A WORD FROM THE VICE-CHANCELLOR

I am delighted to have been asked to provide the welcome for the second edition of Oxford Philosophy, which sets out news on the events, achievements and initiatives of one of the most vibrant faculties within the University. Oxford Philosophy seeks to provide an update to the many alumni of the Philosophy Faculty, and to remind you of the time that you spent here in Oxford.

Before taking up the Vice-Chancellorship in October last year I was, of course, very well aware of the University’s long and illustrious history and the strength of its current reputation. I was also no stranger to the standing of the Oxford Philosophy Faculty in particular. The work of the faculty was much admired at Yale University, where I served for a number of years as Provost, and whose own Philosophy Department was keenly aware of its history and the strength of its current reputation.

Like many other departments at Oxford, the Philosophy Faculty competes on the international stage for the best students and staff. This is particularly true at graduate level, where the Faculty’s main competitors for graduate study are in the United States. The outstanding philosophy community at Oxford helps us to attract top-class graduate students, but contending with the financial firepower and the quality of some US universities is no small task. One of the Faculty’s core development aims is to enhance the number of graduate scholarships it offers, and I fully support their endeavours to raise funds for this purpose. Indeed, the faculty’s aspirations in this respect mirror the University’s own Campaign aims, which seek to enhance core funding for academic staff, the capital infrastructure of Oxford, and funding for student bursaries, both at graduate and undergraduate level.

I am now approaching the end of my first year as Vice-Chancellor. That year has seen rapid change to the public funding regime, which, despite significant success in last year’s Research Assessment Exercise, has already hit the Humanities hard. There is little point in pretending that public finances will improve and to do so, it must enlist the support of its many thousands of alumni. The bar has been set high by an uncertain funding environment, but I am confident that it is not insurmountable.

The inescapable conclusion is that Oxford must build on the successes achieved already by the Oxford Thinking Campaign, and to do so, it must enlist the support of its many thousands of alumni. The bar has been set high by an uncertain funding environment, but I am confident that it is not insurmountable.

Professor Andrew Hamilton

If you have comments or suggestions about this publication, or would like further information about any aspect of Philosophy at Oxford, please contact us

email: news@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
tel: +44(0)1865 276934
fax: +44(0)1865 276932

Oxford Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
10 Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JU UK

www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk

NEW APPOINTMENT

The Faculty is delighted to announce the appointment, from September 2010, of Professor Cécile Fabre to a Tutorial Fellowship in Philosophy at Lincoln College.

Cécile Fabre received her first degree from La Sorbonne, and moved to Britain in 1992 to take a Masters in Political Philosophy from the University of York, and a DPhil in Oxford. From 2007 until 2010 she held the Chair in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh, a post to which she was elected following a seven-year stint at the London School of Economics. She has published widely on rights and justice, and is currently completing the first volume of a two-volume monograph, for Oxford University Press, on the ethics of war. Her appointment strengthens the Faculty’s existing group of distinguished scholars with research interests in political and moral philosophy.

LAUENER PRIZE

Sir Michael Dummett has been awarded the Lauener Prize for an Outstanding Oeuvre in Analytical Philosophy.

He received the award at a Symposium held on Thursday 27 May 2010, in Bern, Switzerland. Dummett held the Wykeham Professorship of Logic at Oxford between 1979 and 1992. He is currently an emeritus member of the Oxford Philosophy Faculty and Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College. He was awarded the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy in 1995, and is the only person to have been awarded both the Schock Prize and the Lauener Prize. His latest book The Nature and Future of Philosophy was published by Columbia University Press in April 2010. Further details about the Prize can be found on the Lauener Foundation website at www.lauener-foundation.ch.

IN MEMORIAM

The Faculty is sad to report the death of Ian M. Crombie on 27 March 2010.

Fellow and Tutor at Wadham College from 1947 until 1983, Ian Crombie gained some fame in the 1950s with his article, ‘The Possibility of Theological Statements’. However, his masterpiece was the two-volume An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines (1962), in which he employed the tools of analytic philosophy in an insightful and accessible account of Plato’s thought, a work that was taken into account by scholarship for decades and helped generations of students get to grips with Plato. Notably cautious in his own judgements, Ian served as an effective chairman of the Sub-faculty and was a pillar of his college. A wise and popular tutor, he taught a number of students who went on to become academic philosophers themselves – Justin Gaoling, David (A.D.) Smith, Bill Christ, Daivid Velleman, Sarah Richmond and Hannah Ginsborg.

The Faculty is sad to report the death of Anthony M. Quinton, Baron Quinton of Holywell on 19 June 2010.

After graduating with a First in PPE at Christ Church, Anthony Quinton became Fellow of All Souls (1949-55) and then of New College (1955-78). From 1978 until 1987 he was President of Trinity College. He also served as president of the Aristotelian Society from 1975 to 1976; and as chair of the board of the British Library from 1985 to 1990. To BBC Radio audiences, Anthony Quinton became well known as a presenter of the long-running Round Britain Quiz. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1977 and was created life peer in 1982. His masterpiece was The Nature of Things (1973). Metaphysics apart, he contributed an introductory work, Utilitarian Ethics (1973), and The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Gladstone (1978). He was an unrivalled conversationalist and public speaker.

