her work so far has focused on the epistemology of language, and knowledge-how. Currently, her central interest is in the interaction between conceptions of normativity and theories of practical and linguistic knowledge.
Fiction poses a variety of interesting philosophical problems. Our ability to understand fictions is philosophically perplexing because, like the contents of assertions, their contents are often non-literally conveyed. We identify the non-literal contents of assertions by appealing to information about the world together with the assumption that speakers intend their assertions accurately to reflect how things are. When the literal content of an assertion does not conform to how things are, we ascribe some non-literal content to it that does. This interpretative strategy does not work for fiction, however, because we do not expect the content of a fiction to reflect how things are in reality.

The scope of fictive content also poses a philosophical problem. We might take it to be part of the fictive content of Fielding’s *Tom Jones* that Tom eats regularly and sleeps at night, although Fielding does not explicitly describe Tom as such. Some philosophers claim that fictions represent things as being as much like they are in reality (or like we believe them to be in reality) as is compatible with the contents of authors’ utterances. However, this makes fictive content too broad in scope. For example, it suggests that Emma has the fictive content that broccoli is nutritious, despite making no mention of broccoli.

The existence and nature of fictional entities is also puzzling. While we readily agree that Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character created by Jane Austen in writing *Emma*, suggesting that Emma Woodhouse exists, there is no woman such as Austen describes Emma as being. This raises the problem of what kind of entity Emma Woodhouse could be, if indeed such an entity exists.

In my book *Fiction* (OUP, 2020), I develop unified solutions to these problems. My chief contention is that fiction is an institutional social practice. This has important consequences. Because institutions consist in systems of rules, it suggests that rules determine the contents of authors’ fictive utterances. I argue that these rules ascribe to utterances of representations with certain features the contents that non-fictive utterances of those representations would have if they were made in certain contexts. Understanding those utterances therefore involves ascribing contents to them in accordance with those rules, rather than drawing inferences about authors’ intentions. These rules suggest that background information can play a role in understanding fiction without itself being part of fictive content. While it is not part of the content of *Tom Jones* that Tom eats, sleeps and sweats, readers may nevertheless need to draw on their knowledge that people do these things in order to understand *Tom Jones*. We draw on rich informational resources and engage in complex counterfactual reasoning in order to understand fictions, although their contents are finite and tractable.

Institutional rules enable the creation of social entities by specifying conditions sufficient for the creation of such entities. For example, the rules of the institution of marriage specify that the utterance of a certain form of words in a certain context suffices to create a marriage. Likewise, I argue, the rules of fiction enable authors to create fictional entities by uttering representations with certain features. On this account, fictional entities are social objects, akin to marriages, corporations and money.
What Good Is Art?

James Grant

One of the core questions in the philosophy of art is what makes good art good. Paintings can be good because they are well composed, powerfully expressive, and original. A poem can be good because it is eloquent, insightful, and imaginative. A work of conceptual art can be good for being challenging and provocative. Is there something that ties all these properties together and explains why they make something good art? For example, is good art always beautiful in some way, or rewarding to experience? An answer to this question promises to shed light on what (if anything) the purpose or function of art is. It should also put us in a better position to explain why good art matters, or why good art is a good thing.

Many would say that, at bottom, good art is a good thing because it gives us pleasure. Indeed, many take this to be obvious. After all, art is made to be looked at, watched, listened to, or read. It is made to be experienced. So when it is a good thing, the basic reason why is that it provides us with pleasurable experiences. Some reject pleasure theories on the grounds that art provides benefits other than pleasure. Experiences can be valuable without being pleasurable, and some say that art provides benefits that are not experiences at all, such as knowledge, moral improvement, or connections with others.

All of these theories explain the goodness of art in terms of its own goodness for us. I want to see how well the value of art can be explained by a non-welfarist theory—that is, one that does not explain art’s goodness by appeal to benefits we get from it. On such a view, the basic fact about the value of intelligent films, graceful dancing, and imaginative novels is that they are good in themselves. We benefit from experiencing them at least partly because we are experiencing something intrinsically good.

One reason to doubt welfarism is that it does not clearly have the best account of the valuable experiences art provides. For example, enjoying a poem or watching a film with pleasure is an appropriate response to its intelligence and beauty. But it is difficult to explain why responding with pleasure is an appropriate response to a film’s intelligence (as opposed to a common or normal response) without claiming that its intelligence has some value other than providing pleasure.

A second route to non-welfarism goes through virtue theory. Many ethicists hold that an act’s virtuousness—its kindness, courage, fairness, justice, etc.—makes that act good in itself, over and above the benefits that result from it. Acts can also have artistic merits. In the performing arts, some artistic merits of acts are forms of virtuousness, such as the couragelessness of a performance artist’s treatment of a controversial subject-matter or the sensitivity with which actors portray certain characters. Many more artistic merits of performances are forms of skillfulness or aptitude, such as dexterity and imaginativeness. Such qualities have long been thought to have important affinities with virtuousness. They are, for instance, grounds for crediting and praising a person. I am interested in whether they, too, can make an act good in itself, and if so, why.

