WELCOME

It is a pleasure to introduce the third edition of Oxford Philosophy, that I have just joined the University as Head of the Humanities Division, and I look forward to working with the Faculty of Philosophy to support them as they continue to develop their outstanding global reputation.

Philosophy is, of course, a diverse and rich discipline comprising many different sub-areas. Oxford can boast of a range of philosophical expertise across the whole spectrum that is arguably unmatched anywhere in the world.

Research continues to go from strength to strength. In recent months members of the Faculty have been awarded major research grants from the European Research Council, the John Templeton Foundation, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Two of these projects are outlined in more detail in this issue of Oxford Philosophy. Significant collaborative research projects are complemented by the achievements of the many exceptional individuals in the Faculty. To pick just one recent and notable example: Derek Parfit’s monumental two-volume monograph on What Matters, published this year by OUP, has been hailed as “the most significant work in ethics since Sidgwick’s masterpiece was published in 1873” in the Times Literary Supplement, and as “the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations” in Times Higher Education.

The Faculty also provides an exceptional offering for its undergraduates and graduates, and for the wider public. Members of the Faculty regularly appear in the media and they have been particularly adept at utilising new technologies, podcasts and blogs to stimulate public debate on vital philosophical issues.

As everyone knows, higher education in the UK is at present undergoing unprecedented transformation. While these changes must prompt us to reflect deeply on our current practices and our future needs, they also oblige all of us in the Humanities to diversify our sources of income and to respond to the growing demands of students and funders, as well as to the intensification of global competitiveness.

The Philosophy Faculty at Oxford is well placed to meet these challenges. But we rely on the continuing support of alumni, and of all those who believe in the significance of philosophy for intellectual life, the ethical, moral and aesthetic problems of our time, and the future of humanity.

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A Farewell to 10 Merton Street

Next summer, the Philosophy Faculty will move from 10 Merton Street, its home for the last 30 years. In 2012 the Faculty will relocate to the refurbished Radcliffe Infirmary building on the Woodstock Road. As well as the Philosophy Faculty, the Grade II* listed building will house a combined Philosophy and Theology Library and the administrative offices of the Humanities Division. The move – which will, amongst other things, enhance the quality and quantity of space available for graduate students – means that Philosophy will become the first academic unit to be located within the Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, the site on which the integrated Humanities Centre (including new space for the Faculty) will be built in due course.

New Philosophy Degree

In conjunction with the Department of Computer Science the Faculty is launching a new joint degree in 2012.

Computer Science and Philosophy can be studied as a three or four year course, leading to a BA degree or a Masters degree. The programme is modelled on the Computer Science half of the Mathematics and Computer Science degree and the Philosophy half of the Mathematics and Philosophy degree. The first year covers core material in both subjects, including a bridging course studying Alan Turing’s pioneering work on computability and artificial intelligence. Later in the degree students will choose from a wide range of papers, with an emphasis on courses near the interface between the two subjects. The optional fourth year also provides the opportunity to undertake an in-depth research project.

Professor Cécile Fabre FBA

We are delighted to report that Cécile Fabre, Professor of Political Philosophy and Fellow of Lincoln College, has been elected a Fellow of the British Academy.

The British Academy was established by Royal Charter in 1902 and champions and supports the humanities and social sciences. It aims to inspire, recognise and support excellence and high achievement across the UK and internationally. Before being appointed to her present post at Oxford, Professor Fabre held a Professorship in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh. She is currently working on a two-volume monograph for Oxford University Press on the ethics of war, which she also written about for this edition of Oxford Philosophy.

Call for Contributions to Oxford Philosophy 2012

We have been extremely pleased to receive feedback from readers of the first two issues of Oxford Philosophy.

In the 2012 edition of the magazine we hope to include a section devoted to Letters to the Editors. These might take the form of responses to the articles in Oxford Philosophy 2011, but we would be very happy to consider any other comments or recollections about philosophy at Oxford that you would like to share.

Please send your contributions to: news@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Ralph Wedgwood considers one of the most recent challenges to academic research in philosophy.

The Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE), which allocates government funding to English universities, has recently announced its decisions about the funding of academic research. Despite widespread opposition from within academia, HEFCE is forging ahead with what has come to be known as the “impact agenda” and allocating research funding in a way that encourages universities to focus on research that has “demonstrable benefits to the wider economy and society.”

Philosophers certainly believe that their research benefits society. In fact, I believe that excellent academic research is just intrinsically valuable: like public collections of rare manuscripts or ancient artefacts, or like areas of unspoilt natural wilderness, a flourishing culture of academic research is a public good. In my view, such public goods would still be a valuable asset to the whole society even if only a few people enjoyed these goods to any significant extent.