The Nature and Future of Philosophy

Lauener Foundation
www.lauener-foundation.ch
Philosophy Calls for Philosophy', found in his article in this area can be of philosophical thinking. Two members of the Oxford Philosophy Faculty take to the international stage under the auspices of the United Nations.

**John Broome on Climate Change**

John Broome has accepted an invitation to serve as a Lead Author for Working Group III of the The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fifth Assessment Report.

The IPCC is the leading body for the assessment of climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences.

To achieve this aim, the IPCC reviews and assesses – objectively, and in full – the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information that is relevant to the understanding of climate change.

John explains: “The task of the IPCC’s Working Group III is to consider how the threat of climate change can be mitigated by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. A large part of the Group’s work will be to evaluate the various options that are available for mitigation. Inevitably its methods are strongly influenced by economics, and particularly by cost-benefit analysis. These methods are ultimately founded on ethics, because judgements of value are ultimately ethical. Moreover they raise difficult ethical issues. For example, climate change will kill many people, through famines and floods, diseases, heat waves and increased poverty. We have to judge what damage to our own quality of life we should accept in order to reduce the number of those deaths. That is one question for philosophical ethics, and there are others too. I am delighted that the IPCC has now recognized the need for a contribution from moral philosophy.”

Further details about the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can be found on the Panel’s website at www.ipcc.ch.

**John Tasioulas on Poverty**

John Tasioulas was one of the main speakers at an international symposium on Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right at UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris in December 2009. Other speakers included Justice Albie Sachs, former Judge of the South African Constitutional Court, and Irene Khan, the outgoing Secretary-General of Amnesty International.

The symposium marked the publication of four edited volumes on the theme of poverty as a human rights violation. The first volume, entitled Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (OUP/UNESCO, 2007), is edited by Thomas Pogge and features essays by philosophers, including a chapter by John on ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’. The other three volumes contain contributions from political theorists, economists and lawyers. Ideas derived from the four volumes are to be distilled in a booklet that will be distributed to Non-Governmental Organizations concerned with human rights.

John told us: “In my talk I stressed that the idea that there is a human right to be free of extreme poverty is not a new-fangled invention of the post-war era, one that finds no responsive echo in the long tradition of thought about natural rights. From the very inception of that tradition in the eighteenth century, philosophers and others have recognized a right of those in extreme need to supply their needs by taking another’s property. This consensus extends right through to the modern era of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. I addressed two questions that any credible defence of a human right to be free from extreme poverty must answer: First, what is involved in saying that there is a right to be free from extreme poverty? And second, what is added if we say that the right in question is, specifically, a human right? Regarding the first question, I emphasized the fact that rights are above all moral norms that impose duties on others. They are not, therefore, simply to be identified with human interests or a shopping-list of valuable goals. The failure to mark this distinction evokes the force of the language of rights, and leads to a damaging proliferation of rights claims. As to the second question, I defended the orthodox view that human rights are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity. This orthodoxy has been assailed in recent years by ‘political’ theories of human rights – supported by philosophers such as John Rawls and Joseph Raz – according to which the distinctive feature of human rights is that their grave and widespread violation is a justification for intervention by one society against another. It unduly marginalizes human rights to regard them as essentially about the regulation of intervention in a state-based global order – an order which some human rights advocates believe we should abandon, and precisely in order better to fulfil human rights.”

John’s talk was informed by the work he has been pursuing while on research leave since October 2008, supported by a British Academy Research Development Award. His aim is to complete a monograph for OUP provisionally entitled Human Rights: From Morality to Law. The monograph will develop an account of human rights as based on a plurality of universal interests possessed by human beings, all of whom enjoy equal moral status. It is hoped that, among other things, this account will provide intellectual resources for responding to the familiar objection that human rights reflect merely Western values. There will be a one-day workshop on the pre-publication manuscript of the book at the National Humanities Center, North Carolina in April 2011.

The idea that there is a human right to be free of extreme poverty is not a new-fangled invention of the post-war era.
If I could win a scholarship to Oxford, I would escape from living under Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew.

I took the right course. When I applied to Oxford, I had no idea what some of the courses were. “Greats” didn’t give much of a clue to a Dartmouth College senior applying to a faraway English university. “Philosophy, Politics and Economics” was what it said on the tin. That is how a life-changing decision was made.

I entered the Oxford lottery at the last moment, and then only because I encountered my fellow student Bob Harrington on the Dartmouth Green. “Have you applied to Oxford yet?” he asked. “No,” I answered. “Why?” “It’s a two-year paid vacation.” Suddenly all the cherries in the slot machine lined up. If I could win a scholarship to Oxford, I would escape from living under Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. I deleted their administration and could not understand why Americans could not see through them. In time, of course, they did. Both men were forced to resign in disgrace, but by then I was across the Atlantic – as it turned out, permanently.