James Grant is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at Exeter College

Creativity and Aesthetic Obligation

Alison Hills

I have two major projects in aesthetics at the moment. One concerns the nature and value of creativity, the other explores the possibility of aesthetic obligation. What is creativity? Creativity is often thought to be important across the arts and to be encouraged wherever possible. It is often defined as producing ideas or objects that are original and valuable. If creative ideas are always good ideas, it is easy to see why creativity itself is important, and worthwhile everywhere and in all circumstances. But this is wrong. In a series of papers, Prof. Alexander Bird and I look at creativity in the arts and sciences, and argue that creativity is manifested when artists and scientists have new and imaginative ideas. Many scientists (including, for instance, Herschel and Tesla) had ideas of very varying quality: some were excellent, others were complete dead-ends. Similarly, creative artists have better and worse ideas, but all are examples of creativity, provided they are imaginative and new. It follows that creativity is not always and everywhere a good thing, and more creativity is not always better than less.

So when and how is creativity valuable? How can we shape our imagination to produce valuable ideas? We argue that we are most likely to produce good ideas when the imagination is shaped by a good understanding of past success in an artistic or scientific tradition, that is, a knowledge of good works of art, or of true and fruitful scientific theories, and a good understanding of why they are successful.

This understanding directs the imagination towards new works that are not direct copies of past successes, but that share some deep similarities with them.

My other project is about aesthetic obligation. Aesthetics and morality are often thought to be very different. Morality is very serious, a realm of constraints and requirements, the “stern voice of duty”, and aesthetics, by contrast, is a domain of freedom, pleasure and self-realization. Everyone has to be moral, but no one has to be an artist; we must keep our promises and, should we break them, we are morally blameworthy. But are they really required to do so? Should we blame them if they don’t do so?

And what of the rest of us, who are not artists? Are we obliged to engage with works of art? Are we obliged to protect, or at any rate not to damage, great works?

I argue that we do have obligations of this kind, and so there are genuinely aesthetic obligations, that is, constraints and requirements appropriate to anyone violating these obligations, and that these obligations reflect the value of great works of art. Ultimately, aesthetics and morality are not as different as they first appear.

Alison Hills is Professor of Philosophy and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St John’s College
When I was a graduate student one of the questions many of us spent our time pondering was: Is there progress in philosophy, or only fashion? I distinctly recall that I (rather passionately) defended progress against fashion. Forty years later, I am not quite so sure. While I still believe that there is progress in philosophy, I also believe that there is a dose of fashion involved as well. Whether it is progress or fashion, what I want to reflect on are just a very few of the changes that I have observed over my 40-year career as an Oxford philosopher.

When I arrived in Oxford in the late 1970’s, I saw myself simply as a philosopher. I wrote my D Phil thesis on H.P. Grice’s theory of meaning and attended lectures by John McDowell, Gareth Evans, Peter Strawson, Michael Dummett, Bernard Williams, J.L. Mackie and others. In those lectures we discussed theories of meaning, issues to do with the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, morals, and aesthetics. We didn’t discriminate. We understood how a philosophical move in one place had repercussions on what one said in quite another. I suppose one could think of that time as the last (for now) when system building was considered a good thing. Nowadays, there is a tendency to identify oneself as a philosopher of x or y—even before one has begun one’s graduate study—and it has become less common for those doing research in one area of philosophy to attend lectures and seminars in another. I myself find, somewhat to my amusement, that I end my career with the title of Reader in the Philosophy of Mind (the title of Reader is itself a victim of change; it is no longer awarded).

Another aspect of the philosophy that I studied when I arrived in Oxford was that it was taken to have strong roots that went deep in the history of philosophy. Just as system building is today frowned upon by some, so is the need to acknowledge anything more than the most recent past. Of course, the production and study of new research are central to any vibrant and flourishing subject (and I do think philosophy is that), but it is at least arguable that philosophy has a special connection to its past. There is much that could be said about this, but I will confine myself here to this simple observation: philosophy, while it can evolve, grow, and take in more within its compass, is also rooted in questions and problems that, fundamentally at least, do not alter and cannot be lost. These are questions that every individual, at some point in their life, has asked—about their own identity, about the identity of the things around them, of the reality of objects and other persons, of the reason why we don’t hurt others or why we find some things beautiful, and the like. And it is not, contrary to the opinion of some, something to be ashamed of that philosophers have not found answers to these questions. It may indeed be in their nature that we simply have to help each other to think about them. What I have found over the course of my career is just how endlessly fascinating thought about these issues can be. While I can wish that I understood more, I have always found the journey of trying to understand satisfying in itself.

Some of the change I have identified is not unconnected to a re-orientation that has occurred in the University, a re-orientation towards graduate teaching and an associated emphasis on research. While this was a needed correction, it is also hard to deny that many now see undergraduate teaching as something of a distraction from research and “getting on” in one’s career. But it is a real question whether
the world needs yet another paper from an academic trying to establish their career, or whether what it really needs is a solidly educated young population—not just for those who will go on in the profession, but for all those who will take on jobs throughout society. And here is where I see philosophy as playing a particularly important role. One of the strengths of philosophy at Oxford is that it is studied with so many other subjects (my colleague Kathy Wilkes used to say, “philosophy is like chips, it comes with everything”). Philosophy adds to the education in those other subjects just as much as those subjects enrich the study of philosophy. Philosophy should not be allowed to become unmoored from the world around us; on the other hand, the world must not be allowed to hold their own—something they have to do every week with their tutors and something that will stay with them as their lives take them out into the wider world.