Of course, this view of the intrinsic value of excellent academic research is controversial. Utilitarian philosophers would insist that research can only benefit society if it causes a net rise in society’s overall level of happiness or welfare. In fact, there is reason to think that philosophical research does indeed contribute to human happiness. But HEFCE’s narrow conception of “demonstrable benefits to the economy and society” seems to exclude all of the ways in which philosophy does contribute to welfare.

Research in philosophy has a deep impact on university teaching. The best university teachers are almost always scholars who are actively engaged in their own research. Many of the world’s best journalists, filmmakers, lawyers, civil servants, and politicians will have taken degree courses involving philosophy. Studying philosophy helped these citizens to have a sharper and deeper understanding of many crucial issues, from the value of democracy and human rights to the ethics of climate change.

However, HEFCE explicitly states that the “impact” that they are especially concerned to encourage does not include the impact of academic research on the “content of teaching.” The impact that they are looking for includes “creating new businesses”, “commercialising new products”, or improving “patient care or health outcomes”, not enriching the quality of university teaching.

Philosophical research also has an impact through its intellectual influence on academics outside philosophy. Mathematicians like Alan Turing was able to make great contributions to the development of computers partly because of the efforts of philosophical logicians such as Bertrand Russell to formulate rigorous definitions of the concept of mathematical proof.

However, according to HEFCE, the intellectual influence of academic research – even when the influence extends across academic disciplines – is also not the sort of “impact” that it is looking for. HEFCE is looking for benefits for “research users” outside academia, such as businesses and health care providers (even general readers seem not to count as “research users” here).

Very occasionally, individual works of philosophical research have a direct impact on political events. For example, J.S. Mill’s essay The Subjection of Women was a central part of the lobbying that led to the Married Women’s Property Act of 1870. In many cases, however, this sort of influence takes decades to come about. Locke’s work on political philosophy helped to inspire the American Revolution of 1776 – almost 90 years after it was first published in 1690. HEFCE is not interested in waiting that long; it aims to encourage research that will have a beneficial impact more or less right away.

How could philosophical research have the kind of “demonstrable impact” that HEFCE is looking for? One way would be if the research is taken up by television or radio shows (so long as these programmes earn some measurable audience response). This seems most likely to happen with research in applied ethics. In this way, HEFCE has created a powerful incentive for philosophy departments to shift the focus of their research away from traditional theoretical questions to hot-button issues in applied ethics, and then to tout this research to “research users” among television and radio producers.

This incentive is likely to have a damaging effect on the quality of philosophical research. Philosophy is a seamless whole; even work in applied ethics needs to draw on ideas that have been developed by a host of thinkers on the more theoretical side of the subject. An incentive to pursue this sort of “demonstrable impact” would only make philosophical research shallower and less rigorous.

All universities face an uncertain future at this time, with sharp cuts in government funding, and the unknown effects of the new tuition fees regime. It is particularly unfortunate that the government is going to waste some of its research funding on initiatives that will probably make academic research in this country not better, but worse.

Ralph Wedgwood is Professor of Philosophy and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at Magdalen College.
I arrived at Oxford in 1964 as a graduate student. Ryle was the presiding figure at that time, and the first thing I had to do was to report to him. I went in. He barked: “Name?” “Walker.” “Of?” I had no idea what he meant. He repeated the question. I remained baffled. It turned out the answer was “Balliol”. He wanted to know my college.

He was a much more genial man than this first encounter suggested. We all attended his seminars, which were held at the Indian Institute – Philosophy had no building in those days. We attended Ayer’s too, and indeed many others, because specializing was rather discouraged. But Ryle’s classes always seemed to be at the centre of things. We were also indebted to him in another way – the books he received as editor of Mind were donated to the New Bodleian’s “Room 303”, a specialist collection that eventually became the Philosophy Faculty Library.