Because I was late to the ball that was the Oxford admissions process, I knew I would not have the time to have my application sent to four different colleges in turn. The first college on my form was the only one that would see my documents in time. How to make sure that my first choice would take me? “Wherever Bob Reich has gone,” I reasoned, “they will want more from where he came.” I was right. The Dartmouth dynamo from two classes before me had gone to University College and made a great impression. Not just on the faculty, either: his fellow student Bill Clinton was moved to make Reich Secretary of Labor when he was elected President of the United States. The Univ Tutor for Graduate admissions, George Cawkwell, did indeed want another Dartmouth man, and I was accepted.

I only had to take two of the three subjects, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, to get a degree in the whole lot. I selected the first two. This means that I can tell disbeliefing Americans that I have an Oxford Masters Degree in Economics without ever having taken a single Economics course. My original reasoning proved correct. There would be plenty of time to read up on Economics, and I do every day now with The New York Times and The Financial Times.

Philosophy, in contrast, would only come around once in my life. This was the time to take it. I was lucky. It was a golden era in Philosophy at Oxford. Giants walked the earth. Peter Strawson and A. J. Ayer were in their prime. And yet it was a young University College tutor, Gareth Evans, who made the greatest impact on me. Gareth was only a few years older than I, so we made a social connection as well as an educational one. I so trusted him that I rode on the back of his motorbike from London to Oxford, a journey I cannot conceive of making with anyone else. My payback was recommending new LPs he should buy. He reported back that he had enjoyed the lot but particularly liked Joan Armatrading.

A couple of afternoons later, at the Osney Town residence of fellow Gareth enthusiast Jesse Spikes, an even smaller group of Philosophy revisers had a similar moment of enlightenment. This is it! We are actually thinking and talking like philosophers! Don’t let this end! Don’t let us be normal again! Ten minutes later, when we had returned to being our mundane selves, we confirmed to each other that we had shared a rare experience we would never forget.

Obviously, I have not forgotten. I have always remembered, and loved, Gareth Evans. I am so pleased that Oxford University does, too.
The study of Classics and Philosophy in Oxford has always emphasized the central place of ancient philosophy. Undergraduates who read Literae Humaniores can study ancient philosophy in both Mods and Greats. In Literae Humaniores, and in the other Honour Schools that include Philosophy, they study ancient philosophy in combination with contemporary philosophy. Many study it in Greek or Latin; many more study it in English translation. They have a choice of authors and texts from many periods of the ancient world. Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have been, and remain, central in the study of ancient philosophy in Oxford. Students also have an opportunity to study Early Greek Philosophy (the Presocratics), other major works of Plato and Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers (Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics).

Oxford is a lively centre of graduate study and research in ancient philosophy. Graduate students reading for the BPhil (normally the first two years of the DPhil course) may specialize in ancient philosophy, while also working in other areas of philosophy. Since 2008 a new degree, the MSt in Ancient Philosophy, has been open to students who want to spend a year on specialized study in this area. (After a second year, they may be admitted to the DPhil.) Since Oxford is fortunate to have an unusually large number of members of the Faculty who teach ancient philosophy, students have a wide choice of supervisors for their graduate study.

The study of ancient philosophy is necessarily interdisciplinary, and most of those who teach it in Oxford also pursue research in some other area of Philosophy or Classics. Many people share interests in the ethics, metaphysics, and psychology of Plato and Aristotle, and in their relevance to questions in contemporary philosophy. But they also cover a much wider range. Among the areas in which we aim to develop co-operative research involving Classics and Philosophy is ancient science and medicine; a joint appointment in this area would both strengthen our present resources and lead us in a new and fruitful direction.

In recent years Oxford has been fortunate to be able to welcome new colleagues in ancient philosophy who have studied and taught elsewhere. They find Oxford a congenial and stimulating place. In the words of one: “The research environment at Oxford is intense and highly collaborative: there is pretty much a workshop, graduate seminar, or reading group for anyone who has studied and taught ancient philosophy. They find Oxford a congenial and stimulating place. In the words of one: “The research environment at Oxford is intense and highly collaborative: there is pretty much a workshop, graduate seminar, or reading group for anyone who has studied and taught elsewhere. They find Oxford a congenial and stimulating place.”
For most of the nineteenth century you knew where you were with an OUP philosophy book. You were in the vicinity of the High Street, listening to an initiated Fellow of one college demurring decorously from the views of one of another. These authors were often the White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, T. H. Green, W. D. Ross, H. A. Prichard, J. H. Paton, J. A. Austin, W. C. Kneale, R. M. Hare, or the Wykeham Professor of Logic, John Cook Wilson, H. H. Joachim, H. H. Price. The Waynfette Professorship of Metaphysics was more poorly represented, with only R. G. Collingwood’s name standing out on the OUP list. The rank and file were not usually expected to place their words between the blue boards, though F. H. Bradley, Fellow of Merton from 1870 to 1924, was a great standing out on the OUP list. The rank and file were not usually expected to place their words between the blue boards, though F. H. Bradley, Fellow of Merton from 1870 to 1924, was a great author who never held a chair. Bradley’s Ethical Studies (1876) was the oldest OUP philosophy book still in print when I started working on the list almost twenty years ago. The oldest philosophy book that we have kept continuously in print since we first published it is Collingwood’s Principles of Art (1938). Nothing else from before the war has been continuously in print a couple more Collingwood’s follow from immediately after; and then there is Hare’s Language of Morals from 1952.