I have also seen a shift in what preoccupies philosophers, in what they find important and the assumptions they accept. It is a real question whether what I have observed here amounts to progress or is simply the result of fashion. Looking back, I see ideas that were discarded once again firmly entrenched; I also see old ideas re-invented in a new, and perhaps more useful, guise. Is this progress? If it is, I don’t believe it is linear progress. Rather, I favour the image of a spiral—as we ascend, we also circle back and see old ideas re-invented in a new, and perhaps simple the result of fashion. I believe it is linear progress. Rather, I favour the image of a spiral—as we ascend, we also circle back and incorporate earlier ideas in new ones. Perhaps there is a touch of fashion in the way this is done, but it is nonetheless.

This is what gives the next generation the confidence to pursue a philosophy when they are a teenager. I applied to Oxford to study PPE, and got in to St Catherine’s College. I then stayed on to do a DPhil in philosophy, and then a DPhil. For most of my DPhil, I was at All Souls College, where I was a Prize Fellow. Aside from philosophy, my other passion in life is entrepreneurship. I started four companies alongside my DPhil: Richard’s Banana Bakery, which was a cake company selling banana cakes to offices in London; Dashing Lunches, a sandwich company selling sandwiches to offices in London; LiveOut, which was a database of student rental properties in Oxford; and PeopleRadar, which was a photo-rating app on Facebook.

The fifth company was Academia.edu. As I was finishing my DPhil in the summer of 2006, I decided I wanted to have a homepage where I could say “this is who I am; this is what I have been working on; here are my papers.” At the time, Oxford offered a few megabytes of space for personal websites, and you had to write your own HTML and FTP files to the server yourself.

I remember thinking “There should be a one-click way of creating a homepage, and uploading papers. Having a homepage shouldn’t require technical ability.” I asked a few of my fellow graduate students, and they felt the same way.

After finishing my DPhil, I decided to raise venture capital for this project, which became Academia.edu. At the time, I had five years left on my All Souls Prize Fellowship. I loved philosophy, and was unsure whether I wanted to spend my career doing philosophy or entrepreneurship. I decided to spend two years out of the remaining five years of my fellowship starting Academia.edu. If Academia.edu was working, I would continue. If the project failed, I would use the final three years of my fellowship, and aim to pursue a philosophy career.

I wrote a long business plan (~80 pages), travelled to and from London to technology networking events, where I would meet investors, and ask them for introductions. In November 2007, I raised £312,500 from several London-based investors and I moved to San Francisco.

I had been able to learn a lot of philosophy from being surrounded by amazingly bright people in the Oxford philosophy department. I thought to myself “where is the equivalent of the Oxford philosophy department for starting technology companies?” I felt San Francisco was that place.

After moving to San Francisco, Ben Lund, a software engineer from the UK, joined the team. Ben, I, and a few others, launched Academia.edu in September 2008. In the early days, what mattered most of all was growth: growth in users and papers uploaded. In the first few months, we were growing linearly. Some days 57 users would join, the next day 42, the next...
The mission of Academia.edu is to accelerate the world’s research. There are four pillars to the mission. The first is open access. Our goal is to ensure that every paper, ever written, is on the internet, available for free. 23 million papers have been uploaded to Academia.edu. We think there are ~100 million papers ever written, so we are ~20% of the way there.

The second pillar is distribution. Our goal is to provide daily recommendations of papers, personalized to the recipient. Today around 20 million people receive papers, on a daily basis, powered by Academia.edu’s recommendation system.

The third pillar is peer review. Our goal is to provide signals regarding the trustworthiness of papers, and the trustworthiness of individual claims within papers, on Academia.edu.

The fourth pillar of the mission is web-native formats. Our goal is to go beyond the PDF, and enable knowledge to be shared in web-native formats. A PDF is effectively a photograph of a piece of paper; a format that is a legacy from the era of print. We have one feature that allows a user to convert a PDF into HTML on a mobile device, so the words fit to the screen—no more pinching and zooming of the PDF image.

In the future, we would like to enable the sharing of other formats such as data-sets, code, video, and maybe different kinds of textual formats.

Overall, our guiding philosophy is that people want research to be free; they want to receive recommendations that are personalized to them; they want signals about whether to trust the papers they read; and they want to access the research in the format that works best for them. Academia.edu’s goal is to make that vision a reality.

Academia’s business model is a premium subscription service. People can pay £69 a year to upgrade to a premium account. This includes features such as Mentions (knowing who is mentioning you); Advanced Search (searching the full-text of papers on Academia.edu); Grants (accessing a database of grants on Academia.edu); and other features.

225,000 people have become Premium subscribers. Today, Academia.edu runs at cash-flow break-even. The company has 53 people, most of whom are software engineers, product managers and designers. Everyone is based in San Francisco.