The classes Grice gave were particularly remarkable. He would stride in, carrying a cricket bag, and say “I haven’t prepared anything to talk about this week, but on my way here I was thinking about a puzzle …” – and there would follow half an hour of completely creative philosophy, with a first-rate discussion afterwards. Equally creative, though very different, was Miss Anscombe. I was lucky enough to be supervised in one term by Ayer, and in the next by Anscombe. Ayer was very efficient, and made all the objections I really ought to have thought of. With Anscombe there were always very long silences, during which she smoked cigars, but then, every time, she came up with something that I knew I could never have thought of myself or found in any literature. Once I tried pointing out that the idea I had been defending was one she had herself argued in print. “Oh, did I?” she said. “But it can’t be right, because …”

Oxford philosophy at that time, and for some years after I became a member of the Sub-Faculty (as it then was), was still quite preoccupied with ordinary language and with verifiability. There was more of a shared approach than there is now, and there were more general philosophical discussions, involving nearly everyone, than there are in these more eclectic times. But there was one area in which the disagreements went too deep for good discussion, and that was moral philosophy (then dominated by metaethics). Anscombe’s denunciation of Hare had led to an unfortunate split between two groups, each of which regarded the other’s views as morally reprehensible. It took many years for that split to heal.

In most matters, though, Oxford philosophers shared a broadly similar conception of what the important philosophical problems were, and how to resolve them. This may explain why we were so susceptible to unexpected revolutions in thinking. In 1970 Davidson came to Oxford: suddenly we stopped talking about Wittgenstein and turned to Tarskian truth-theories. In early 1972 we all agreed with Quine’s dismissal of “Aristotelian essentialism”; then everyone read Kripke, and by the autumn the only question was about necessity of origin.

Philosophers like to think of themselves as particularly rational people. Are we? Fashions may change less rapidly now, but change they do. A while ago I was seconded for some years to the University administration in Wellington Square. When I went there, Dummett’s anti-realism was a central concern. When I returned, the interest had died. Had anti-realism been conclusively refuted? It would be nice to think that there had been really good reasons for the changes of approach there have been here in my lifetime. In some cases, I think there have been. But always?
After five years, Stout moved to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics at St Andrews and was succeeded as Wilde Reader by William McDougall, one of the founders of the British Psychological Society, and then by William Brown, under whose leadership an Institute of Experimental Psychology was established in 1939.

Brown had been an undergraduate at Christ Church from 1889, taking Psychology as a special subject in Greats and winning the John Locke Scholarship. Thirteen decades later, he expressed some frustration that these were still the only two ways in which psychology figured in Oxford examinations, writing in the Oxford Magazine (11 May 1933), “psychology has encountered more difficulty breaking away and finding its own level in Oxford than in any other university,” and in the British Medical Journal (20 March 1939), “the whole subject has been a subordinate one within the School of Philosophy.” But psychology did achieve independence, and in 1947 the first Professor of Psychology, George Humphrey, was appointed and the Honour School of Psychology (PPP) took its first students. A single-honours psychology course followed in 1969, and today the Department of Experimental Psychology is part of the Medical Sciences Division.

Since 1947, Wilde Readers have been philosophers, beginning with Brian Farrell, who held the Readership for thirty-two years. Farrell made significant contributions to philosophical commentary on psychoanalysis but his best known paper is ‘Experience’, published in 1950, just a year after Gilbert Ryle’s book, The Concept of Mind. Ryle famously rejected dualism about mind and body as being a myth about “the ghost in the machine”. Farrell agreed with Ryle on this, but thought that psychologists and physiologists might still worry that their scientific accounts of seeing, remembering, or thinking left out sensations, feelings, and experience. Farrell’s aim was to reassure the scientists that there was really no such problem as the one that they thought they faced.

Farrell asked his reader to imagine that psychologists and physiologists had found out all they could about a Martian’s sensory systems, or a bat’s sensory systems, and yet the scientists still believed what it would be like to be a Martian, or what it would be like to be a bat. Farrell argued, on philosophical grounds, that the impression that science leaves out the “what it is like” of experience is an illusion and that, in reality, experience is subsumed by behaviour.

The question that Farrell thought would worry psychologists and physiologists is, in essence: Do the sciences of the mind leave out consciousness? It is still debated in philosophy of mind without engaging in depth with the sciences of mind.

In contrast, Thomas Nagel, who completed the BPhil in 1960 and then a Harvard PhD, argued in a famous paper, “What is it like to be a bat?”, that the objective sciences inevitably leave out subjective truths about conscious experience. David Chalmers, who studied mathematics at Oxford (1987–88) before moving to the USA for doctoral work in philosophy, and who gave the 2010 John Locke Lectures, has also defended a resolutely non-reductionist view of the “what it is like” of experience in The Conscious Mind: An Evolutionary Investigation (1996) and The Character of Consciousness (2010).