By the 1960s, hegemony of Anglophone philosophy was shifting to the new world. W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson had walked the High, but they had learned their trade at Harvard not Oxford. The philosophical party became louder in other rooms. The University’s Press could no longer rely on draft de expositions to capture the finest new works of philosophy: other presses published Bernard Williams and P. F. Strawson.

The OUP philosophy editor cannot now be content to ply his trade between aged stone walls. I have to go afield and find authors. Most of the philosophers I seek to publish now work in other countries, most have no connection with this university. And even Oxford philosophers could easily choose Blackwell or Routledge, Princeton or Harvard.

So we need to make ourselves appealing. One of the ways in which we have tried to reflect the fact that publication with OUP is not a matter of conforming to the Oxford style of philosophy is by giving our books a more diverse visual identity. The dark blue boards, so dark they might be black, boldly imitating the leather of times past, the neat gold print these can still be seen, but the crested breed are rare now. As for the jackets, a grand man of the Press complained to me that Derek Parfit had started it all – ‘it’ being the adornment of philosophy books with intriguing or evocative images whose connection with the subject of the book was not obvious. I have never asked whether Parfit’s own atmospheric photograph of Venice has something to do with the content of Reasons and Persons (1984), but I do think it good that the book has had this particular physical presence in the hands of those of us who have pored over it.

Of course I can’t be sure that any of the books I have published will last as well as Bloch’s or Collingwood’s, whether as works of philosophy or as aesthetic objects. But times have changed and we have had to change in them. Oxford philosophy will continue to flourish not because of past glories but because of its present prominence within a much wider philosophical world than that of the mid-twentieth century. OUP is happy to be the world’s philosophy publisher, not just Oxford’s.

Peter Momtchiloff is Senior Commissioning Editor for Philosophy at the Oxford University Press.
ON NEITHER WANTING TO DIE NOR WANTING TO BE IMMORTAL

by Adrian W. Moore

How should we view death? Among the countless subsidiary questions that this raises, there are two in particular that are interesting to pit against each other. Prima facie they are equivalent. It is important, however, to distinguish them. I shall put them in the crudest possible terms. Refining them would be a large part of addressing them.

(1) Is death a bad thing?
(2) Would immortality be preferable to mortality?

These two questions can easily appear to demand the same answer. True, no sooner does one begin refining them than one sees all sorts of ways in which a full, qualified response to one can differ from a full, qualified response to the other. But it is important to see how, even at this crude level, there is scope for answering yes and no respectively. (I shall assume, incidentally, that death is the end of our existence. A full answer to either question would have to take into account the possibility that it is not.) Very roughly, death is a bad thing because it deprives both the person who dies and others of opportunities to create and discover meaning. On the other hand – and this is equally rough – immortality would not be preferable to mortality because mortality is what gives life its most fundamental structure and, therewith, the very possibility of meaning.

Yet there is something puzzling about the idea that the answer to (2) can be no, even if the answer to (1) is yes. Consider the following train of thought, which I shall call the Simple Train of Thought and which seems to tell against this idea: If death is a bad thing, then it is always better to live than to die. But if it is always better to live than to die, then it is better to live always than to die some time. And to say that it is better to live always than to die some time is just another way of saying that immortality would be preferable to mortality.

Admittedly, there are important tacit qualifications here to the effect that all else must be equal. Someone could resist the Simple Train of Thought – and thereby hold fast to the idea that the answer to (2) is no, even though the answer to (1) is yes – by insisting that all else would eventually, and necessarily, not be equal. This is what Bernard Williams argues in his celebrated article "The Makropoulos Case" (reprinted in *His Problems of the Self*, Cambridge, 1973). The title of Williams’ article is taken from a play by Karel Čapek, which was made into an opera by Leó Janáček. The play concerns a woman named Elina Makropoulos, who has been the beneficiary of an elixir of life. She finds, after 342 years, that “her unending life has come to a state of indifference, boredom, and coldness.” She refuses to take the elixir again. Williams, whose article has the subtitle "Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality," argues that Elina Makropoulos’ case is an illustration of a general truth about life and what gives it value. He argues that a life without death would eventually become tedious to the point of unendurability. The kernel of his argument is that the conditions that would have to be satisfied for the life to continue to count as someone’s life against the conditions that would have to be satisfied for it to continue to sustain any interest and thus to be a life worth living. Conditions of the former kind demand a constancy, and conditions of the latter kind a variety, that cannot be reconciled. But even if we disregard Williams’ argument, there are reasons to resist the Simple Train of Thought.

Consider the following variant of the Simple Train of Thought, due to Thomas Nagel and taken from his book *The View From Nowhere* (Oxford, 1986): Given the simple choice between living for another week and dying in five minutes, then – since I would always choose to live for another week and dying in five minutes I would always choose to live for another week; and by a version of mathematical induction I conclude that I would be glad to live forever.