225,000 people have become Premium subscribers. Today, Academia.edu runs at cash-flow break-even. The company has 53 people, most of whom are software engineers, product managers and designers. Everyone is based in San Francisco.

The most surprising thing I have learned, since starting Academia.edu, is how large the interest in academic research is from beyond the academic world. Academia.edu has over 65 million visitors each month. By our calculation, there are about 17 million academics in the world (graduate students and faculty). A reasonable fraction of academics visit Academia each month, but approximately 85% of Academia.edu’s monthly visitors are not academics. They are professionals: lawyers, engineers, teachers, nurses, architects. Every profession is represented.

When downloading a paper, someone can explain what sparked their interest in the paper. We call these “reasons for downloading.” Here are three reasons for downloading from professionals. These reasons speak to the broader impact of research.

A chemical engineer from the U.S. wrote “I was viewing this article in an attempt to better model the crystallization reactor for a phosphoric acid production plant. I’m particularly trying to find operating temperatures and pressures.”

A farmer in Africa, downloading a paper on water conservation, wrote “I farm in the Sahara desert so conserving water is important to me, and I want to find out more about how to re-use our limited water to feed myself and my animals.”

A teacher downloaded a paper called “The Pen is Mightier than the Keyboard”, and wrote as their reason for downloading “The kids I teach are in a K-8 school. The school says pencils will be banned next year. I am looking for research to change that decision.”

We are in the first chapter of the project of making research open; distributed; contextualized; and available in web-native formats. We have made a start. I am proud of what Academia.edu has achieved so far. Most of the work lies in the future, and I find that inspiring.
I can remember feeling that philosophy, and especially modern philosophy, had saved me at Oxford. After leaving school, I decided to read Classics because it seemed like a tasty pic ’n’ mix degree, with language elements which I knew I loved, and then history, literature and philosophy thrown in. What philosophy actually was, I had no idea. During one of my interviews to get in, I was asked about the existence of God. What arguments could I think of for it? I was utterly thrown. Was this philosophy? I hadn’t realised His existence was even up for discussion. I didn’t have a feeling I would particularly enjoy philosophy and had never had a conversation about such things, being from a suburban and unquestioningly Christian household. I don’t think of for it? I was utterly thrown. Was this philosophy? I didn’t have a feeling I would particularly enjoy philosophy and had never had a conversation about such things, being from a suburban and unquestioningly Christian household. I don’t remember coming up with an answer at all.

I still had a feeling I would particularly enjoy philosophy and was excited to get to read Plato in my first term. I was set a fun essay on Plato’s Meno, entitled ‘What is X?’ But I only read the first page, holding nothing but a green biro meant for a child. As I walked to my desk, clacking my heels in a pair of noisy sling-backs and wondering if the paper was going to be in Greek or Latin, and did I even know the difference anymore, I knew I’d let myself down. I woke up from that exam with dribble on my chin and a deep sense of shame. (It was Aristophanes). I can’t explain why my standards slipped so much and I regret wasting the time of so many magnificent tutors. I bluffed my way appallingly in tutorials. I can remember a tutor asking me if I’d managed to read the Xerox, and gushing, “Oh yes, I love reading Xerox”, before she showed me the one term, which I hoped would be a canny cross-over. On a student show budget, I was dressed in a green smock and slippers and looked more like Friar Tuck than Clytemnestra. The Greek poetry fell out of my mouth wrapped in an estuary nasal twang that gave me heebie-jeebies. I’d let myself down. I woke up from that exam with dribble on my chin and a deep sense of shame. (It was Aristophanes). I can’t explain why my standards slipped so much and I regret wasting the time of so many magnificent tutors. I bluffed my way appallingly in tutorials. I can remember a tutor asking me if I’d managed to read the Xerox, and gushing, “Oh yes, I love reading Xerox”, before she showed me the one term, which I hoped would be a canny cross-over. On a student show budget, I was dressed in a green smock and slippers and looked more like Friar Tuck than Clytemnestra. The Greek poetry fell out of my mouth wrapped in an estuary nasal twang that gave me heebie-jeebies. I’d let myself down. I woke up from that exam with dribble on my chin and a deep sense of shame. (It was Aristophanes).

I had had such a good start to the course too! I had come to Oxford from a state school with no previous knowledge of Ancient Greek, so had assumed my Greek would never quite catch up with my Latin, or indeed the standard of the majority of students. But I had the great privilege of daily Greek lessons with Mr James Morwood and in a few months my Greek was my stronger of the two. I spent those early terms studying the poetry of Ovid, Callimachus and Horace and loved it. I was diligent and dreamt of getting a first. But at the end of my first year I played Titania (very badly) and my priorities changed overnight. My degree went on temporary hold. I decided not to worry about getting a first after all, a 2:2 would do.

I did more plays, and less of my reading lists. I took part in the Greek play (phigenia at Aulis one term, which I hoped would be a canny cross-over. On a student show budget, I was dressed in a green smock and slippers and looked more like Friar Tuck than Clytemnestra. The Greek poetry fell out of my mouth wrapped in an estuary nasal twang that gave me heebie-jeebies. I’d let myself down. I woke up from that exam with dribble on my chin and a deep sense of shame. (It was Aristophanes).