In Oxford today, there is a thriving community of academics and graduate students who work on this and other questions in philosophy of mind. In recent years, the area has been strengthened by the appointment of a specialist University Lecturer in Philosophy of Mind and by the establishment of a graduate scholarship, generously supported by the Laces Trust. Peter Forrest, who achieved a Distinction in the BPhil examination this summer, has been awarded a Laces Scholarship for doctoral research under Tim Bayne’s supervision. The scope of the Laces Scholarship is defined in terms of relevance to psychiatry, and we anticipate further developments, ranging from philosophy of mind into psychiatry of the next few years.

Farrell suggested, “we are reaching the stage where not much work on the mind can be done in future by philosophers who are not also steeped in psychology”. Farrell was not completely right about this because, in fact, many philosophers have continued to do first-rate work on philosophy of mind. Oxford philosophers of mind are currently engaged in research on a wide range of topics at the interface with psychology, including attention and visual perception, the boundary between perception and cognition, belief and delusions, the phenomenology of thinking, the limits of introspection, agency and decision making, the unity of consciousness, and the relationship between neuroimaging and philosophy of mind. This research nourishes our teaching of Psychology and Philosophy students, particularly through the new FHS paper on Philosophy of Cognitive Science, which will be examined for the first time in 2012.

Martin Davies is Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy and Fellow of Corpus Christi College.
Theirs to reason WHY?
by Cécile Fabre

O n the eve of the battle of Borodino, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky, one of the main characters in War and Peace and, in that scene at least, Tolstoy’s mouthpiece, describes war as follows:

“But what is war? What is needed for success in warfare? ...The aim of war is murder; the methods of war are spying, treachery, and their encouragement, the ruin of a country’s inhabitants, robbing them or stealing to provision the army, and fraud and falsehood in warfare? ...The aim of war is murder; the

Pro patria mori.”

The old Lie:
Dulce et Decorum est

The traditional view is that, however unjust the laws, treat soldiers and civilians. One

moral philosophers, including Walzer, on two

grounds. Soldiers, it is often said, act under duress; they are ordered to go to war, and should therefore be seen as instruments of the state rather than autonomous agents. Moreover, it is also often said, soldiers are not capable of discerning whether the war which they are ordered to wage is a just war – indeed, they ought not to be expected to engage in such a reflective process – and it is unfair, therefore, to hold them responsible for their participation in it.

And yet, as some of the aforementioned proponents of the revisionist account have noted, the diplomacy and the epistemic objections to holding ordinary soldiers responsible for their participation in an unjust war prove too much, since it follows that soldiers cannot be held responsible for wrongful acts of killing committed under orders against civilians. Put differently, exonерating soldiers who are safely ensconced in their barracks from the burden of reaching a judgement as to the justness of the war and of acting on that judgement, while requiring them to reflect on the moral status of the orders they are given in the heat of battle, seems incoherent. Likewise, it seems incoherent to deem them bound by an order wrongfully to cross the border into a neutral country and kill enemy soldiers who resist their ex hypothese wrongful aggression, while at the same time imposing on them a moral and legal obligation to disobey an order deliberately to kill innocent civilians.

So if the horror of wars resides in what it leads individuals to do to each other, as Tolstoy and Owen tell us, then it must be morally appraised as the concatenation of individual acts, committed by individual agents whom it is appropriate, much more often than is traditionally thought, to regard as morally responsible for what they do – be they soldiers or civilians. Tennyson got it wrong: it is theirs to reason why.

Cécile Fabre is Professor of Political Philosophy and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at Lincoln College. She is author of the two-volume: A Cosmopolitan Theory of The Just War forthcoming with Oxford University Press.
Richard Price talks about his move from philosopher of perception to web entrepreneur and founder of Academia.edu.

I remember first becoming interested in philosophy when I was at school, at around the age of fifteen or sixteen. Some friends and I would vigorously debate topics such as free will, the existence of God, and communism. I realized that there was this subject called ‘philosophy’ and that I loved thinking about philosophical questions. I did PPE at St Catherine’s, and did as much philosophy as I could. I stayed on to do the BPhil at St Catherine’s, and then the DPhil at Corpus Christi and All Souls. Doing philosophy at Oxford was an incredibly exciting experience for me.

My other passion in life, aside from philosophy, is entrepreneurship. After I finished my BPhil, I was very keen to set up a business during the summer. I created a company called ‘Richard’s Banana Bakery’, selling banana cakes to cafes and offices in London. I was doing all the baking of the cakes in my Mum’s kitchen in London. I had two Magimixes on the go for a few hours a day, and the oven on most of the time. There was banana cake mixture everywhere, and I think I drove my Mum up the wall a bit.