Mathematical induction is the principle whereby, if something is true of the number 1, and if its being true of any given positive integer entails its being true of the successor of that integer, then it must be true of every positive integer. It follows from this principle that, if something holds for a week, and if its holding for a week entails its continuing to hold for another week, then it must hold for ever. But this is not enough to validate Nagel’s argument. For one thing, the premise of the argument is concerned with choices I would make, whereas the conclusion is concerned with what I would be glad to do, which is a different matter. But also, more importantly, and more pertinently, the most that follows from the premise is that I, starting now, were given a weekly choice between living for another week and dying in five minutes, then – since I would always choose to live for another week – my repeated choices would keep me alive for ever. This is not to say that I would ever actually choose to live for ever. I might have a clear preference not to live for ever, indeed I might be appalled at the prospect of living for ever, yet still never want these to be my last five minutes. I might never want to die, without wanting never to die.

The Simple Train of Thought can be resisted then. There is no logical conflict between answering yes to (1) and no to (2). There is no logical conflict. But there may be conflicts of other kinds. Indeed, if these are the right answers, with whatever qualifications are called for – if death is bad because it destroys meaning in life, and if mortality is preferable to immortality because it is a precondition of life’s having the very meaning that death destroys – then this surely signals one of the great tragedies of human existence.

Professor Adrian Moore has been Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St Hugh’s College since 1988. He is author of *The Infinite* (1990), *Points of View* (1997), *Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy* (2003), and *Making Sense of Things: The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics* (forthcoming).
A case for Philosophy TUTORIALS

With government cuts posing an ever greater threat to the tutorial system, we asked John Lucas to reflect on the value of this unique mode of teaching. Whilst times have changed a little since John retired in 1996, the case for philosophy tutorials remains much the same.

Oxford is famed for its tutorials. They are famously frightening. The undergraduate goes into his tutor’s book-lined room, is told to sit down and read his essay, finally completed in the small hours the night before, with many fine passages, some purple prose, expressing profound thoughts about the nature of the universe and man’s destiny within it. The tutor listens impassively, fails to say how good it is, and then asks a seemingly innocent question, followed by another, and before he knows where he is, the undergraduate finds himself caught up in a web of contradictions, no longer knowing what he thinks, but dimly aware that all his best efforts of yesterday Will Not Do. Confused and humiliated, he stumbles out of the tutor’s room, manages to get home, spends much time trying to reach his own conclusions. It is in doing this that the great value of the tutorial lies. It is a truth not always appreciated by those who have previously been said, leading in some cases to a discomfiture of the pompous opinionator.

In philosophy, tutorials are peculiarly important. The first tutorials were conducted by Socrates, sometimes with willing young men who were anxious to learn, more often with意见建议 pillars of Athenian society, pleased to pontificate about anything that came into their minds. In each case Socrates by a series of questions would draw out the implications of what had previously been said, leading in some cases to a better appreciation of what had been dimly thought, and in others to the complete discomfiture of the pompous opus. What emerges from Socrates’ dialogues is a greater understanding of concepts – beauty, fairness, respect, honesty and the like. The interchange of question and answer leads us from knowing how to use words to knowing how words are used. In ancient Athens just as in arguments in broad day-light, at night as in arguments in broad day-light, in which philosophy is impelled to move out from the close-fought verbal argument of tutorials to the wide-ranging issues that keep one awake at nights. But – what is often forgotten – clarity of thought is as important in the wakeful watches of the night as in arguments in broad day-light, and because thinkers in previous generations have wrestled with these problems, they are the subject of many essays, and are much discussed in tutorials too.

In Oxford, tutorials are the chief means of instruction in most subjects. They have great merits, and some defects. It is a general truth that human beings learn more by doing than by being told what to do. Lectures tell us what to think, and are important in giving a wide coverage of the subject. Tutorials inevitably focus on a narrow topic, on which the pupil spends much time trying to reach his own conclusions. It is in doing this that the great value of the tutorial lies. It is a truth not always recognised by tutors that nine tenths of that value is gained by the pupil before he enters the tutor’s room. But the one tenth is important too. It stimulates the pupil to do his best, and having done his best, shows him how he could better what he has done. By the end of his course the undergraduate has done a lot of thinking about a few topics, and has had his thinking criticized and improved. And in learning to think about some subjects he has learned to think. Thinking is a transferable skill, and a valuable one: although by the end of his course an Oxford graduate has acquired less knowledge than one who has been comprehensively lectured at, he is better able to acquire knowledge and understand its implications than his more knowledgeable rival. Tutorials are valuable in all subjects, though never exclusively so, and Oxford undergraduates who skip all their lectures disadvantage themselves: knowledge is also important.

It is a general truth that human beings learn more by doing than by being told what to do. It is that question above all, which leads people to study philosophy, to go on to study the nature of justice, to ask whether the universe is such that a person is free to make up his mind for himself, and, more generally still, to examine the whole nature of reality and our knowledge of it. The last book Iris Murdoch wrote was Metaphysics as a Guide to Life. The title expresses the way in which philosophy is impelled to move out from the close-fought verbal argument of tutorials to the wide-ranging issues that keep one awake at nights. But – what is often forgotten – clarity of thought is as important in the wakeful watches of the night as in arguments in broad day-light, and because thinkers in previous generations have wrestled with these problems, they are the subject of many essays, and are much discussed in tutorials too.