And so I began the second part of my course sheepishly grateful to my long suffering and loyal tutor Dr Innes. I had chosen as many philosophy options as possible for Finals—as well as Plato’s Republic. I would sit papers on philosophy of mind, history of modern philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics and epistemology. It felt like a new start, and one without much translating involved. I was hugely fortunate at St. Hilda’s to come under the tutelage of two charismatic philosophers, Dr Kathleen Wilkes and Dr Anita Avramides.

I would match Dr Wilkes cigarette for cigarette if not thought for thought, and Dr Avramides let me smoke during her tutorials too, which was good because in those days I’d managed to convince myself that I could have no thought at all without a Gauloise in hand—especially now that I’d moved on to Descartes. Some of my happiest times at Oxford were in my tutorials with Dr Avramides, and I felt healed after my Mods and relished learning for learning’s sake again. For me, the immediate scope to throw ideas around, the playfulness that the robustness of the subject seemed to allow, took away any dry aspect to the study. Whereas I sometimes found translating Thucydides quite a dry experience. There, I’ve said it.
When I left Oxford to become an actress it felt to begin with like an abandonment of my degree.

But, of course, I have found since that although I didn’t need a Classics degree on my CV to go into acting, that hasn’t stopped it from being hugely useful and indeed relevant. I have, for a start, often banded around philosophical quotes to seem clever in rehearsals. Hume said that “reason is the slave of the passions”, which can be applied endlessly to characters in plays, from Medea to Willy Loman.

At Oxford, I remember loving the Thomas Nagel essay, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, in which Nagel talks about the limits of empathy, and have often thought of it as a relevant essay somehow to the business of acting. Ok, I am not likely to be cast as a bat. But even if I was cast as a bat, Nagel would say you can’t imagine being a bat. You can only imagine what it’s like for you to be a bat, which is not the same thing. For true empathy of experience, you need to imagine what it’s like for a bat to be a bat. But I will never be cast as a bat. (Why not? I’d be a great bat!) I’m more likely to be cast as a human of my own gender and age than a bat, so the gap between objective and subjective experience will not be so huge. In fact, for many actors, type-casting means the gap is not big enough. (Why can’t I play a bat???) Of course, Nagel is talking about the gap between subjective and objective experience in a bigger sense and has no interest I’m sure in what bloody actors think. But I find this philosophical point interesting in the context of acting, because there seems to be a school of thought amongst actors that when you play x, you must truly be x, and then because there seems to be a school of thought amongst actors that when you play x, you must truly be x, and then there are others, like myself, who think respectfully that all you can do is imagine what it would be like for you to be in x’s shoes.

Whilst the responsibility to tell a story as an actor should not be taken lightly, I have always felt uncomfortable when some actors liken acting a thing to living a thing.

Quite often these stories are ones of trauma or tragedy that have not in fact touched them in their real life. Does this not misrepresent the nature of the true and subjective experience of trauma? Does it not accidentally belittle it? In fact? It is my personal opinion that because you have played a prisoner of war, read up about it, felt moved and cried, it does not in fact mean you know what it is like to be a prisoner of war. And so says Nagel! By being clear about the distinction between objective and subjective experience, I find it easier to perform a play about a failing marriage and then go home to my unfailing one. Oddly I feel able to invest more this way.

I was much more together for my Finals than I had been for my Mods. No green bios or ill-fitting sling-backs. I even brushed my hair. As a joint school at Oxford, you enter the exam hall for philosophy Finals papers and sit alongside mathematicians and PPEists and fellow Classicists, all about to answer questions in completely different ways, but all valid. I came out of the exam hall having riffed on the other minds of aliens and even, as I remember, having somehow quoted the Cliff Richard song ‘The Twelfth of Never’, pretending I’d nailed it and knowing I hadn’t. Oh well, I thought, I’ll get a Douglas. Hurd. Third.

My last Finals paper was Euripides. How ironic, after my love affair with philosophy, that it was that paper that in fact saved the day. I had been able to quote huge swathes of Ψηφιάγεια at Aulis. The beauty of Euripides’ poetry had never left me; just as, nowadays, philosophy still makes my mind feel valid.

And, dear reader, I got my 2:1.

---

Whichever philosophy/AI nexus for 35 years, it was a revelation to discover—in late 2018—just how much fascinating research has been going on around the University, concerning both the technical development of AI and its implications for society. In the first season of the Futuremakers podcast, and thanks to the excellent work of Ben Harmon and Steve Pritchard of the University’s Digital Communications Office, I hosted ten episodes involving three researchers each, covering such issues as the threat of AI to employment, the bias of algorithms, AI’s potential impact on finance and on healthcare, its role in generating fake news and propaganda, and even its implications for the future of humanity. We also held a live session of Futuremakers at the Oxford AI conference last September, and all of these episodes are freely available, as they say, “wherever you get your podcasts”. I hope readers who are interested in learning what all the fuss over AI Ethics is about will find these podcasts interesting and illuminating (https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2018-10-22-the-futuremakers-podcast-gives-an-outline-guide). I personally found some of them quite worrying, but in the time of COVID-19, it’s pleasing to be able to say that the episode on healthcare was much more positive!