At the end of the summer, and over the course of the vacations during the first year of my DPhil, I turned the cake business into a sandwich business called ‘Dashing Lunches’ (I was dashing around London on a bike delivering sandwiches to offices). Running both of these businesses was exhausting work, but the idea of making my own products was incredibly thrilling to me. After a year of running Dashing Lunches, I decided to try something on the internet, and I built a student accommodation site in Oxford, LiveOut.co.uk, with some other Oxford students.

My entrepreneurial ventures were a side interest while I was pursuing my DPhil in philosophy, which I was having the time of my life with. Tim Williamson was my supervisor and his standards of precision, and approach to philosophy, had a huge impact on me. I was working on a question within the philosophy of perception regarding how rich the content of visual experience is. Does visual experience only represent a sparse set of properties, such as colours and shapes, or does it represent richer properties too, such as the property of being a tomato, the property of being sad, and so on? My studies at Oxford were an incredibly exciting experience for me.

As I was starting to finish my DPhil, I realized I was extremely torn about what my next steps should be. I had been very fortunate to win an All Souls Prize Fellowship, and I had the option to pursue research on that fellowship for another few years after my DPhil finished. I decided to try out entrepreneurship for a couple of years, and if my efforts failed, I would still have three years left on my All Souls fellowship to pursue research.

The business model I had turned into Academia.edu was very keen to set up a business during the summer. I created a company called ‘Richard’s Banana Bakery’, selling banana cakes to cafes and offices in London. I was doing all the baking of the cakes in my Mum’s kitchen in London. I had two Magimixes on the go for a few hours a day, and the oven on most of the time. There was banana cake mixture everywhere, and I think I drove my Mum up the wall a bit.

The graduate community at Oxford was incredibly alive with passionate and brilliant people, and I benefitted almost more than I can say from being immersed in it, often talking about philosophy into the small hours of the night. I remember one philosophy conversation with a friend of mine, Hermant Lerman, going on for twelve hours with one half an hour break. I found philosophy at Oxford to be an exhilarating experience.

Valley is to technology startups what the Oxford Philosophy Faculty is to philosophy: you can immerse yourself completely in a community of people who are all obsessively passionate about the same thing as you.

After three years in operation, and after raising another £1 million in venture capital, we have about 370,000 registered users, and about 1.7 million monthly visitors. Every day around 1,500 people sign up, and around 2,000 papers are uploaded. We have five employees and are based in downtown San Francisco. There are many challenges to building an internet company: ensuring that you have a clear product vision, recruiting the best software engineers you possibly can, and ensuring the company is adequately financed so you can pay the bills. It’s extremely enjoyable to face all these challenges and to try to overcome them.

Some people ask me whether there are any connections between philosophy and entrepreneurship. I think there is at least one connection, which is about attitudes towards problem-finding. Problem-finding comes before problem-solving: you have to find and clearly articulate the problem before you can set about trying to solve it. The graduate community at Oxford was incredibly alive with passionate and brilliant people, and I benefitted almost more than I can say from being immersed in it, often talking about philosophy into the small hours of the night. I remember one philosophy conversation with a friend of mine, Hermant Lerman, going on for twelve hours with one half an hour break. I found philosophy at Oxford to be an exhilarating experience.
Research funding

21st CENTURY STYLE

Like the natural sciences, Philosophy now derives much of its research funding from external grants for group projects. These grants provide money for research leave to establish academics and support postdoctoral fellowships and doctoral studentships.

Two of Oxford Philosophy’s research projects which have recently been successful in securing major funding are described here.

Reflection and Incompleteness in the Formal Sciences

Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)

Project Directors: Volker Halbach & Gabriel Uzquiano

Commenced January 2011 with employment for three postdoctoral researchers and one DPhil studentship.

Since antiquity philosophers have been interested in the foundations of the formal sciences and, in particular, mathematics. However, many topics in the field emerged much more recently. This is partly because some of the formal sciences, such as formal linguistics, computer science, and formal philosophy only came into prominence in the last few decades. Moreover, some of the older disciplines such as logic and mathematics have developed very rapidly over the last century and completely new perspectives have been opened. The development of modern formal logic has enabled philosophers to formulate and tackle new questions in the foundations of the formal sciences. Some of these new issues are investigated in Reflection and Incompleteness in the Formal Sciences.

One example of such an issue arises by reflecting on very general puzzling limiting results in logic, it turns out that under fairly general circumstances the soundness of a theory cannot be proved and cannot even be expressed within the theory itself. For instance, it is impossible to state or prove within the theory that all consequences of the theory are true. This applies to theories that contain a modicum of assumptions about numbers, sets, or strings of symbols; such theories cannot express the notion of truth for such languages, as is shown by Tarski’s celebrated theorem on the undecidability of truth. According to Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorems, not even the consistency of a theory can be a consequence of that very theory (as long as the theory is consistent and certain natural conditions are met).