Some philosophers have been content to rest their case there. In the middle of the twentieth century Linguistic Analysis was claiming that the careful analysis of ordinary language was the sole task of the philosopher: “ordinary language is quite all right” it was said, and the philosopher needed nothing other than a good ear for contemporary English usage in order to give us an authoritative analysis of concepts. But ordinary usage, though always informative, is not infallible. The sun does not rise. Socrates said, and the Greek word ‘gentleman’ cannot be translated into Greek, because the Greeks did not recognise certain traits of modesty and forbearance as estimable. These are questions – whether it is just to kill killers, whether one ought to be modest and forbearing – that philosophy has to address. Much more important is the one that Plato has Socrates raise at the end of Republic I. “It is no trivial matter we are discussing, but the way in which one ought to live one’s life.” It is that question above all, which leads people to study philosophy, to go on to examine the nature of argument, so as to be able to tell good arguments from bad, and beyond that, to try to make out what it is to be a person, to decide whether the universe is such that a person is free to make up his mind for himself, and, more generally still, to examine the whole nature of reality and our knowledge of it. The last book Iris Murdoch wrote was Metaphysics as a Guide to Life. The title expresses the way in which philosophy is impelled to move out from the close-fought verbal argument of tutorials to the wide-ranging issues that keep one awake at nights. But – what is often forgotten – clarity of thought is as important in the wakeful watches of the night as in arguments in broad day-light, and because thinkers in previous generations have wrestled with these problems, they are the subject of many essays, and are much discussed in tutorials too.

John Lucas was Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Merton College from 1960 until 1996. He is an emeritus member of the Oxford Philosophy Faculty and Fellow of the British Academy.
There have been over two million downloads from the University of Oxford page on iTunes U since it was launched in October 2008. Oxford Philosophy has been at the forefront of this success.

The most notable example of this success is Dr Marianne Talbot’s Romp through the History of Philosophy, which, for a time, enjoyed the global number one spot on iTunes U and was still in the top ten six months after its initial posting.

At the time of writing, Marianne’s lectures on the history of philosophy remain at number one in the chart of podcasts hosted on the Oxford site, where she reappears at number three with her introduction to critical reasoning, ‘The Nature of Arguments’.

Two more philosophers join her in the Oxford top ten, Peter Millican with his lectures on General Philosophy (at number five) and Adrian Moore (at number ten). But Oxford Philosophy’s impact does not stop there. The first of Professor Robert Stalnaker’s 2007 John Locke lectures is at number eight and ‘The Genealogy of Guilt’, by Professor Bernard Reginster, one of the keynote talks at the conference ‘Nietzsche on Mind and Nature’, organized by Peter Kail and Manuel Dries, is at number four.

General Philosophy
This series of lectures delivered by Peter Millican for the General Philosophy component of philosophy Mods and Prelims in 2009 gives you a window onto the educational lives of our current first year undergraduates.

Interviews with Philosophers
In these podcasts, members of the Faculty of Philosophy give their insights into Philosophy. They comprise Adrian Moore on Metaphysics; Roger Crisp on Aristotle’s Ethics; John Broome on Rationality; Nick Bostrom on Global Catastrophic Risk and Simulation Theory; and Julian Savulescu on Applied Ethics and Human Enhancement.

The John Locke Lectures

Nietzsche on Mind and Nature
These podcasts contain the keynote lectures and special session from the international conference ‘Nietzsche on Mind and Nature’, held at St Peter’s College in September 2009. They include: ‘The Genealogy of Guilt’ by Bernard Reginster; ‘Who is the “Sovereign Individual”? Nietzsche on Freedom’ by Brian Leiter; ‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics’ by Galen Strawson; and ‘Nietzsche’s Value Monism – Saying Yes to Everything’ by John Richardson.

Philosophy for Beginners
This series of five introductory lectures by Marianne Talbot, aimed at students new to philosophy, will test you with some famous thought experiments, introduce you to a number of central philosophical issues and lead you through the ideas of some key philosophers.

Critical Reasoning for Beginners
In this six-lecture introductory course by Marianne Talbot you will learn all about arguments, how to identify and evaluate them, and how not to mistake bad arguments for good.

Oxford Philosophy podcasts can be accessed at www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts
A conversation with David Chalmers
2010 John Locke Lecturer

What is the basic idea behind your current John Locke lectures?

The title is "Constructing the World", which is a sort of homage to Rudolf Carnap’s 1928 book Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt. Carnap’s attempt at constructing the world involved starting from a very primitive vocabulary for specifying certain simple truths about the world, and deriving all other truths about the world from these by a chain of definitions. Carnap’s project is usually viewed as a sort of heroic failure, but I am interested in seeing whether a version of the project might be possible after all.

What do you see as the applications of the project?

In the philosophy of language, one can use the basic framework to define notions of meaning that are closely akin to Fregean senses. In metaphysics, one can use the framework to help to adjudicate which truths about the world are truly fundamental. In the philosophy of mind the project ends up having some bearing on my original interests in the mind-body problem. In fact it was these applications that drew me to the project in the first place, because it seemed to me that I needed something like it to serve as a foundation for earlier work I’d done in those areas. Outside philosophy, there are interesting connections to issues regarding the psychology of basic concepts and to issues about the relationship between high-level and low-level perception.