Some history helps to explain why ethical concerns about AI have become so salient recently. Worries about machines coming alive go way back in literature and legend, but it was Alan Turing’s discovery of universal computation in 1936 that created the real possibility of artificial intelligence.
In 1950, he optimistically prophesied that by 2000, computers would be conversing plausibly with humans. Over the next 20 years, many far more optimistic predictions were made by enthusiasts (e.g. defeat of the world chess champion by 1968, having the “general intelligence” of an average human by 1976, “doing any work a man can do” by 1985). But progress proved much harder to achieve, and the field came down to earth after 1973, with serious funding cuts in the UK and USA. Revival came a decade later in response to the Japanese “fifth generation” project, which aimed to seize international leadership by building powerful new hardware and “expert systems” developed on the foundation of logic and databases. In the UK, this prompted the Alvey Programme, and also won funding for some related academic posts. (One of these – in Computing and Philosophy at Leeds in 1985 – attracted a young Hume scholar who had recently purchased a BBC Computer in order to prepare a “Plan B” career option as a programmer, after the Thatcher cuts had reduced the philosophy academic pipeline to a dribble. 20 years in that post lay behind my development of the degree in Computer Science and Philosophy at Oxford, which started in 2012.) The mid-1980s also saw great enthusiasm for “connectionist” systems that learn using artificial neural networks. In 1987, however, the growth of personal computers—which were getting more powerful every year—led to a collapse in the market for specialist AI machines, and as more over-hyped promises failed, funding dried up again to bring a second “AI winter”.

Computer hardware, however, continued to progress, enabling many of the techniques developed within AI to become respectably mainstream within Computer Science. The Web took off in the mid-1990s, further stimulating usage and data growth. Hardware development encouraged targeted research, and in 1997 computers finally overtook humans in chess (exploiting speedy search rather than sophisticated judgement). AI seemed to have learned its lesson of due modesty; however, and the aspiration towards general human-level intelligence faded. But that changed within the last decade, when the combination of powerful computers and “big data” suddenly led to a dramatic resurgence of the AI field. With “deep learning” now practicable, many of the problems in modelling human thinking—especially involving pattern recognition and classification—suddenly became solvable, not by hand-coding sophisticated algorithms (which had proved intractable), but by automated machine-learning based on massive data stores. The resulting developments have indeed been remarkable, provoking anxieties from Oxford’s Nick Bostrom—endorsed prominently by Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates—that “super-intelligent” AI presents an existential threat to humanity. But many of us who lived through the over-hyping of AI in previous decades tend to be sceptical. Harmful uses of AI by unscrupulous people will hurt us seriously well before we need worry about super-intelligence. Terminator is not a plausible risk, though automated weaponry might well be.

More mundane worries are far more immediate, as deep learning threatens imminent disruption in several areas. “White-collar” jobs that depend on experiential classification, pattern recognition, or recall of systematic knowledge became endangered in the same way as “blue-collar” jobs under previous waves of industrial revolution. Such workers may be replaced with algorithms fuelled by machine learning on (potentially biased) “big data”, which then go on to make life-changing decisions, whether financial, legal or medical. More subtly, in recent years we have seen machine learning combining with social media to give huge potential for targeted manipulation of opinion and behaviour, whether to sell a product, influence financial markets, provide divisive factionalism, or fix an election. Key issues like privacy and security are challenged in new ways, as algorithmic analysis of our browsing behaviour and “likes” turns out to reveal facts that we might prefer to keep private, such as our spending tendencies, political preferences, and even our sexuality.

Adapting our ethical frameworks to address these new and largely unforeseen issues faces us with major conceptual challenges. These demand sustained interdisciplinary discussion and the ability to think across boundaries, reconsidering fundamental assumptions and frameworks. This is traditional philosophical fare, but its urgency is perhaps even greater than in the field of medical ethics, where Oxford also has a proud tradition of practical service (notably through the work of Mary Warnock). Let us hope that the new Institute will enable us to contribute just as effectively to bring positive developments in AI Ethics.

Peter Millican is Professor of Philosophy and Gilbert Ryle Fellow at Hartley College, Oxford.
There is a well-known video in which one chimp tries to get another to pass a stick that it can’t itself access. The chimp leans over a barrier between the two, catches the attention of its companion, and reaches towards the stick it wants. The stick is obviously out of reach but the reaching produces a satisfying result, since the second chimp responds by offering a stick to the first: initially, the wrong stick, but then eventually the right one.

In acting like this, the first chimp plausibly intends the second to give it the stick, since it clearly cannot hope to reach it on its own: the reaching is gestural, we naturally think, not instrumental. And it plausibly relies on the second chimp to recognize that intention and to cooperate in response; otherwise the action would make no sense. On this reading, then, the exchange involves a simple, successful case of communication, understood on broadly the lines associated with the work of Paul Grice in the mid-century.

The chimp vignette supports two suggestions. One is that communication, including communication with the fineness of grain that speech as distinct from gesture makes possible, may not strictly presuppose any greater reflectiveness than our chimps display. And the other is that it is speech that accounts for the appearance of reflective capacities in creatures of our human ilk. My John Locke lectures were designed to pursue the second suggestion—or at least a thesis close to that suggestion—assuming the correctness of the first.