When we accept such a theory, we are committed to the soundness of that theory. If we believe that the theory has false consequences, we had better not accept the theory. But by the limiting results mentioned above, the soundness claim cannot be part of the theory. Hence when we accept a theory we accept more than what is expressed and proved in the theory. These incompletenss and inexpressibility phenomena concern not only theories about a single kind of objects – such as sets, numbers, computer programmes, expressions of a language – but any theory containing such a theory. Hence they hint at a very general limitation of language and theorizing.

One can try to close the gap between the content of a theory and what is implicit in the acceptance of a theory by various means. For instance, the soundness of the theory can be added as a new axiom of the theory. To this end one can add a truth predicate and appropriate assumptions about it to the theory. The soundness of the original theory can be an explicit consequence of the new theory, but the soundness of the new theory itself will not be included in the new theory.

The project will investigate whether one is led by these attempts to close the gap with explicit and implicit assumptions of a theory. This is only one example of some of the inexpressibility phenomena that will be studied in the project. Others concern the inexpressibility of semantic notions and the ontological indefinite extensibility of the set-theoretic universe.

Kurt Gödel

http://users.ox.ac.uk/~reflect/Reflection_and_Incompleteness

Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies

Funded by the European Research Council (ERC)

Project Director: Anna Marmodoro

Commenced April 2011 with staged employment for six postdoctoral researchers and one DPhil studentship.

What is there at the bedrock of reality? What are the ultimate building blocks out of which everything else is constructed? Are they things (objects, particles), or activities of some sort? Or is there something else, even more fundamental than they are?

These questions fascinated and challenged the ancients as much as they challenge and fascinate us. Yet, there is evidence that the ancients conceived of the building blocks of reality very differently than has been traditionally thought. This £1 million research award from the European Research Council explores a new hypothesis about how the ancients conceived of the universe and its contents during the first millennium of Western civilization. The advantage of this hypothesis, if correct, are far reaching with respect to our understanding of ancient philosophy.

The traditional view is that the ancients conceived of the universe either as built out of objects (whether concrete or abstract) or as built out of processes; on that view Plato and Aristotle, for example, stand on one side and Heraclitus stands on the other.

In a radical departure from this traditional interpretation, the project will explore the hypothesis that nearly all ancient ontologies account for all there is in the cosmos by positing a sole elementary building block, not objects or processes, but powers. Powers underlie both objects and processes, and are more fundamental than either of them. Powers are properties directed toward an end (e.g., the power to heat). They relate to their possessor to be or act in a certain way, which is manifested in appropriate circumstances (e.g., something with the power to heat is disposed to heat something cooler). A world built solely out of powers is structured in a web of ontological dependencies between powers. For briefly, this metaphysical position may be called Power Structuralism.

The primary goal of the Project will be to investigate which ancient ontologies are power-structuralist ones.

But what is the world like, for the ancients, if all there is are powers? How are all entities derived from structures of powers? Are there objects over and above the relations between them? If not, how are objects constituted out of relations? If there are objects, do they have natures over and above their intrinsic/extrinsic relations? If not, what grounds the distinctness and identity of objects?

To explore these and other related questions, the European Research Council award will be used to create a research team based in the Philosophy Faculty at Oxford comprising five postdoctoral fellows, each specializing in a different area of ancient philosophy (Pre-Socratics; Plato; Aristotle; Hellenistic and Latin philosophy; Plotinus) and one specializing in contemporary metaphysics.

The contribution of the fellow specializing in contemporary metaphysics will be to help investigate the question of what, if anything, is distinctive about ancient power structuralism. One of the aims of the project will be to compare and contrast the position of the ancient thinkers under consideration with recent developments in general (or basic) type of the term “structuralism” in contemporary metaphysics and physics – that is, to offer a contemporary structuralist rendering of the ancient ontologies under consideration; but rather, to illuminate the past through its differences as well as similarities with the present, and where possible bring out insights that might be unique to ancient varieties of structuralism.

The project has an International Advisory Board including over twenty academics from various institutions. There will also be Academic Visitors affiliated with the project; and external collaborators working on other, thematically related, projects of their own. The project team will work in close collaboration with members of the Faculty of Philosophy, within which its research activities will be embedded. Such research activities (seminars, conferences, etc.) will run throughout the project and will be open to anyone interested.

www.power-structuralism.ox.ac.uk
Ancient Philosophies as Ways of Life

John Cooper discusses the theme of his 2011 Locke Lectures.