How does your version of the project differ from Carnap’s?

Carnap started from a very austere basis involving just logical expressions and the relation of similarity between experiences. I think that one has to expand the basis a little to bring in non-experiential and non-logical elements – perhaps notions tied to causation or spacetime. I also think that to connect the basic truths about the world to all other truths, one should not rely so strongly on definitions and instead rely on a weaker epistemological relation. But with these changes I think that one can carry off a version of the project that in principle might meet at least some of Carnap’s aims.

What have you enjoyed most about your term in Oxford as John Locke lecturer?

I was in Oxford for a while as a graduate student in mathematics, and it has been great to get to know the place again. I also have many old friends here in philosophy, and I’ve enjoyed meeting many new people as well. Of course a high point has been giving the lectures and getting to talk about these issues with a lot of very smart people.

Have you encountered any unexpected reactions?

I knew coming in that my whole approach in these lectures was very different from the sort of approach that is currently popular in Oxford. In a way it has more in common with earlier was at Oxford. For example, along the way I defend Grice and Strawson against Quine. So I was looking forward to hearing reactions. At a broad level, it has been especially useful to hear about how these issues look from the perspective of a strong epistemological externalism which is deflationary about the idea of a priori knowledge. I’ve also had all sorts of useful feedback on various points of detail. I’ll have to take a lot of this into account in revising the book manuscript on which the lectures are based.

How did you get interested in philosophy?

Although I started out in mathematics, I gradually became obsessed with the mind-body problem. It seemed to me that the problem of consciousness was the most interesting unsolved problem in science, and that at least for now, philosophy was the best way to approach it. So I switched to philosophy as a graduate student. I had taken only one course in philosophy as an undergraduate, and I didn’t do very well in it, so I had a lot of catching up to do. But I’m glad to have taken the path that I look.

What would you recommend to an Oxford Philosophy reader who wanted to find out more about your philosophical views?

In my 1996 book The Conscious Mind, I argued that consciousness can’t be wholly explained in terms of physical processes and that we need a new nonreductive science of consciousness. Later this year I have a new book coming out, The Character of Consciousness, which develops some of those ideas a lot further and also explores a number of different issues about consciousness. Either book would be fine as a place to start.

You’ve been at the forefront of using the Internet to enable scholarship. How do you think philosophy has benefited from the increased use of electronic resources and communication?

I think that one huge benefit has been making philosophy more accessible to a wider audience. Another has been increasing the speed at which philosophical work is disseminated to other philosophers. Of course the most important part of philosophy is still the generation of philosophical ideas. But interaction plays an important role in generating and refining ideas, and dissemination of ideas is important in its own right. In the PhilPapers project (philpapers.org) we’ve tried to help with those parts of the process. It’s also good to see that Oxford has been making more and more philosophy available over the Internet. I’ve listened to podcasts of quite a few John Locke lectures in previous years, and this year I’ve enjoyed getting emails from people who have listened to mine.

David Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He maintains an archive of electronic resources at: http://consc.net/chalmers/
No one who met Jerry Cohen could fail to see that he was an exceptional human being. He was, for a start, brilliantly clever, with a quite amazing ability to articulate precisely the structure of complex ideas. The sharpness of his mind, together with his obsessive persistence in the pursuit of an argument, made him a formidable figure in debate. Yet he was also immensely lovable. He was kind, open-minded, morally passionate, politically engaged, sensitive, loyal, high-spirited and (quite unusually for a philosopher, it must be admitted) hilariously funny.

Jerry came to Oxford from Montreal in 1961 to do the BPhil. He was, as he himself loved to relate, the ultimate “red diaper baby”, a child of first-generation Jewish immigrants, deeply involved in the Communist movement. Oxford – in particular, his teachers, Gilbert Ryle and Isaiah Berlin – suited him extremely well, however. Ryle’s doctrine that the pursuit of conceptual distinctions was central to the practice of philosophy matched both Jerry’s convictions and his talents, while Berlin was a generous and tolerant mentor who became a friend for life. Berlin’s liberalism and Jerry’s Marxism were at odds, of course, but Jerry remained a believer in value pluralism even when his certainty about Marxism had receded.

Jerry was lucky too in his first job at University College, London. Richard Wollheim, whom Jerry also adored, was happy to give a place in his department to talented individuals with unusual interests. The rigorous application of analytical techniques to areas outside the mainstream of current fashion was very much the hallmark of the UCL Philosophy Department under Richard. It was at UCL that Jerry became the founder of what came to be called “Analytical Marxism” but which its original advocate preferred to call “Non-Bullshit Marxism”.