But how to defend such a thesis? The line I follow is to imagine creatures like us who have developed this basic capacity for speech, and then to see whether there are distinctive capacities that we might expect them to develop, perhaps immediately, perhaps after time, in addition to those presupposed to speech. Using that methodology, I argue that there are half a dozen capacities that speech would be likely to catalyse in such creatures.

Here’s a first. Our imagined speakers will presumably be able to ask one another questions, displaying a desire for information in the expectation that the display will prompt another to satisfy it: thus, as the chimp’s display of a desire for the stick prompts the companion’s satisfying response. And presumably they will be able to answer at least some questions they are posed—whether the fish are running, whether it’s raining on the hill—by attending, as we would put it, to the data available. Thus, they will be able to make up one another’s minds, eliciting cognitive states to guide action.
But if these speakers are able to make up one another’s minds on certain issues, intentionally asking and answering suitable questions, they will surely be able to make each up their own minds too. They will be able to ask themselves various questions, and to answer at least some of those questions, with the aim of learning what is the case and forming a corresponding cognitive state. They will be able, in short, to think. Specifically, they will be able to think in the sense in which we take Rodin’s Le Penseur, to exemplify that activity, albeit at a very sophisticated level.

Most of the time, the world will presumably make up the minds of our imagined subjects, and indeed do so more or less automatically. But this first capacity means that on certain issues they themselves can play an intentional part in this updating process. They can assume a degree of control over their mental lives.

A second capacity that speech will likely elicit in them also illustrates a special form of self-control. With sentences available to express the contents of their cognitive states, they will be able to form beliefs about those contents as well as beliefs in them: for example, the belief about the possibility expressed in (the offline use of) the sentence ‘the fish are running’ that it is true or is surprising or is denied by someone else. At least they will be able to do this, given that it is intelligible why they should be able to form concepts associated with the terms employed. And with access to such beliefs about contents, they will be in a position to conduct the activity of reasoning.

Any rational subject that believes that p and that if p, q is likely to be constituted so as to form a belief that q, and to do so more or less automatically. But speaking subjects can also form a belief about the state of affairs expressed in the premises—that p, and that if p, q—to the effect that it ensures the truth of the possibility expressed in the conclusion ‘q’. And they can seek to make up their mind about such a connection and to use it in justifying the inference ex post or to prompt it ex ante, as in concluding: ‘so, q’. The activity of seeking out such connections, and letting them check or drive inferences, we naturally describe as reasoning.

As access to speech is likely to give the subjects in our thought experiment the capacity to think and to reason, assuming a novel, if only partial sort of control over their own minds, so it promises to deliver other rewards too. Four other capacities explored in the lectures were: to distinguish appearance consciously from reality; to make commitments, giving a special credibility to their words; to form normative judgments and hold one another responsible to normative standards; and to pursue the focus on self, and the fidelity to self, that is the mark of personhood.

As the subjects of our thought experiment would be in the debt of language and for a range of distinctive capacities, so we may be in the debt of language and conversation for the capacities that mark us off from other species. It may be that what makes us special is that we are a conversive, conversable species.

Speech may not be just a sign of what makes us special, as Descartes thought; it may be, as Hobbes maintained in opposition, that speech is the source of our special features.

Postcard Reads: 

Philip Pettit is Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University.

RECENT BOOKS by Oxford Philosophy Faculty Members

Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought (OUP)
Ursula Coope
The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves—they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. The human soul is free insofar as it strives above bodily things and engages in intellect, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. In this book, Ursula Coope discusses this notion of freedom and its relation to questions about responsibility and explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility.

Sacrifice Regained (OUP)
Roger Crisp
Does being virtuous make you happy? In this book, Roger Crisp examines the answers to this ancient question provided by the so-called ‘British Moralists’, from Thomas Hobbes, around 1650, for the next two hundred years, until Jeremy Bentham. This involves elucidating their views on happiness (self-interest, or well-being) and on virtue (or morality), and in order to bring out the relation of each to the other. Morality and well-being of course remain central to modern ethics, and Crisp demonstrates how much there is to learn from this remarkable group of philosophers.

Aristotle Metaphysics Book A (OUP)
Lindsay Judson
Lindsay Judson presents a new translation and the only in-depth, rigorously philosophical commentary on this work in the modern era. Despite its position towards the end of the Metaphysics, Book A is an outline or plan for much more extended work in what Aristotle calls ‘first philosophy’. He discusses the principles of natural substances and, in a way not paralleled anywhere else, of non-substantial items; offers the fullest exposition we have of his extraordinary conception of his supreme god, and provides almost the only contemporary evidence for the leading astronomical theories of his day as well as for his own highly impressive cosmology.

Simply Nietzsche (Simply Charly)
Peter Kail
In Simply Nietzsche, Peter Kail traces the development of Nietzsche’s thought through the various phases of his life. Emphasizing the philosopher’s critique of modern morality and his revolutionary conception of the self, he also discusses key motifs of Nietzsche’s thought, such as the death of God, the will to power and the eternal recurrence. Described by one reviewer as “A perfect companion for students, teachers, or novices who are just curious to know what makes Nietzsche so compulsively readable despite being his most challenging thinker since Kant”.