Philosophy today, like most subjects taught in universities, is an intensely theoretical matter: there are philosophical theories of knowledge, of ethics, of metaphysics, of aesthetics and logic. Philosophy consists of theoretical arguments and analyses. Western philosophy has been like that all the way back to its ancient Greek beginnings. Think of Thales’ idea that everything is ultimately water, or Parmenides’ worries about the nature of being – not to mention Plato’s elaborate theory that Forms, or Ideas, are the true reality, lying behind the physical and perceptible world, a world that is just a metaphysical shadow of the Forms. Yet in antiquity many philosophers also did, and taught, philosophy as a way of life. Epicureans and Stoics had sharply conflicting comprehensive world-views, but to be an Epicurean or a Stoic famously also meant living in a quite specific and distinctive way, guided by that Epicurean or Stoic philosophical world-view. Though nowadays we don’t usually highlight this aspect of ancient philosophies when we teach them, the idea that one might literally live one’s philosophy has an undoubted appeal: it gives philosophy, as a subject for study, a special kind of seriousness. But what does it mean? Where did the ancient philosophers who conceived philosophy that way get the idea that philosophy should (somehow) be your way of life? How did they conceive philosophical theory, that it could be a basis for living?

Interestingly, we don’t find evidence that anyone earlier than Socrates thought of philosophy in that way. But in Plato’s Apology, where Plato has Socrates defend himself against charges of impiety and corrupt teaching, Socrates presents his whole life as a life of philosophy – not only in his daily devotion to philosophical discussions and questionings, but in the very fabric of his moral commitments and indeed in leading the whole of his life, day by day. In his philosophical discussions he was pursuing “wisdom” – philosophical knowledge about human nature and the human good – and he was shaping his life from his philosophical conclusions, in the hope of living a fully good life, a wise one based on philosophical principles. Plato’s Socrates, as represented in the Apology and other Socratic dialogues, such as Protagoras, Euthydemus, Euthyphro and other dialogues about particular moral virtues (piety, courage, temperance, etc), became the inspiration for the whole subsequent tradition of making philosophy a way of life: not only the Epicureans and Stoics, but Plato himself in dialogues such as Phaedo and Republic, Aristotle in his Ethics, Plotinus in his Enneads, and even, in their peculiar way, the Pyrrhonian skeptics (Sextus Empiricus, and others).

These philosophers all had very different theories – mutually opposed and contending – in moral psychology and ethics, just as they did in all other parts of philosophy. Hence their respective ways of life were very different, and in many ways opposed to one another. But three features, all prominently displayed in what we learn about Socrates’ philosophy of life from Plato, unite them. First, the experience and practice of philosophical reasoning and investigation is regarded as one of the most highly valuable sorts of activity that our nature and natural capacities make available to human beings; philosophical discussion and thinking become one of the most centrally good activities, a constant focus of your life, in any of these philosophical ways of life. Second, philosophy is regarded as the highest – indeed, sole – authoritative means of learning about human nature, the human good, the human virtues. Accordingly, philosophical reasoning works out, explains, defends, and justifies the truly best and happiest way of living. Thus, philosophy is made the authoritative guide for how we ought to live, in all the detailed preferences, choices, practical attitudes, and individual actions making up a human life.

Third, a philosophically complete grasp of all the (alleged) truths of the philosophical system in question is regarded as providing a sufficient basis of psychological motivation for living the life of philosophy, as so articulated. All these Greek philosophers hold that the human power of reason possesses motivational force of its own: because we are by nature rational beings, every adult human being is moved toward action simply and directly in rationally holding that something they might do will bring something good for them. Further, when this power is cultivated and perfected through philosophical reflection and thought, to the point where one can claim that it has achieved a complete, fully and deeply reasoned grasp of the human good (one’s own good), that grasp becomes a sufficient and invincibly powerful psychological motivation actually to live from the guidance provided in that comprehensive philosophy. In that sense, philosophy actually steers your life, and doesn’t just offer you guidance for it.

There might be such a thing as a distinctive way of life of physics or medicine – a life devoted with passion to the practice of those professions, taken as central components of a person’s life. There might even be a life of literature, in which, in addition, one shapes and lives one’s daily personal life, and one’s moral life, through inspiration drawn from novels and poems one loves. But because philosophy as a way of life, understood in this Greek way, combines all three of these features, including this most important third one, only philosophy claims to offer a totally consuming way of life.