With the growth of the New Left in the 1960s and 70s came a revival of interest in Marxism outside the framework of Soviet orthodoxy. Fervent debates took place in those years between those who read Marx through the eyes of Lukacs and Marcuse and those who rejected such “Hegelianism” in the name of a “structuralist” version of Marxism, inspired by Althusser. What was at stake behind these often arcanes and sectarian disputes was what it meant for Marxism to be a social science. The “Hegelians” wanted to insist on the teleological character of collective human action; the Althusserians to present a “structuralist” account of social causation. Jerry disagreed with both sides. Against them both, he argued in his major book, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: a Defence (1978), that Marxism did not need a special “dialectical” conception of science to vindicate its claim to be scientific. Properly understood, Marxism has the character of a scientific theory in just the same way and for the same reasons that other respectable scientific theories do. True, it makes use of “functional” explanations. But such explanations are, he pointed out, equally present in Darwinian biology – the model for Jerry (as, indeed, for Marx) of a well-grounded scientific theory. Marxism did not need the bullshit and would be better off without it.

There was some surprise when Jerry returned to Oxford as the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory (Berlin’s old chair) in 1985. How would a Marxist get along at All Souls? More seriously, there was a question about Jerry’s philosophical interests. By that time, the explosion of energy and ideas that followed the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) was evident to all. Would the appointment of someone whose work hitherto had been in such a different direction help Oxford to be part of that? As we now know, the answer was – triumphantly – “yes”. Thanks in large part to Jerry, his 24 years as Chichele Professor saw Oxford become a centre of activity in political philosophy, normative ethics and legal philosophy to rival Harvard.

Many years ago, before his appointment to the Chichele chair, Jerry remarked to me that, while he thought that Nozick was clearly an important thinker, he didn’t see why everyone was so impressed with Rawls. That was an opinion that he certainly did not still hold ten years later.

Jerry described himself as a reactive thinker – someone who made progress by seeking out the weaknesses of other positions – and his critical engagement with Rawls and Nozick dominated his thinking for the last twenty-five years of his academic career, as Marx had done for the first twenty-five. His Tanner Lectures, Incentives, Inequality and Community, given at Stanford in 1991, contain the kernel of a critique of Rawls that he elaborated and defended (no philosopher ever replied to his critics in greater detail than Jerry) until the publication of Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008).

By this time, Jerry no longer called himself a Marxist, but a socialist he remained. Indeed, his last book was a very short essay called Why Not Socialism?, published posthumously.

In the course of his career, Jerry wrote a great deal and many of his writings have been extremely influential. “Analytical Marxism” apart, his later ideas on self-ownership and equality have sparked philosophical tendencies, perhaps even movements – “left libertarianism” and “lack egalitarianism” – that will survive him and be debated for a long time. But those of us who knew him will remember above all a man who could switch instantly from the most intense argument to exuberant humour, who cherished his friends and loved his family without stint, and who inspired his students with the example of his high principles and dedication.
Laura Harrison has just finished her third year studying Literae Humaniores at St Anne’s College

My introduction to philosophy was in the first year of my undergraduate degree in Classics, when I was told that I’d have to choose a philosophy special subject for Mods. My first reaction: Do I have to? I eventually settled on the Plato paper, which looks at the Euthyphro and the Meno, because I figured that you couldn’t complete a Classics degree at Oxford and not have read any Plato. I thought to myself that all I would have to do was get through the course and then I could be done with philosophy for good. Two years and five philosophy courses later, I’m preparing to apply for Masters and PhD programmes.

I discovered my love of philosophy during the summer vacation after I’d done my first course on Plato, after spending a term being altogether a little confused in tutorials. I spent a few weeks reading up on the topic, and found that the way of thinking about the text required for a philosophical analysis very much appealed to me. A love of Plato was born. After that, once I had taken the Classics Honour Moderations of course, I chose as many philosophy options as the course would allow, including an optional thesis that I am soon to embark on.

I ventured into more ancient philosophy first, studying Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The topics I enjoyed and found most fascinating were Plato’s conception of justice and his theory of the tripartite soul, and Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and his bipartite theory of justice. After that, I took the leap into contemporary philosophy. I chose courses in Knowledge and Reality and Ethics, and, having just completed them, it seems to be Ethics that has really caught my interest. In fact, I hope to write my thesis on the notion of an ideal theory of morality and the search for such a theory.

Once, I have finished my undergraduate degree at Oxford, I hope to be able to move into studying philosophy at the graduate level and I am looking forward to the challenges that this will bring. I am particularly keen to explore areas of philosophy that I have not had the chance to study yet, such as logic, and social and political philosophy, as well as to consider in more detail the branches of philosophy that have already caught my interest. I am especially looking forward to pursuing philosophy as a research discipline and taking my tools away from passing exams. Getting the chance to study philosophy at Oxford has been the most positive and inspiring opportunity that I could have asked for, and I feel that it has fundamentally shaped my future.

In recent years the Oxford Philosophy Faculty has lost a number of the top applicants for its graduate degrees to universities in the US, where fully-funded places are the norm. With your support we can start to reverse this unfortunate trend.

We are currently collaborating with New College to offer a three-year graduate scholarship made possible by a generous donation to the college by Michael and Margaret Likierman. The scholarship is named in honour of their former tutor David Wiggins.

The Faculty’s aim is to raise matching funding of £22,500 by the end of 2010.

You can help us reach our goal by sending a donation to:

Oxford Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy,
10 Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JJ, UK

or by visiting www.giving.ox.ac.uk/philosophy