Language, World, and Limits: Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics (OUP)
Adrian (A.W.) Moore
Adrian Moore’s essays are concerned with the business of representing how things are. Part One deals with linguistic representation. One thesis that surfaces is that things are beyond representation. Part Two deals with representation more generally and with the character of what is represented. One thesis that surfaces is that nothing is beyond representation. Part Three indicates how the resulting tension between Parts One and Two is to be resolved: namely, by constraining the first part as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second part as a thesis about facts or truths.

Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics (OUP)
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
The Discourse on Metaphysics is one of Leibniz’s fundamental works. Leibniz’s goal in the Discourse is to provide the answers that he believes Christians should give to basic metaphysical questions. To this end, Leibniz discusses some of the most traditional topics of metaphysics, such as the nature of God, the purpose of God in creating the world, the nature of substance, the possibility of miracles, the nature of our knowledge, free will, and the justice behind salvation and damnation. This volume provides a new translation of the Discourse, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive philosophical commentary.
David Bostock 1936 – 2019

David Bostock came to Oxford as an undergraduate where he read Greats at St John’s College and studied under Paul Grice. His first academic appointment was at Canberra but he came back to Oxford in 1968 to become a Fellow and Tutor at Merton until his retirement in 2004. David’s philosophical breadth was great—he wrote books on logic, mathematics, and the relation between them; on Russell, Plato and Aristotle, as well as articles on these subjects and on a variety of others too—and his work was always characterized by clarity and precision. He had a great many other interests outside academic life, including sailing, hill-walking, theatre, and opera. Whilst David continued to think about philosophical issues until perhaps a year before he died, he then decided that he had not read enough literature, and undertook a programme of reading all the books on his bookshelves; in the order in which they happened to have been placed.

Myles Burnyeat 1939 – 2019

Myles Burnyeat was a Senior Fellow of All Souls from 1996 until 2007. He was one of the most distinguished experts in ancient philosophy of his generation, and was admired by scholars and philosophers all over the world. Before coming to Oxford, he taught at University College London and at Cambridge, where he was Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy from 1984 to 1996. His interests spanned the entire range of Greek and Roman thought, and he will be especially remembered for communicating the importance of the subject to contemporary philosophers.

Jim Griffin 1939 – 2019

Jim Griffin took his BA at Yale in 1955, and then came to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, as Rhodes Scholar from 1955–58. He took his DPhil in 1960 under the supervision of Gilbert Ryle. Jim then held a Lectureship at Christ Church, until he was appointed to a Fellowship at Keble College. After thirty years at Keble, he returned to Corpus to occupy the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy from 1996 to 2000. After his retirement from Oxford Jim became Distinguished Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and from 2002 he was Adjunct Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics in Canberra. He published five books and numerous articles mainly in the area of moral and political philosophy. He loved, and was highly knowledgeable about, art and in his last years, he was working on a book which he saw as a contribution to our understanding of paintings rather than to technical philosophical aesthetics. He listed his recreations in Who’s Who as eating and drinking, but what he perhaps most enjoyed was the company of others.

Rom (Horace Romano) Harré 1927 – 2019

Rom Harré was Friedrich Waismann’s successor as University Lecturer in Philosophy of Science, and Fellow of Linacre College, from 1960 until his retirement from Oxford in 1995. Born in New Zealand, he studied Mathematics (BSc), Philosophy (MA) at the University of New Zealand (now Auckland University) and took the BPhil at Oxford under the supervision of J. L. Austin, whose influence on him was something he relished all his life. An extremely prolific writer, Rom published over a wide range of subjects, including the philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, and psychology itself. He was awarded five honorary doctorates and received a Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Psychological Association. Colleagues considered Rom a wise and warm man; one visiting American scholar who benefitted much from his generosity described him as having “a doctorate in people”.

John Lucas 1929 – 2020

John Lucas was Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Merton College from 1960 until his mandatory retirement in 1996. John was a philosophical polymath, and quintessential Oxford don who many considered endearingly eccentric. His interests ranged over ancient philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, political and legal theory, and the philosophies of mind, religion, economics, mathematics, and physics. His prolific publications cover the whole spectrum of his diverse philosophical interests, and include 19 books, of which he was sole author of 14. He is most famous for claiming, on the basis of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, that the human mind exceeds the capacities of any Turing machine, and so cannot be characterized by a Turing machine. Such considerations were further developed by Roger Penrose, and are now generally referred to as the Lucas-Penrose argument.

Brian McGuinness 1927 – 2019

Brian McGuinness was Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at The Queen’s College. Brian spent most of his career at Queen’s. He arrived as a graduate student, and, after holding a Junior Research Fellowship, taught there from 1953 until 1988 when he took a post at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study. In 1990, he became a professor at the University of Siena, Italy where he was director of the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences from 1990-93. A student of R.M. Hare, McGuinness became a noted expert in early analytic philosophy and, in particular, the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. As well as authoring numerous articles, he edited 11 volumes including works by Gottlob Frege and Ernst Mach, but was perhaps best-known as the translator (with David Pears) of what came to be the standard English-language edition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.