Podcasts of John’s lectures are available at: www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/john_locke_lectures
Philippa Foot

Philippa Ruth Foot (née Bosanquet), Tutor in Philosophy at Somerville College from 1950-69, died on 3 October 2010, her 90th birthday.

Foot did not publish a monograph until she was over eighty. Most of her work was in the form of highly original, deeply thoughtful, and finely crafted articles. These were mainly on ethics – on the nature of ethical judgements (metaethics), on theories about how we should act (normative ethics), and on particular problems, such as abortion and euthanasia (practical ethics). Many of them are collected in Virtues and Vices (1978) and Moral Dilemmas (2002).

Metaethics in the 1950s was dominated by expressivism, the view that moral judgements are nothing more than expressions of certain emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions. In two landmark articles at the end of that decade, ‘Moral Arguments’ and ‘Moral Beliefs’, Foot argued that this view of ethical judgements was far too thin. It allows that the judgement ‘No one should look at hedegophos in the light of the moon’ – if expressed in the way that moral judgements are expressed – can count as a moral judgement like any other. Morality must have a point, and there are standards of appropriateness for moral evaluations. These evaluations have to be brought within the sphere of some virtue which we recognise.

In these papers, Foot was already taking the view – quite standard among ancient philosophers – that the virtues have to be justified in terms of their benefiting the agent. In ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ (1972), she concluded that morality is no more ‘categorical’ (to use Kant’s term) than etiquette. Whether you have a reason to be moral depends on the desires you have; but, like Hume, Foot expected that many of us would continue to “volunteer” to be moral.

It is a mark of Foot’s philosophical integrity that she published a reattribution of this position in 1994, in which she said that she had come to see morality as depending not on contingent desires, but on a conception of practical rationality grounded in facts about creatures such as ourselves. It was this position that Foot set out at more length in Natural Goodness (2001). Human beings are co-operative, and we need the virtues to flourish. This view is combined with another Aristotelian thesis – that happiness, at least in part, consists in living virtuously.

From the beginning, Foot emphasized the role of the virtues in ethics, and she is often described as a ‘virtue ethicist’ (a label she herself rejected, perhaps because she saw herself in normative ethics as primarily in opposition to consequentialism alone, and not the kind of ‘deontological’ ethics found in the work of W.D. Ross, Prichard, and others). Her ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’ (1985) outlines a significant challenge to utilitarian and other forms of consequentialism: to give an account of what it means for a state of affairs to be ‘good, period’, rather than good for some being or beings.

One of Foot’s most influential legacies is the so-called ‘trolley problem’, the many variations on which have given rise to what is now jokingly called ‘trolleyology’ (in ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’, 1967), Foot asks us to compare two cases. In the first, a magistrate can save the lives of five innocent people held by a mob, but only by framing and executing another innocent person. In the second, the driver of a runaway trolley, about to kill five workers on the line, switches to another track, on which there is only one person working. The magistrate forces the same five lives in exchange for one. So why do most of us think the driver should switch tracks, while the magistrate should not frame the innocent person?

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Photo: Norm Schindler

A Life in Celebration

Somerville College hosted two events on 18 and 19 March 2011 to celebrate Philippa Foot’s life. At a memorial occasion held in the Hall, some two hundred people heard accounts of her life and work from former colleagues and pupils, and from a recent Director of Oxfam who described her sixty-year association with that charity. A talk by Sir Michael Dummett, read out by his son, paid tribute to her as a friend and praised her work and writings. Dummett called her monograph Natural Goodness “the greatest work on moral philosophy since at least G.E. Moore”.

To honour her memory, Somerville also arranged and hosted a Moral Philosophy Symposium the day before, with talks from six philosophers on topics close to Foot’s work. Gavin Lawrence of UCLA opened the Symposium discussing a topic Foot had written much about: can a wicked life, or for that matter an ultimately useless one, nonetheless be counted a happy one? Other talks were given by Sarah Brodie (a former student and now Professor at St Andrews), on ‘Aristotle on Practical Truth’, and Michael Thompson of Pittsburgh on ‘Utilitarianism’.

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Among the ninety who attended the Symposium were professional philosophers from all over the U.K., and from Bulgaria, Germany and Italy as well as the U.S. The event also attracted plenty who would not class themselves as philosophers but as interested amateurs, including some of Philippa Foot’s former pupils. They were intrigued and delighted to take part in live philosophical debate again after so many years. One of them wrote: “It was just great to see so many philosophers so happy and delighted to be with each other, all talking about profoundly meaningful things and trying all the time to discover, or to persuade each other, what exactly the profound meanings are.”

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